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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this investigation is to design a blueprint or framework for infrastructure and service 
delivery in sub-Saharan Africa. This involves a critical analysis of the interface between 
infrastructure services on the one hand and economic growth and development on the other, a 
critical identification and evaluation of the causes and effects of infrastructure deterioration, and a 
critical examination of the current framework for infrastructure and service procurement in sub- 
Saharan Africa. The country chosen to provide a case study was Nigeria. This was because its 
population makes up almost a quarter of that of sub-Saharan Africa, with about 504 ethnic 
nationalities comprising 774 local government areas and over 6,932 local communities. Nigeria 
also has one of the largest energy reserves in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite these advantages, 
Nigeria is also seen as suffering from one of the worst cases of dearth of infrastructure of any 
country in the region. 
The interface between infrastructure, economic growth and development is not only theoretically 
evaluated but also empirically substantiated. It was found that there is a very strong correlation 
between private and public investment in infrastructure and gross domestic product on proxy for 
economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
A survey was then conducted to identify the perceived causes and effects of infrastructure failures 
in Nigeria. During the empirical analysis of this survey, a new generic model was generated called 
"Severity Index in Matrix Order" (SIMO) that helps to identify core variable factors in similar 
investigations of this magnitude. By using SIMO, the major perceived causes of infrastructure and 
service delivery failures in Nigeria were identified and then ranked in order of severity. It revealed 
that there was correlation between infrastructure service stability on the one hand and 
infrastructure maintenance, supply, quality, monthly bills and even the staffing of local infrastructure 
service providers on the other. Their various relationships were also assessed in order to assist the 
forecasting process in Nigeria. Subsequent empirical models were developed and validated based 
on these results. The various effects of infrastructure service failures in Nigeria were also 
theoretically evaluated. 
Also examined was the current framework for infrastructure procurement in Nigeria, The World 
Bank, The African Development Bank and the United Nations Commission for International Trade 
and Law (UNCITRAL) international best practice for procurement. These various methods were 
found to be difficult to adapt in view of distinctive local factors such as culture, beliefs and even 
value systems. The lower recognition accorded to users of infrastructure right from its 
conceptualisation to its actual delivery was found to be a major procurement failure. This thesis 
then presents a polycentric cultural model or framework for infrastructure and service delivery in 
Nigeria. It is believed that this model could also be applied to other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Infrastructure provision is widely viewed as one of the major catalysts for growth in a developing 
economy. Regrettably, economic stagnation in sub-Saharan Africa has made it difficult to 
finance, maintain and replicate existing infrastructures in areas of need. Thus, the goal of a 
more productive economy appears to be impossible to attain. However, rates of deterioration 
and sometimes dearth of basic infrastructure has made life almost unbearable for the average 
poor. The lack of access to clean water and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa has been traced to 
high mortality and morbidity rates, pollution and other public health-related problems. Similarly, 
the shortfall in construction and maintenance of roads and also the chronically poor 
transportation systems have contributed considerably to unemployment situation in the region. It 
is also a common sight in rural areas, where the majority of the population in sub-Saharan 
Africa dwells, to find people living in squatter settlements with no hope of any greatly improved 
housing. 
Thus, this research entitled "Blueprints for Infrastructure and Service Delivery in sub-Saharan 
Africa"is a direct response to the high failure rates of infrastructure and service delivery, with 
specific reference to Nigeria. It is hoped that the findings of this research could also be 
applicable to other developing countries. This investigation aims to achieve the following: a 
critical evaluation of the interface between infrastructure delivery and economic growth and 
development; a critical evaluation of the causes and effects of infrastructure and service 
deterioration in sub-Saharan Africa; a critical evaluation of the current framework for 
infrastructure and service procurement in sub-Saharan Africa; to be a contribution to existing 
knowledge regarding infrastructure service delivery in developing countries, particularly in sub- 
Saharan Africa; and finally to finally design a blueprint or framework that could guide 
infrastructure and service delivery. The case study chosen for this investigation was Nigeria. 
These aims and objectives are thoroughly covered in the following chapters. 
Parts of chapters two and four theoretically and empirically validate the interface between 
infrastructure delivery, economic growth and development. The political economy of 
infrastructure and service delivery in Nigeria was presented in chapter three of this work. The 
survey in this research presented in chapter five and further analysed in chapter six ascertains 
and examine the causes and effects of infrastructure and service failures in sub-Saharan Africa, 
taking Nigeria as a case study. However, the questionnaire was developed from facts gleaned 
from the literature review in chapter two. The current framework for infrastructure and service 
procurement in Nigeria was critically evaluated and the model for infrastructure blueprints was 
presented in chapter seven. Finally, the conclusion and recommendation for future work was 
presented in chapter eight. The thesis itself and four other academic papers (in Appendix B) 
presented at various conferences are expected to serve as original contributions to knowledge. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature review on infrastructure delivery in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
2.0. Introduction 
Infrastructure is a term for social over-head capital with subsequent potential for economies of 
scale and huge externalities (World Bank 2002; World Bank 1994). Economies of scale refers to 
the tendency for infrastructure to reduce the unit cost of production over a wide range, while 
huge externalities indicate the tendency for the effects of infrastructure to spill over from users 
to non-users. Infrastructure could also be defined as the capital stock which provides public 
goods and services with several outputs, ranging from production activities to quality of life, that 
permeate society (Yoshino and Nakahigashi 2000). In short, infrastructure provides the 
fundamental supporting framework or structure that enables any organization, system, city, 
state or country to function (Ostrom, et al. 1993). This framework includes physical 
infrastructure such as water supply, electricity, sanitation, housing, telecommunications, 
irrigation, drainage, accessible roads, railways, airports and ports. Facilities like markets, 
hospital and schools are classified as social infrastructure. 
For clarity, the term "infrastructure delivery" or "provision", refers to decisions made by collective 
choice mechanisms during the process of acquiring goods, works and services which may lead 
to the award and actual execution of contracts (Ostrom, et al. 1993). These decisions cover the 
type of goods, works and services to be provided by a designated group of people, the quantity 
supplied, the quality, stability and maintenance of goods, works and services to be provided, the 
degree to which private activities related to these goods and services are to be regulated, how 
to arrange for the production and financing of these goods works and services, and how to 
monitor the performance of those who produce them. The term "production" refers to the more 
18 
technical process of transforming inputs into outputs in making a product, or in many cases in 
rendering services (Ostrom, et al. 1993). 
Once a government department or public enterprise or other collective decision making body 
decides to provide a particular type of infrastructure, it must then consider the relative 
advantages of inhouse production and outsourcing. If the latter alternative is chosen, 
governmental and non-governmental units might contract with private or perhaps public 
agencies to construct facility and even to operate it. On the other hand, governmental units 
could mandate other enterprises to produce the service or encourage its production by offering 
them financial incentives. 
However, in the course of Ostrom's study of the sustainability of the physical infrastructure of 
developing countries, it was discovered that the economic and socio-political structures of any 
system cannot be sustained effectively if they are not supported by a sustainable physical 
infrastructure (Ostrom et at., 1993). Therefore, infrastructure has a profound impact on the 
economic development, production and consumption capacity of a nation. In this regard, this 
thesis focuses on the dearth of infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa and the consequent 
implications for sustainable economic growth and development. The effects of this dearth are 
magnified by the inability to maintain the very sparse infrastructure that does exist and replicate 
it to areas of disamenity. In other words, existing infrastructure delivery models may have failed. 
As a result, the need for an alternative and sustainable infrastructure delivery model is 
overwhelming. 
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2.1. Impact of infrastructure on economic development 
World Bank studies confirm that infrastructure growth and development has witnessed 
tremendous expansion over the years (World Bank 1994). In particular, the percentage of 
telecommunications, sanitation, water supply and power services to households and businesses 
have increased dramatically globally (see Fig. 1 in Appendix A). This development 
notwithstanding, the distribution of infrastructure throughout regions is to the disadvantage of 
low income countries, and the existence of a strong correlation between economic growth and 
infrastructure was revealed when the per capita provision of infrastructure services was 
compared across regions in a World Bank study (1994). This showed that the greatest 
improvement in infrastructure has been in East Asia, with sub-Saharan Africa recording the 
least (see Figure 2.1 in the next page). As implied above, this is because the average GDP per 
capita for sub-Saharan Africa ranks lowest in comparison to other regions; this is clearly shown 
in the regression analysis graphs of Figure 2.1. Though the four graphs were all linear, 
however, the association or correlation is evidence from their various intercepts and slopes; a 
stronger association or correlation is witnessed between available income levels or GDP per 
capita and telephone main lines per thousand persons and kilometres of paved roads per 
million persons. Thus, these regression analysis representations in Figure 2.1 reveal the 
existence of a direct relationship between income levels and availability of infrastructure. 
However, what remains unknown at this stage is whether the availability of infrastructure is 
responsible for economic growth or vice versa. This raises the question of whether it could 
justifiably be said, in view of the increase in number of infrastructures over the years, that there 
are concomitant improvements in the stability of infrastructure services. While both questions 
are hypothetical, the former is completely outside realm of this investigation. Indeed, the 
significance of infrastructure on economic growth and development has been theoretically and 
empirically validated in the works of Aschauer (1989), Easterley and Ravelo (1993), Pinnoi 
(1994), Buffie (1995), Barro (1997), Looney (1997), Canning (1998), Otto and Voss (1998), 
Rioja (1999), Delorme, Thompson et al. (1999), and Sagales-Roca and Pereira (2001) 
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Figure 2.1: Per capita availability of major infrastructure and income levels 
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Aschauer (1989), using non-military public capital in the United States of America, revealed an 
elasticity of 0.39. Elasticity measures the responsiveness of one variable in response to 
another, which means the ratio of output percentage change to percentage change in the level 
of infrastructure. He discovered that the impact of infrastructure investments on economic 
growth in the USA represents a high rate of return of almost 60% with about 1.5% change in 
levels of infrastructure. Aschauer's (1989) findings are further corroborated by Munnell (1990), 
who reveals a 0.34 elasticity and an implied rate of return from infrastructure investment of 
about 60%. Thus, with an elasticity of 0.34 and an investment return of 60%, it follows from 
these figures that the level of infrastructural change is certainly less than 2%. However, Munnell 
only measures non-military public capital in the USA. 
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Furthermore, Aschauer's (1993) work on the impact of infrastructure on production costs reveals 
that infrastructure significantly reduces production costs in the manufacturing sectors in 
Germany, Japan, Mexico, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Further, Easterly and Rebelo's (1993) 
study of the impact of infrastructure investments on economic growth using multi-country and 
developing countries as samples and transportation and communication as infrastructure 
measures disclosed a 0.16 elasticity and a 63% implied rate of return. This simply implies that 
there was a change of approximately 4% in levels of infrastructure. 
However, the research of Canning and Fay (1993) present a somewhat different picture to 
these success stories. Their studies reveal an elasticity of 0.07 with an infrastructure 
investments implied rate of return of just 19 percent despite an approximate 3% change in 
levels of infrastructure for multi-country and OECD. They use transportation as an infrastructure 
measure. Notwithstanding the low rate of return for multi-country and OECD, what was 
significant from the estimates was that infrastructure investments had an incremental and 
positive, though marginal, effect on economic growth. Nonetheless, when Canning and Fay 
(1993) carried out a similar study on multi-country and developing countries, an elasticity of 0.07 
with an incremental return rate for infrastructure investments of over 95% was achieved. 
Invariably, a change of approximately 14% in the level of infrastructure resulted in this huge 
percent investment incremental return. 
However, (Canning 1998) was able to establish, from a database of world infrastructure stock 
from 1950-1995, that there is a significant, stable and enduring relationship between 
infrastructure and economic growth. Additionally, the stock of infrastructure across countries 
was shown to vary significantly with population size, income level and geography. Using a 
number of telephone main lines, he was able to establish that infrastructure has a significant 
impact on per capita growth rate. 
Canning's work is supported by the findings of the World Bank (1994). These show that as a 
country's income grows the amount and quality of infrastructure required also increases. This 
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conclusion is based on the findings of the World Bank's unit income elasticity for the demand for 
infrastructure. This implies a one-to-one relationship between infrastructure and gross domestic 
income - i. e. a1% increase in the stock of infrastructure is associated with a1% increase in 
gross domestic product across all countries (World Bank, 1994 - see Figure 2.2 below). 
Figure 2.2 Income growth and infrastructure stock per capita 
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However, most of the work on the likely impact of infrastructure on the economy has been 
based on the experience of developed countries, with very little work on their developing 
counterparts. One exception is the work of Yoshino and Nakahigashi (2000). Their studies 
reveal that, apart from the direct impact on production and consumption capacity, infrastructure 
also confers huge indirect benefits by bridging income disparities through offering income and 
economic opportunities. 
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In another study carried out by Sagales-Roca and Pereira (2001) on infrastructure performance 
in Spain, reveal a positive crowding in of private inputs from public capital accumulation that had 
led to an encouraging level of private output. They argued that one peseta invested in public 
capital generates in the long term a return of as much as 5.5 pesetas of private outputs. In 
particular, their findings revealed also that infrastructure investments made services more 
capital intensive and the manufacturing sector more labour intensive. 
In other research, Voss and Otto's (1998) studies of Australia using public infrastructure 
investment data covering more than three decades made known the existence of an inter- 
temporal efficiency over a sample period. However, they argued, in contrast to previous 
researches, that there was no evidence to substantiate excessive returns to public investments; 
rather, they estimated a mere 9% return per annum for both the public and private investments. 
Nevertheless, Buffie (1995), using a simple foresight model in his work on public investment, 
private investment and inflation, contend that an effectively balanced increase of public and 
private sector investments in infrastructure would reduce inflation considerably provided the 
elasticity of substitution is not large. Elasticity of substitution measures the ease with which the 
changing factor could be substituted for others. In addition, Delorme et al. (1999), applying a 
stochastic-frontier approach, reveal that investment in public infrastructure affects the economy 
positively by its indirect impact on private productivity. 
Furthermore, Pinnoi (1995) shows, from a translog production function with different types of 
services from public infrastructure for four census regions and four industries, that services from 
infrastructure like water supply and sanitation were productive factors of private production 
throughout the world. He argued however, that variations in research findings on the impact of 
Infrastructure on economic growth had been predicated on the fact that different regions and 
industries react differently to various types of public infrastructure. 
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Though no consensus has been achieved regarding the level of infrastructure impact on 
economic growth, many studies have confirmed that infrastructure investments have substantial 
impact on economic growth, and these impacts are usually greater than other forms of capital in 
any viable economy. This development has had a tremendous effect on the quantum of 
resource allocation for infrastructure investments and policies worldwide (World Bank, 1994). 
Therefore, one could argue that one of the prerequisites for viable and effective economic 
development and growth for any nation is undeniably the state: its quality, its quantity and the 
functionality of the infrastructure available to it. Moreover, it has been argued that the extent of 
economic problems in sub-Saharan Africa could also be demonstrated by relating the degree of 
its inadequate infrastructure to its chronically weak institutions (Hart 2001; Ebohon et al. 2002). 
2.2. Effects of infrastructure deficiency in the developing world 
The extent of infrastructure deficiency in the developing world is exemplified by the fact that the 
majority of the people in developing countries lack access to basic infrastructural services. For 
example, it has been reported that about 1.2 billion people currently lack access to safe potable 
water, making them vulnerable to water-borne diseases; 2.4 billion people lack adequate 
sanitation, thereby compromising their health and well-being (World Bank Group 2003). Also, 
about 900 million rural dwellers in developing countries live without adequate roads to markets, 
jobs and clinics (World Bank Group 2003). 
Furthermore, an estimated 2.5 billion people remain without access to modern energy supplies, 
often meaning no electricity and total reliance on traditional fuel for heating and cooking, with 
major implications for respiratory illness (World Bank Group 2003). For example, an estimated 
500,000 women and children die in India each year due to indoor air pollution-related diseases 
because of the use of traditional biomass fuels (World Bank Group 2003). These recurring 
examples call for more improvement and investment in infrastructure and service delivery 
throughout the developing world. To achieve this, however, a critical examination of the pattern 
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of investment in infrastructure in the developing world over the last decade, providing a 
perspective for a study of sub-Saharan Africa, would be vital. 
2.2.1. Infrastructure investments pattern in sub-Saharan Africa 
Data in Table 2.2.1 and the subsequent bar chart plot in Figure 2.2.1 collected from 
International Financial Statistics (2003) shows sub-Saharan African gross capital formation and 
final consumption expenditure over time. The table and chart show a very high consumption 
capacity when compared to investments in the region. This level of consumption certainly 
reflects the very high demand for infrastructure; this in turn is eventually transformed into the 
call for new investments. The high levels of these investments as fixed capital formation are 
subdivided into public and private investment. 
Table 2.2.1: Gross capital formation and final consumption expenditure (1991- 
2001) for sub-Saharan Africa 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Gross capital 
Formation as a %GDP 19.6 18.8 19.1 20 19.2 18.4 18.1 19.1 18.4 17.1 17.5 
Final consumption 
expenditure as % of GDP 80.6 83.3 83.7 83.6 83.2 82.1 82.7 85.6 79.2 75.2 77.1 
Source: International Financial statistics (2003) 
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Figure 2.2.1.1: Sub-Saharan African gross capital formation and final 
consumption expenditure over time 
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A further study on private and public investments carried out by Omoregie and Ebohon (2005) 
applied a multiple regression analysis tool to the: per capita GDP annual growth rate, gross 
public capita formation and gross private capita formation of all sub-Saharan African countries. 
They were effectively able to quantitatively capture the relationship between gross domestic 
product (GDP) and gross public capita formation on the one hand and gross private capita 
formation on the other. The findings from this study showed that sub-Saharan African gross 
private capital formation was seven times greater than public gross capital formation. These 
findings give credence to the fact that irrespective of private sector dominance in the area of 
investments, the inadequate infrastructure service delivery in the region must be due to 
investment and infrastructure supply not meeting demand and other extraneous factors. This 
further reinforces the correlation between infrastructure service stability and infrastructure 
supply. The table below from a World Bank study (2002) further elucidates this point. 
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Table 2.2.1.2: Investment in infrastructure projects with private participation in 
developing countries by sector and region (1990-99) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Telecommunications 6.7 13.3 8.1 11.0 19.6 24.0 29.9 42.8 54.3 39.2 249.0 
Energy 1.6 1.2 12.1 14.6 17.0 24.1 33.7 47.9 25.7 14.9 192.8 
Transport 8.0 3.1 4.2 7.7 8.2 10.1 16.5 22.4 17.6 8.4 106.1 
Water and sanitation - 0.1 1.9 7.5 0.7 1.7 2.2 8.9 2.6 5.9 31.4 
Region 
East Asia and Pacific 2.6 4.1 8.9 16.2 17.7 23.4 33.4 38.8 9.5 14.1 168.6 
Europe and central Asia 0.1 0.3 1.3 1.5 3.9 8.6 11.6 15.1 11.5 8.7 62.5 
Latin America and Caribbean 13.2 12.6 15.8 18.5 18.9 19.4 28.8 51.1 71.0 36.3 285.6 
Middle East and North Africa 0.0 - 0.0 3.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 5.3 3.5 2.4 15.3 
South Asia 0.3 0.8 0.1 1.3 4.0 7.6 6.1 7.1 2.3 4.0 33.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.1 - 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.8 2.1 4.5 2.4 2.9 13.6 
Total 16.3 17.8 26.1 40.9 45.5 59.9 82.3 121.9 100.2 68.5 579.3 
Note: 0.0 means zero or less than half the unit shown (Billions of US dollars). 
Source: World Bank, PPI Project database 
Figure 2.2.1.2: A plot of private sector infrastructure investment for developing 
countries and sub-Saharan Africa 
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Figure 2.2.1.3: Private sector investment in infrastructure by region 
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From the Table 2.2.1.2 and Figures 2.2.1.2 and 2.2.1.3, it is evident that sub-Saharan Africa 
has the least investment in infrastructure globally, having a contribution of just 2.3% of the total 
infrastructure investment stocks of the six developing regions. If the population of a region is 
anything to go by, the demand for infrastructure would be quite high. By implication, sub- 
Saharan Africa is actually investing far less in infrastructure compared to its capacity to 
consume infrastructure services. Notwithstanding the poor investment climate of sub-Saharan 
Africa's infrastructure, a broader understanding of the current state of infrastructure in the region 
is overwhelming. 
2.2.2. The state and causes of infrastructure deficiency in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This picture presented in sections 2.2 and 2.1 is replicated throughout sub-Saharan Africa, 
where it was recently reported that more than one million lives, especially those of women and 
children, are lost annually due to inadequate infrastructure (International Monetary Fund African 
Department 2005). Such an endemic situation and its associated problems have contributed 
immensely to the overwhelming poverty of sub Saharan Africa. 
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"Poverty" has been interpreted broadly to include lack of income and assets to meet basic 
needs such as food, shelter, education and health (World Bank 1998; World Bank 2000). Assets 
in this case include human, natural, physical or infrastructural (World Bank 1998; World Bank 
2000). A major area of great concern to the global community has been the continuing lack of 
access to basic infrastructure in sub Saharan Africa, causing hardship and poverty on a huge 
scale. There is no doubt that Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the poorest regions of the world 
(World Bank, 1994; World Bank, 1997; World Bank, 1998, World Bank, 2000, World Bank, 
2004). Twenty-one out of the thirty poorest regions of the world are in sub Saharan Africa. Thus, 
it comes as no surprise that about 92 million sub Saharan Africans live on less than one US 
dollar per day (World Bank 1998; World Bank 2000). 
The World Bank (1994) study has shown that in sub-Saharan Africa the vast majority of the 
population is engaged in peasant agriculture and lack access to basic infrastructure. This shows 
the need for rural roads to link farms to markets and other infrastructure facilities and services 
such as rural schools, rural health centres, irrigation works, storage facilities and decent but 
affordable shelter, electricity, water supply and sanitation. Irrigation facilities are conspicuous by 
their absence, with the result that well over 90% of subsistence agriculture in sub-Saharan 
Africa is rain-fed (World Bank, 1994; Zawdie and Langford, 2001). The absence of rural facilities 
and the lack of social and economic opportunities has been a major factor contributing to rural- 
urban migration (World Bank, 1994). 
Infrastructure deficiency in sub-Saharan Africa is further aggravated by the region's heavy debt 
burden. For example, external debt as a share of total gross national product (GNP) was at 82% 
in 1994 compared to 36% in Latin America (USAID 1996). This means that only 18 per cent of 
current GDP is available to fulfil all the competing demands of the economy. As is often the 
case, this 18 percent is consumed in recurrent expenditure, leaving capital expenditure to the 
vagaries of multilateral and unilateral financial assistance. No doubt, this has had a major 
impact on sub-Saharan Africa's construction capacity, which is fundamentally important to 
infrastructure delivery. 
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Although no direct link has been established, it can be safely argued that inadequate 
infrastructure in most of sub-Saharan Africa may explain the lack of basic infrastructural 
services. Indeed, Awotona (1987), Obudho (1997), Onibokun et al. (1989), Ogu (1999), Piermay 
(1997), Attahi (1991), Dubresson (1997) and Awortwi (2003) have all indicated a serious 
deterioration in service infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa - for instance, no real achievement 
in the provision of piped water, central sewerage and drainage systems, roads, electricity, 
telephone services and housing (Awortwi 2003; Attahi 1991). Urban and rural roads are 
deteriorating rapidly during the rainy seasons; housing is overcrowded, the majority of the 
people live in un-serviced plots, domestic and industrial sewerage is still being discharged into 
ditches and open drains leading to hazardous emissions, and choked drains have resulted in 
floods in many towns and cities, while the electricity and water supply is erratic (Awortwi, 2003; 
Awotona, 1987). Refuse continues to be dumped at random and, where bins are provided, they 
are seldom emptied, with the result that they overflow and the rubbish forms unsightly heaps 
with severe health implications in most areas of villages, towns and cities (Awotona 1987). 
In addition to these unsanitary conditions, serious health implications can also arise from the 
lack of other infrastructural services, for example, the quality and adequacy of the water and 
electrical supply, choked drains resulting in flooding, hazardous emissions from industrial 
wastes, accident risk from poor transportation, overcrowded housing and poor irrigation 
schemes (Obodho 1997; Ogu 1999). The figure below reveals a practical example in Nigeria. 
Therefore, the need to examine the extent to which infrastructure quality affects the stability of 
infrastructure services is also important. 
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Figure 2.2.2.1: A typical sanitary condition of a Market (Edaiken) in Benin City 
(2004) 
It is important to articulate the reasons that have been given for the state of the infrastructure in 
sub-Saharan Africa as discussed so far. These reasons include misallocated investments, 
inadequate maintenance, non-responsiveness to user,, waste and inefficiency (World Bank, 
1994; IMF, 2003): Misallocation of investments results when too much attention is paid to new 
investment and not enough to maintenance, and too much attention to low priority projects with 
less attention for essential services. 
Furthermore, inadequate maintenance shortens the infrastructural life span, increases 
expenditure for new infrastructure and creates low capacity utilisation. For example, World Bank 
assisted projects on maintenance in sub-Saharan Africa revealed that a reconstruction cost of 
US$45 billion would have been saved if timely maintenance expenditure of about US$12 billion 
were invested. In another development, the World Bank (1994) revealed that power systems in 
sub-Saharan Africa work on average at less than 60 percent of their installed capacity, and 
water supply systems at less than 70 percent. Poor maintenance reduces service quality and 
also increases users' costs due to the installation of some back up facilities such as back up 
generators, water storage tanks and private wells. It is therefore imperative to investigate how 
and to what extent inadequate maintenance and the response rate to this bears on 
infrastructure service stability. 
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Technical inefficiency and outright waste have held back infrastructure and service delivery in 
sub-Saharan Africa. For example, outdated power plants consume more fuel, and transmission 
and distribution loses are two to four times greater than plants in power systems operating at 
best practice levels. Moreover, port facilities on average in sub-Saharan Africa are 60 percent 
less efficient in speed compared to more efficient ports in developed countries (World Bank 
2000). Another aspect of inefficiency is misallocation of labour such as overstaffing (World 
Bank, 1994). Thus, one obvious implication on users of infrastructure emanating from wastage 
and inefficiency is the resultant high cost of infrastructure services. Recent studies have shown 
that poor users pay higher prices and often consume fewer infrastructure services than the 
more wealthy (World Bank, 2002; World Bank, 2000; World Bank, 1994; IMF, 2003). Hence, the 
need for Infrastructure users to be well positioned in order to make their demands felt In the 
areas of planning and operation of new infrastructure investments. 
In order for this to happen, there is need for an effective infrastructure service delivery within a 
market structure (Ostrom, 1996; World Bank, 2002). In a market structure, one dominating 
characteristic is competition, which is evidently absent in most of sub-Saharan Africa's 
infrastructure service delivery (World Bank, 1994). This is because most infrastructure services 
in sub-Saharan Africa are provided by government departments or centrally managed 
monopolistic public enterprises. 
Almost all irrigation, water supply, sanitation, transport, power supply and drainage in sub- 
Saharan Africa is provided by the public sector (Ostrom, 1996; World Bank, 1994). Until a few 
years ago, telephone services in most of sub-Saharan Africa had been strict monopolies of the 
public sector's post, telephone and telegraph enterprises. Consequently, advantages that could 
come from the pressure competition could exert on all parties for maximum efficiency had been 
lacking. 
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In order to meet the challenges that could arise from a competitive climate in an effective 
market structure; there is need for some form of managerial and financial autonomy for those 
charged with the responsibility for delivering infrastructure services (Ajanlekoko, 2002; Akora, 
2002; Olomola, 2002; World Bank, 2002; World Bank, 1994). Those charged with such 
responsibility in the public sector are often engaged with objectives completely at variance with 
the primary functions of efficient delivery of high quality infrastructure services. In addition, they 
are sometimes compelled to deliver services far below cost - i. e. they are not allowed to adjust 
prices for inflation (Independent policy group 2003; Alexandra 2002; Nwoye 2002). 
Lack of financial and managerial autonomy notwithstanding, public providers (i. e. managers of 
public infrastructure services in sub-Saharan Africa) are rarely held accountable for their actions 
(IMF, 2003; Shafik, 2002; Wolfensohn, 2002; Hussain, 1999; Kessides, 1999; World Trade 
Organization, 1998; Schubeler, 1996). Thus, their inefficiency is occasionally compensated for 
by budgetary transfers rather than outright disapproval (Fischer et al., 2003). It is common 
knowledge that corruption thrives in the absence of transparency and accountability. Though 
accountability is essential if infrastructure service delivery is to be run purely on commercial 
principles, an effective cost recovery strategy is nonetheless vital. 
Effective cost recovery for infrastructure and service provision in the developing world, most 
especially sub-Saharan Africa, has been very poor (Ostrom etal., 1993; Ostrom 1996; World 
Bank, 2002). This is due basically to the fact that infrastructures in the region are not being seen 
as service industries that provides goods that respond to consumer demands. Such commercial 
orientation is at variance with the situation currently existing in most public sector utilities or 
government departments. These state owned departments suffer from multiple and conflicting 
objectives and inadequate accounting for costs which put little emphasis on revenues collected 
and quality of service delivered (World Bank, 1994). For example, governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa are fond of siphoning revenues from infrastructures like telecommunications, power 
supply and water supply for other uses, leaving these sectors under funded (World Bank, 1994; 
World Bank 1992). 
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The lack of focused and explicit objectives has its roots in inconsistent government policies on 
infrastructure, policies which vary across the region (Dixon 2000; National integrity system 
2004). World Bank (2002) studies have also revealed that inefficient infrastructure provision and 
poor infrastructure policies absorb scarce fiscal resources and damage microeconomic stability, 
because prices often fall below cost. 
Furthermore, the lack of environmental consideration in policies that affect infrastructure in sub- 
Saharan Africa has contributed greatly to infrastructure failures in the region (Dixon 2000; 
Kubeyinje and Nezianya 1999; Obadina 1999; Ostrom 1993). World Bank studies have shown 
that political trends in many low income countries towards democratization, pluralism and 
decentralization have engendered a concern for finding more affordable and environmentally 
friendly solutions to infrastructure failures. This trend has increase the need for greater 
commitment in consultation with local communities, the poor and groups affected by 
environmental factors (World Bank, 1994). 
However, the need for consultation on environmental issues as it affects infrastructure 
provision has become imperative in sub-Saharan Africa due to the negative impact of the 
existing infrastructure on the environment. For example, some multilateral organisations are of 
the view that there are highly visible effects of some large-scale infrastructure projects such as 
dams, roads, power stations, crude oil drill, reservoirs in sensitive ecological areas (Dixon, 
2000). Equally serious and more pervasive is the damage to the environment because of a 
failure to control unnecessary emissions, and wasteful consumption of infrastructure services. 
This is due in particular to under-pricing of power, vehicle fuels, and water for irrigation and 
municipal uses to outright maintenance neglect (Alexander, 1999; Dixon, 2000; World Bank, 
1994). 
Inadequate maintenance as previously explained has being responsible for large-scale energy- 
related pollution, as witnessed in power generation, transportation, handling of hazardous 
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cargos and Inappropriate disposal of waste from ships, port dredging, unregulated and badly 
designed municipal water and sanitation infrastructure (World Bank, 1994; World Bank, 1992; 
Dixon, 2000). Analysis of the causes of infrastructure failures reveals that maintenance is not 
just a major problem of its own but also a causal factor for other variables contributing to 
infrastructure failures. Studies have shown that existing institutions for addressing this and other 
problems have being unsuccessful in sub-Saharan Africa and thus the need for effective and 
functional institutions (Ebohon e tal., 2003; World Bank, 2002, Ostrom e tal, 1996; Ostrom e tal, 
1993; World Bank, 1994, National integrity systems 2004). 
2.2.3. The imperatives of institutions in infrastructure and service delivery in sub- 
Saharan Africa. 
Institutions could be simply defined as rules, enforcement mechanisms and organisations 
(World Bank, 2002). In his detailed work on the relevance of institutions in service delivery, 
North (1991) perceived institutions as humanly devised constraints that outline human 
interactions; as a consequence they structure incentives in human exchange, be they political, 
social or economic. Moreover, institutional change has been described as being a way of 
shaping societal evolution, and thus as the means to understand and visualise the spectrum of 
historical change (North, 1991). 
It follows that the lack of such an understanding underpinning the significance of appropriate 
and supportive institutions is one of the major causes of infrastructure and service delivery 
failures in the sub-Saharan Africa (Ebohon e tat., 2003; World Bank, 2002, Ostrom et at, 1996; 
Ostrom e tat, 1993; World Bank, 1994). 
The World Bank (1994) analysis of infrastructure coverage compared to infrastructure 
performance and gross domestic product across countries revealed a significant correlation 
between infrastructure coverage and gross domestic product (see Figure 2.2). However, there 
was no correlation between infrastructure coverage when compared with performance or 
36 
efficiency and effectiveness. In other words, infrastructure supply is not directly related to the 
quality of infrastructure services delivered. 
Table 2.2.3.1: Country's infrastructure coverage and performance 
Indicator Low 
Income 
Economies 
Transition 
Economies 
Middle 
income 
Economies 
High 
growth 
Economies 
OECD 
Economies 
Coverage of Infrastructure 
Main lines per thousand persons 3 95 73 122 475 
Households with access to safe water 47 95 76 86 99 
(%) 
Household with electricity (%) 21 85 62 61 98 
Performance of Infrastructure 
Diesel locomotives unavailable (%) 55 27 36 26 16 
Unaccounted for water (%) 35 28 37 39 13 
Paved roads not in good condition (%) 59 50 63 46 15 
Power system losses (%) 22 14 17 13 7 
Basic Indicators 
GNP per capita, 1991 (US, dollars) 293 2,042 1,941 3,145 20,535 
GNP per capita, average annual growth -0.2 1 -0.6 5 2 
rate, 1980-91 (%) 
Population average annual growth 
rate, 1980-91 (%) 
Urban 6 1 3 4 1 
Total 3 0.3 2 2 05 
Source: Appendix table A. 1; WDI tables 1,25,31,32 
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Figure 2.2.3.1: Efficient and effective delivery of infrastructure services and 
increased coverage or availability 
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Plots of coverage against performance in water, power, telecommunication, roads, and railway 
showed very little relationship between the two across a wide sample of low-income and middle- 
income countries (see Table 2.2.3.1 and Figure 2.2.3.1). Nonetheless, there was no close 
correlation between a country's efficiency of provision in one sector and its performance in 
another. The significance of these findings is an indication that the efficiency and effectiveness 
of infrastructure provision is never a function of economic growth and development but of the 
institutional environment, which often varies across sectors in individual countries. Hence, 
changes in the institutional environment can lead to improved performance not withstanding 
levels of incomes and infrastructure coverage; this is true because in each sector, some lower 
income countries perform creditably well (World Bank, 2002, Ostrom e tal, 1996; Ostrom e tal, 
1993). 
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Table 2.3.1: Public ownership and public operation model 
Function Option A: Public ownership and public operation 
Government Public enterprise 
department Traditional Corporative With service With 
And contract management 
commercial contract 
Ownership of assets Public Public (majority) 
Sectoral investment, Internal By Parent ministry 
planning, to parent or 
Coordination, policy making, government ministry separate public authority 
regulation 
Capital financing Government Subsides and Mainly market-based financing 
(fixed assets) budget public loans 
Current financing Government Main Mainly internal revenues 
(working capital) budget subsidies 
Operation and maintenance Government Public enterprise Private operator Private 
and operator 
Specific services 
Collection of tariff Government Government or Public enterprise 
revenues Public 
enterprise 
Managerial authority Government Public enterprise Private operator 
Bearer of commercial risk Government Public enterprise Mainly public 
Basis of private party Not applicable Fixed fee based on Based on 
Compensation Services rendered services 
and results 
Typical duration No limit Fewer than 5 years About 3-5 ears 
Source: worin uanK studies 
From this table, it is apparent that ownership of assets in this option in government department 
and traditional public enterprise is 100 percent in the public sector. However, this cannot be said 
of the other types of public enterprise, given that majority asset though not all in the direction of 
the public. The implication of this structure is that the huge responsibilities of maintenance, 
operation, financing, policy making, planning and risk taking would be expected to be carried by 
the public sector or government. 
The table also revealed, under the function of operation and maintenance, a temporal private 
sector involvement with the categories of public enterprise with service contract and public 
enterprise with management contract. This temporal involvement period is usually less than or 
equal to five years. Nevertheless, the temporal involvement of private contractors for specific 
services such as maintenance in public utilities generates experience that might gradually be 
extended to full operation by the private sector (World Bank, 1994). This gradual development 
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into full partnership is useful, but an understanding of how to realise useful achievements with 
this option is imperative. 
Notable achievements from public infrastructure delivery have been centred on commercial 
principles and regulations which give managers control over operations and freedom from 
political interference, while the manager's accountability is often measured as spelt out in the 
performance agreements or the management contracts (Fischer et al. 2003, IMF 2003; World 
Bank 1994). Thus, subject to similar constraints as in private enterprise, successful public 
delivery strives through competition posed by private firms in the infrastructure market. 
Successes were achieved under this pattern by the water supply authorities in Togo and 
Botswana, highway authorities in Ghana and Sierra Leone and the restructured road agency in 
Tanzania (World Bank 1994). 
In contrast, it is been argued that successes from this approach on many occasions are short- 
lived due to political and social interference in sub-Saharan Africa (Nwoye 2002; World Bank 
1994). Moreover, Ostrom (1996) also criticises this model by arguing that centralisation of 
infrastructure and service delivery at the national level have actually kept municipalities and 
citizens from access to decision making responsibilities and resources. He goes on to say that 
citizens were themselves helpless at doing anything about their squalid conditions although they 
possessed skills and time that could have been applied towards a solution of the problems they 
faced. 
However, it is further argued that public provision of social and physical infrastructure has 
choked the abilities of several governments in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Akora (2002) 
argues that the governments within sub-Saharan Africa have more to do than they can handle, 
as they are in charge of education, defence, telecommunications, power supply, water supply, 
sanitation and drainage and irrigation schemes, with the onus of maintenance and operations 
resting solely on their shoulders. In consequence, suggested or existing options aimed at 
41 
supporting public provision are those of public-private partnership - i. e. public ownership and 
private provision or an outright private provision, or privatisation. 
2.3.2. Option B: The public ownership and private operation option 
This option is characteristically put into practice through lease and concession contracts by 
assigning full operation and maintenance, along with commercial risk and the responsibility of 
new investment in publicly owned infrastructure facilities, to the private sector. The following 
Figure 2.3.2 extracted from World Bank studies gives an insight into the processes and 
responsibilities within this option. 
Table 2.3.2: Public ownership-private participation 
Function Option B: Public ownership and private operation 
Leasing contract Concession contract 
Ownership of assets Public (majority) 
Sectoral investment planning, 
Coordination, policymaking, 
Regulation 
Public authority negotiated with 
Private operator 
Capital financing (fixed assets) Public Private operator 
Current financing (working capital) Private operator 
Operation and maintenance Private operator 
Collection of tariff revenues Private operator 
Managerial authority Private operator 
Bearer of commercial risk Private operator 
Basis of private party compensation Based on results, net of fee paid by 
Operator for use of existinassets 
Typical duration 5-10 
years 
10-30 
years 
Source: World Bank studies 
Thus, only through concession can the private operator typically assume all commercial risk of 
operation and shares in investment risk. Lease and concessions are working well for water 
supply in Guinea and port facilities in Ghana, and Nigeria is about to apply this option to electric 
power supply (Bureau of Public Enterprise 2002; World Bank 1994). Moreover, leases and 
concessions evidently consent to private sector management and financing without necessarily 
dismantling existing organizations or immediately crafting an exclusively new regulatory 
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framework. This system of concession is another form of partnership popularly referred to as 
public-private-partnership (PPP). 
2.3.2.1. Public private partnerships (PPP) 
This is a partnership between the public and private sectors for the purpose of designing, 
planning, financing, constructing, ownership and operating projects which would be regarded 
conventionally as falling within the responsibility of the public sector (Akintoye et at. 2006). PPP 
involves the sharing of responsibility between government and the private sector. For example 
design, construction, operation, maintenance, finance, and risks management skills are 
provided by the private sector while the government is responsible for strategic planning and 
industry structure, obtaining permits, customer's interface issues, regulation, community service 
obligations and sometimes payment on behalf of the service users (Australian council for 
Infrastructure development 2001; IRS 2003). 
Simplistically, BOT arrangement is one where the private sector consortium, usually foreign, 
puts up sufficient funds and builds an infrastructure such as power supply whose output is later 
sold to a publicly owned infrastructure company of the same type in the host country for a 
franchised period of between 10 and 30 years before transfer to the host government for a 
token (David and Fernando, 1995; Haley, 1992). 
Nevertheless, a slightly different explanation of BOT arrangement is given by Tam (1999), 
McCarthy and Tiong (1991): the arrangement grants the franchisee (project sponsor) the sole 
right to generate revenue from the infrastructure for a specified period, having already been 
responsible for financing, construction and operation of the facility. After the concession period, 
the infrastructure is transferred at no cost to the franchiser, which is usually the government. 
Similarly, arrangement for build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) involves a private developer 
financing, building, owning and operating a facility for a specified contract period. At the end of 
this period the facility is given back to the government (IRS, 2003; World Bank, 1994) 
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However, the BOO arrangement is different from the BOT/BOOT arrangement because the 
ownership of infrastructure remains in perpetuity with the private developer (David and 
Fernando, 1995). This arrangement subjects the developer to regulatory constraints on 
operations and pricing, and significant financial incentives for capital investment is derived from 
long term right of operation of the facility (IRS, 2003). 
The notable advantages of BOT/BOOT/BOO arrangements from studies conducted by Tam 
(1995 and 1999) and David and Fernando (1995) shows that the host government need not 
spend public funds but still could excel in the provision of public facilities for its citizens, while 
the franchisee makes huge profits from a successful BOT/BOO/BOOT project. This 
arrangement also is fast becoming the most suitable interface for mobilizing private foreign 
capital while selling production output to a local monopoly purchaser, while BOO is a semblance 
of foreign investment into the manufacturing and service sector with a very huge capacity for 
risk. 
However, researches have revealed that the requirements for effective and efficient delivery 
using BOT or BOO approaches are an experienced, equitable and simple governing body and 
structure, honest and incorruptible political regime, an intact contractual agreement, a structured 
set of BOT regulations and legal system, a large and reliable consortium, an experienced 
construction organisation and last (and most important), no political intervention ( Tam, 1999; 
David and Fernando, 1995). 
These factors above are not easily achieved, judging by the current situation in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Thus, the success of these approaches in sub-Saharan Africa on a long term appears 
doubtful. Other forms of public-private partnerships are as follows: 
Operation and maintenance contract (0 & M): this involves the private sector operating a 
publicly owned infrastructure subject to the terms of contract with the government. 
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In Traditional Design and Construction (TDC), the principal, notably the government, prepares 
the brief that sets out project requirements before the invitation of tenders for design and 
construction. Private developers produce designs in accordance with the brief and construct it 
for an agreed fee which may be fixed or subject to escalation. 
Lease-develop-operate (LDO) involves the expansion and operation of an existing facility by a 
private developer who is granted a long-term lease. The private developer agrees to invest in 
infrastructure improvement, recover investments and make returns. 
Build-own-maintain (BOM) are arrangements that involve the private sector developer building, 
owning and maintaining the infrastructure on lease from the government. The government 
operates it through sector staff. 
2.3.3. Option C: The private ownership and private operation option 
Private (including cooperative) ownership and private operation is attracted by new private firms 
in the infrastructure market and outright divestiture of public ownership (World Bank, 1994). This 
option is known for its simple nature and the tendency to flourish in a more competitive climate. 
Success stories have been recorded from most developing countries that have allowed 
telephone services and electricity to be competitively provided with little or no economic 
regulation beyond those applied to all private firms (World Bank, 1994). 
However, considerable constraints to this model are prevalent in the developing world, most 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa. These include an inappropriate competitive climate or 
restructuring for business, practical and statutory barriers to private entry, and involvement and 
failing regulation that is incapable of protecting the public interest when competitive discipline is 
insufficient (World Bank, 2004; World Bank, 2002; World Bank, 1994). 
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2.3.4. Option D: Community and User provision 
This option is most relevant for the delivery of municipal and local services that provide small- 
scale infrastructure such as village feeder roads, water supply, sanitation and small-scale power 
generation off the national grid. When those who contribute towards the cost are basically the 
primary beneficiaries, effective and efficient service is guaranteed. World Bank supported 
projects have shown that community self help schemes should be selected, designed, and 
implemented locally without outside imposition. Several authorities have supported this 
proposition. 
This community demand-driven approach with variable levels of service has been successfully 
practiced in South Africa (Abbott 1996). In this model the emphasis is on developing the 
community in its widest sense rather than focusing on capacity building. The central issue is the 
community's right to choose, and this right is not governed solely by the criterion of affordability 
alone (Abbott, 1996; World Bank, 1994; World Bank, 2002). In this model, services are 
designed to meet specific needs and are not related to a structural hierarchy of incremental 
improvements with long-term implications (Abbott, 1996). 
In another supporting instance, in his discussion on urban management policies in sub-Saharan 
Africa as reported by Abbot (1996), Mabogunje (1994) argues that governmental structures and 
processes imported into African countries by the various colonial administrations represent no 
more than the level of responses to the evolving free market economy of their home countries 
up to, at best, the beginning of the second world war. To overcome this particular hurdle entails 
a deeper appreciation of societal reality, and the recognition that it is quite easy to induce 
societal change by working through institutional forms like the community and by using 
provisions with which the majority of the people are familiar and to which they can relate. 
Mabogunje's proposal on institutional reforms for infrastructure provision in urban regeneration 
has given birth to several institutional concepts for infrastructure provision. Chief amongst these 
is the co-production concept by Ostrom (1996). 
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The co-production concept implies that citizens can play an active role in producing public 
goods and services of consequence to them (Ostrom 1996). The term co-production model was 
developed by Ostrom (1996) to describe the potential relationships that could exist between 
regular producers (street level police officers, schoolteachers and health workers) and clients 
who want to be transformed by the service into safer, better educated, or healthier persons. The 
realization is that the production of a service, as opposed to a good, is difficult without the active 
participation of those supposedly receiving the service (Ostrom 1996). 
2.3.4. Option E: Bottom up participatory stakeholder partnership 
Schubeler (1996) and Ogu (2002) have stressed that this "bottom-up" participatory stakeholder 
partnership represented the strategy capable of enlisting the financial, material resources and 
expertise of various sectors of the urban community towards the improvement of the urban 
environmental infrastructure. 
In addition, international organizations such as UNDP, UNCHS and UN-Habitat / UNEP have 
subsequently initiated strategies to evolve a participatory approach to development and 
management of the urban environment (Ogu, 2000; UNDP, 1999; UNCH, 2003). One of these 
strategies is the sustainable city program SCP, which aims to provide municipal authorities and 
city stakeholders in the public, private and community sub-sector with an improved capacity for 
building in the urban environment and for planning and management (Ogu, 2000; UNDP, 1999; 
UNCH, 2003). 
For example, the Sustainable Ibadan City Project (SIP) from SCP took a systematic approach to 
the mobilisation of a cross-section of institutions, community, public and private agencies, 
NGOs, professionals and business groups and multilateral organizations in Ibadan. Mobilization 
activities were initiated to ensure that these groups or institutions participated in the 
identification and prioritization of environmental problems, formulation of environmental 
improvement and development and execution of such strategies. It also provided an avenue for 
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the building of partnerships (Ogu, 2000). Thus, the project promoted public and private sector 
partnership approaches to the planning and management of the environment, emphasising the 
involvement of the communities in planning and management of their environment, including the 
identification of environmental problems, and the choice and strategy for environmental 
development (Ogu and Ogbuozobe 2001; Taiwo 1999). In spite of the excellent studies carried 
out by leading authorities on the relevance and types of institutions that underpin effective 
infrastructure and service delivery, there are still some arguments to the contrary. 
For example, Van der Vaeren (2004) differs completely from the standpoint that the setting up 
and managing of the right public institutions are the sole key to infrastructure development. He 
argues that cultural factors are as important as institutional ones - sometimes even more 
important. Furthermore, he maintains that the efficiency of public institutions is dependent on or 
determined by its association with existing culture, because these institutions are run by people 
even more than by law or regulations. For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, researches have 
shown that cultural factors remain a major impediment to development, though existing practice 
appears effective by western standards. 
2.4. An overview of some existing infrastructures in Nigeria 
As at the year 2000, Nigeria had ten power plants with a total capacity of less than 6000MW, 
which supplied power to less than 50% of the populace; only 3000km of obsolete rail system 
with outdated locomotive engines; abandoned waterway systems; and 150,000km of 
abandoned road network due to cost escalation (Adenikinju, 2003; Adenikinju; 2000; Matthews; 
2001). 
2.4.1. Telecommunications services 
The world has become smaller than ever because of the power of telecommunications (Alabi 
1996; Arzika 2000; Chukwudebe 2001; Dajab 2001). Access to telecommunications is regarded 
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as a basic necessity for social and economic development. Apart from contributing directly to a 
nation's GDP, it enhances economic growth because everyone can have easy access to any 
part of the world instantly (Alabi 1996; Arzika 2000; Chukwudebe 2001; Dajab 2001; Matthews 
2001). Improved telecommunications services not only support economic development and 
industrial growth, but also encourage foreign investment, create job opportunities, enhance 
national security and reduce the need to travel. 
Sadly, however, after implementing the second phase of the United Nations transport and 
communications decade in Africa (1978-1988), Africa attained an average telephone 
penetration of only 0.72/100 as against the projected 1/100 penetration (Alabi, 1996; Matthews, 
2001). To date, Nigeria has about one million lines connected with about a quarter of them idle, 
thus giving a teledensity : telephone penetration of less than one. Only two countries in sub- 
Saharan Africa have a teledensity greater than one. However, developed economies have a 
teledensity of up to 45 (Matthews 2001). World telecommunications infrastructure investment in 
1992 amounted to US$120 billion with a meagre 17% coming from developing nations, where it 
is most needed (Matthews, 2001). 
2.4.3. Power supply 
The Manufacturers Association of Nigeria, MAN (Ikeja branch) reported that in 1997,65% of the 
working hours of the companies in Lagos were lost to power outages (Adenikinju, 2002). The 
average Nigerian firm experiences power failure or voltage fluctuations about seven times a 
week, each lasting about two hours without benefit of prior warning. 
Due to this phenomenon, the cost of manufacturing has increased, and there is also a 
considerable increase in the cost of privately owned standby generators which are sources of 
environmental pollution (Adenikinju 2000; Matthews 2001; Ilori, Adeniyi et al. 2002; Adenikinju 
2003). 
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At one time, Nigeria possessed one of the most advanced power systems in the whole of sub- 
Saharan Africa. Today, however, the system is plagued with problems ranging from vandalism 
and lack of maintenance to complete breakdown and the non-payment of three billion naira in 
debt owed by the consumers. The recent government policy on deregulation is a welcome idea. 
However, one implication of the existing electricity market structure is that Nigeria electric power 
authority( NEPA) has completely monopolised the huge economies of scale in the industry 
(Matthews 2001; Oruye 2001; Adenikinju 2003; Ikeme and Ebohon 2003). Adenikinju (2003) 
observed that 36% of installed capacity in NEPA is over twenty years old; 48% of NEPA 
installed capacity is over fifteen years old; and (c) 80% of installed capacity is over ten years 
old. Thus most of the machinery is in dire need of refurbishment. 
2.4.4. Transportation 
For economic growth, air, road, rail and water transport must be efficient, safe and customer 
friendly. 
2.4.4.1. Air travel services 
It has been shown that no parameter associated with air transport in Nigeria meets international 
standards, and local air transportation is not cheap, safe and efficient (Matthews 2001). An 
assessment of Nigerian Airways depicts a sad story of under-performance (BBC, 2003), and an 
excruciating debt burden and corruption - one example of which is the purported embezzlement 
of US$400 million of unaccounted-for Nigerian Airways funds (BBC, 2003; Guardian, 2003). The 
national carrier has been comprehensively overhauled with a view to making it operate 
efficiently (BBC 2002; BBC 2001; Matthews 2001). 
2.4.4.2. Road transportation 
At least 70% of Nigerians and goods are transported by road (Matthews 2001). Within the last 
decade, this transport sector has nearly ground to a halt due to lack of maintenance of the 
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roads and vehicles, and travelling by road to some parts of the country has become a nightmare 
(Matthews, 2001). Some striking illustrations showing the damage resulting from inadequate 
maintenance in Nigeria are shown below: 
Figure 2.4.4.2.1: A portion of the Ugbowo Benin-Lagos Highway (2005) 
Though majority of the households in Nigeria do not have a car, they still require access roads 
that are suitable for public transportation because many of the residents are traders who need 
to move goods within the areas close to where they live (Olanrewaju 2000). 
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Figure 2.4.4.2.2: A typical access road in Benin City, Nigeria (2004) 
.r t 
rý 
Figure 2.4.4.2.3: A typical access road in Owerrei, Nigeria (2004) 
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Figure 2.4.4.2.5: A failed portion of Uwasota road in Benin City (2005) 
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Figure 2.4.4.2.4: A typical access road in Effunrun, Nigeria (2004) 
Figure 2.4.4.2.6: Part of a failed portion of a road in Ojota, Nigeria (2004) 
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The causes of failure of Nigerian roads vary from poor maintenance to inordinately heavy axle 
loading resulting from the collapse of the railway system and the total abandonment of 
waterways which are best suited for bulk and heavy haulage (Matthews 2001). Good quality 
and safe roads are necessary for economic development, as they will ensure comfort and safety 
in travelling. 
2.4.4.3. Rail transport 
One of the cheapest means of transportation in Nigeria, with large carrying capacities, is rail. 
This means of transportation was neglected during the last decade, bringing high axle load 
pressures to bear on the highways, resulting in the rapid deterioration of road network as 
outlined above (Matthews, 2001). With the present state of development in Nigeria, it has been 
suggested that three important cities in the nation ought to be operating metro rail systems. The 
building of new railroads can be done by direct labour, considering the abundant human 
resources unemployed in the nation (Matthews, 2001). The Indian government built most of its 
railroads through direct labour or joint venture operations, and the slide below reveals how the 
first railway was built through by this means. 
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Figure 2.4.4.3: Labour intensive construction of the first Railroad in Nigeria 
Furthermore, Matthews (2001) suggested that the concrete sleepers for railroads can be 
contracted out to local engineering contractors, and the rolling stock manufactured in Naokuta 
steelworks instead of patronizing foreign steel companies. This strategy will ensure 
sustainability: maintenance can easily be carried out since spares will be locally available. 
2.4.5. Water supply 
In Nigeria, fewer than 40% of the population are provided with adequate potable water. For 
economic development, an adequate potable water supply should be available in every town in 
the country. The national per capita water consumption is still below the WHO specification of 
as least 20 litres per day (Matthews, 2001). BBC (2005) reported that United Nations water 
experts were of the view that the quality of water supplied to millions of Nigerians was below 
standard and that majority of the population has no access to potable water. The figure below is 
a typical example of a Lagos resident seriously in search of water. 
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2.4.6. Housing 
In the fifties, about 10.6% of the total population in Nigeria, lived in the cities and this 
significantly increased with increase in population to 19.1% in 1963,24.5% in 1985 and 30% in 
the nineties (Ajanlekoko 2001). The implication of this growth rate on housing infrastructure in 
the urban centres is huge going by the national housing requirement. The national housing 
requirements as cited by Ajanlekoko (2001) are between the range of 500,000 to 600,000 units 
considering the prevailing occupancy ratio of three to four persons per room. Thus, the cost to 
provide housing excluding other physical infrastructure amounts to about 300 trillion naira at a 
conservative estimate of 500,000 naira per unit. Nonetheless, the rise in population has 
manifested in acute shortage of dwelling units resulting in overcrowding, high rents, poor urban 
living conditions and high crime rate. 
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Okpalla (1986) was of the view that the current trend of private sector involvement or 
participation in infrastructure provision should evolve into a systematic method for the 
integration of local communities at the background level. This process of bringing in people and 
communities would to a sizeable extent prioritise the types and locations of infrastructure to be 
provided to address the immediate needs of the people (Zawdie and Langford, 2001; 
Mabogunje, 1994; Abbott, 1996). 
On housing as reported by Ogu and Ogbuezuobe (2001), Okpalla (1986) has stressed in his 
discussion on housing strategy in sub-Saharan Africa that the house of the poor may have to be 
built by the poor. Okpalla (1986) had maintained that it is a recognisable fact that though Nigeria 
is a rich country over 70% of the population are low earners, thus majority of the households in 
Nigeria fall within low-income category. 
These low-income earners nonetheless use whatever resources are currently available to seek 
and secure shelter. Advancing this category of developer, or the private sector, to produce 
housing units is very important, as observed in Ghana's informal sector housing -a housing 
supply strategy for low earners involving the use of local or easily available materials (Tipple 
and Korboe 1998; Tiwari and Parikh 2000). 
2.5. Privatisation in Nigeria 
Growth empirical models and estimations made revealed that the influences of the private 
production sector on public infrastructure were higher (Raminez 2000; Wang 2002). This 
implied that keeping a balance between infrastructure expansion and private sector growth is 
crucial for rapid economic development (Raminez 2000; Wang 2002) 
In line with this objective, the Nigerian government under President Olusegun Obasanjo 
inaugurated the National Council on Privatisation (NCP), under the chairmanship of vice 
president Atiku Abubakar, tasked with the timely supervision of the programme in a transparent 
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manner (Bureau of Public Enterprises 2002. ). The Bureau of Public Enterprise (BPE) is 
accountable to the Council for implementation of the programme under the general policy 
oversight and other directions of the Council. The BPE (2002) highlighted the primary goals of 
the Nigerian privatisation and commercialisation programme as follows: 
" To send a clear message to the local and international community that a new 
transparent Nigeria is now open for business. 
0 To restructure and rationalise the public sector in order to substantially reduce the 
dominance of unproductive government investment in the sector. 
0 To change the orientation of all public enterprises engaged in economic activities 
towards a new horizon of performance improvement, viability and overall efficiency. 
9 To raise funds for financing socially oriented programmes in such areas as poverty 
eradication, health, education and infrastructure. 
0 To ensure positive returns on public sector investments in commercialised enterprises, 
through more efficient private sector-oriented management. 
0 To check the present total dependence on the treasury for funding by otherwise 
commercially parastatals, and so encourage their approach to the Nigerian and 
international capital markets to meet their funding needs. 
0 To initiate the process of gradual cession to the private sector of public enterprises 
which are better operated by the private sector. 
" To create jobs, acquire new knowledge, skills and technology, and expose Nigeria to 
international competition. 
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2.6. Regional integrated approach to infrastructure delivery 
The cost of infrastructure provision is not only huge but continues to escalate, due largely to the 
fact that all inputs to infrastructure provision (materials, technology and expertise) are largely 
imported by developing countries (Page and Bilai, 2001; World Bank, 1994). Thus, the financial 
constraints have become too onerous a burden to be easily shouldered by countries on an 
individual basis. The integrated approach remains one of the most feasible ways to proceed. 
This is where countries within a regional grouping pool their resources together in the areas of 
common interest, and address common problems. 
This type of body already exists in sub-Saharan Africa, examples being the South African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS). Collier (1995) argues that due to the condition of the smaller southern African 
economies and the extent of inadequate infrastructure provision, a country-by-country approach 
to the problem might be cosmetic and piecemeal. Only an integrated approach, he maintains, is 
capable of providing the construction capacity needed to bridge the gap in southern Africa. 
Furthermore, he continues, a regionally integrated approach to the development of the 
construction industry will avoid the duplication and waste of scarce resources, spread 
investment risks, encourage more direct foreign investments and facilitate technology transfer 
and managerial efficiency. Above all, the lives of the individuals in those countries which are 
presently impoverished will be enriched by the quality and quantity of infrastructure and service 
provision which will be possible through an integrated approach. 
Reflecting on the importance of industrial development relative to its origins, Page and Bilal 
(2001) were of the view that regional infrastructure projects in transport, energy, water and other 
areas are important to regions like ECOWAS. It has supported the building of roads: about 87% 
: 3894Km out of 4460Km of the trans-Sahelian highway linking Dakar to Djamena and about 
83% of the trans-coastal highway from Lagos to Nouakchott have been completed (Page and 
Bilal 2001). It has projects for rail links and a coastal shipping line. It has ambitious projects for 
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the development of hydroelectric and thermal power, interconnected electricity, and the 
construction of a gas pipeline from Nigeria to Ghana and eventually to Cote d'Ivoire (Page and 
Bilal 2001). 
Collier (1995) further observed that global recession coupled with the redirection of aid to former 
communist countries and the Middle East has drastically reduced the flow of aid to Africa and 
other developing countries. External borrowings from capital markets have been substituted for 
aid, and these have brought their own additional problems in terms of massive debts and 
interest rates (Haupt 1996). The consequence for development has been that a greater 
proportion of output and export proceeds are now devoted to debt servicing. He continues, with 
Collier (1995), on the need for regional cooperation, as there is an increasing global trend 
towards regional integration. The industrialised countries are organising themselves into three 
giant trading groups, namely NAFTA, the EC and the Pacific trading alliance (Collier 1995; 
Haupt 1996). Haupt (1996) is of the view that, if developing countries fail to respond by 
negotiating collectively, but do so individually, they will be further marginalised. Economic 
cooperation, he maintained, has become an absolute necessity for meaningful growth and 
development. 
In addressing the problems surrounding the regional integration approach to infrastructure 
provision (demonstrated when differing structures and political institutions seek integration), 
Collier (1995) argues that these arrangements would definitely create the scenario of gainers 
and losers. An example was the defunct East African Economic Community (EAEC), in which 
Kenya became the dominant exporter and by 1966 apparently accounted for 66% of total 
exports from this common market. For this reason, it is advocated that there should be a smaller 
degree of economic integration where selected and vital sectors are integrated across member 
countries. Given that, these sectors would be fundamental to the development of each country. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the regional approach to infrastructure provision is somewhat 
complementary to the efforts of individual countries. The prevalent problems militating against 
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infrastructural provision in sub-Saharan Africa, highlighted in the models discussed previously, 
include those envisaged and experienced from the regional integration pattern. However, the 
integrative strategy still remains indispensable as a complementary process for infrastructural 
provision in sub-Saharan Africa. The board of executive directors of the World Bank group 
recently approved a new Infrastructure action plan which involves the application of a spectrum 
of public-private partnerships and project financing at regional, national and sub-national levels 
(World Bank Group 2003). 
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2.7. Summary 
At the beginning of this chapter, the definition of infrastructure and the concept of infrastructure 
and service delivery were introduced and discussed. Further, infrastructure dearth and its 
implication to sustainable economic growth were emphasised. Also reviewed was the impact of 
infrastructure on economic growth. Several of the views reviewed emphasised both theoretically 
and empirically the critical role of infrastructure in economic growth and development. The 
effects resulting from infrastructure deficit in the developing world were also critically evaluate 
along the following lines: infrastructure investment patterns, the present state and causes of 
infrastructure deficiency in sub-Saharan Africa, importance of institutions in infrastructure and 
service delivery in sub-Saharan Africa, the various existing models for delivering infrastructure 
and services to the people. Lastly, an overview of some of the existing infrastructures in Nigeria 
was presented. 
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Chapter Three 
The Political Economy of Infrastructure Delivery in Nigeria 
3.0. Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to have an overview of the political and economic systems, their 
behaviour (relationships) and how they affect infrastructure and service delivery in Nigeria. 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, comprising thirty-six states and a centrally 
located federal capital territory situated at Abuja. Its characteristic political, economic and social 
strata cut across all its frontiers (Ayogu 2000b; Utomi 2000; The Nigeria Congress online 2003; 
Mohammed 2004). 
Figure 3.0. Map of Nigeria showing its 36 states and Federal capital territory 
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Demographic studies bear out the universality of these characteristics across Nigeria (Nigerian 
Federal Office of Statistics 1992 as cited in Adebusoye and Kritz 1997). Notwithstanding the 
contentiousness of Nigeria's population statistics among demographers , it 
is possible to state 
unequivocally that available statistics put Nigeria's population at about 130 million as at 2000 
with an annual growth rate of about 2.54% (Ayogu 2000b; Directorate of central Intelligence 
2002). Tribes include the Fulani and Hausa in the north, the Ibo in the southeast and the Yoruba 
in the southwest, who together constitute 65% of the population; the others, of equal 
importance, are the Edo, Ibibio, Kanuri, Nupe, Tiv, Chamba, Ekoi, and Ijaw (Ayogu 2000b). 
Similar to the ethnic fragmentations within the country are the religious divisions, which are 
equally significant. Islam accounts for 47 percent of the population, Christianity 30 percent, and 
the rest of the population holds traditional beliefs (Ayogu 2000b). Islam is dominant in the north, 
Christianity in the south. However, a thorough understanding of this chapter from this point 
demands firstly an overview of Nigeria's political and economic profile. 
3.1. Nigeria's political profile 
At independence in 1960, Nigeria adopted a parliamentary system of government and became 
a federation comprising three regions, the northern, western and eastern; each of the three 
major political parties that emerged had its power base in one of the regions (Ayogu 2000b; 
Erediauwa 2004), the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) in the north, the Action Group (AG) in 
the west and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the east. The NPC under 
the leadership of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (a northerner) as the Prime Minister formed the first 
post-independence government (Ayogu 2000b). 
Attempts by the NPC to use its control at the federal level to alter the balance of power 
decisively to its favour increased the problems, even if it did not provide the immediate cause of 
Nigeria's first military intervention (Joseph (1997) as cited by Ayogu (2000b). The NPC crucially 
abused its federal powers by producing a highly disputed census count favourable to itself in 
1962-1963, imposing a minority faction of the Action Group party on the Western region in 
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1962-1964, and manipulating the results of the 1964 federal election, especially in the north 
(Ayogu 2000b). 
On January, 13,1966, a group of army officers under the command of a southerner, Major 
Nzeogu, attempted to oust the government of Tafawa Balewa. However, troops loyal to that 
government, under the leadership of a southern Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, General Officer 
Commanding (GOC) the Nigerian Army, succeeded in foiling the coup attempt. Nonetheless, a 
combination of events forced the council of ministers to decide on a voluntarily handover of the 
federal government to the armed forces (Ayogu 2000b). These events included the failure of the 
coup attempt, especially in the west, the general loss of control in the north, and the absence of 
the president (a southerner) who was out of the country for medical treatment (Ayogu 2000b; 
Erediauwa 2004). The decision of the council of ministers was made known in a radio broadcast 
on January 16,1966 by the acting president, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, a southerner and the senate 
president (Ayogu, 2000). Six months later, another coup placed Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu 
Gowon (a northerner) in command. In 1967, the eastern region under the leadership of 
Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu seceded as the republic of Biafra. This rebellion was put 
down after 30 months of a bloody civil war (Ayogu 2000b). 
After a successful period of eight years, the government of General Gowon was finally 
overthrown in 1975 by yet another northerner, Major General Murtala Mohammed; who was 
later assassinated in a failed coup attempt led by Major Dimka in 1976. Lieutenant General 
Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner, took over the leadership of Mohammed's regime and 
presided over the transfer of power to an elected civilian administration of Shehu Shagari (a 
northerner) under a new constitution that came in to force in 1979 (Ayogu 2000b). 
Alhaji Shehu Shagari was re-elected in 1983; nevertheless his administration was overthrown 
by another northerner, Major General Buhari (Ayogu, 2000). Buhari's government worked at 
ending corruption and instilling discipline. Unfortunately, he was removed from power in August 
1985 in a bloodless coup led by Major General Ibrahim Babangida, yet another northerner. 
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Babangida promised a return to civilian rule under a new constitution approved in 1989. Nine 
new states were created in 1991 and six more in 1996 (Ayogu 2000b). 
Legislative elections were held in 1992 and the presidential election in June 1993. 
Unfortunately, Babangida annulled the result of the presidential election of June 1993 but public 
resentment forced him to step down as scheduled in August of the same year. An appointed 
interim southern civilian president, Ernest Shonekon was ousted on November 17,1993 by 
General San! Abacha (a northerner) who initiated another period of military rule (Ayogu 2000b). 
Abacha promised elections in 1998 but wanted afterwards to succeed himself as a civilian 
president. He died unexpectedly in June 1998 and was succeeded by General Abubakar (a 
northerner) (Ayogu 2000b). Abubakar's regime organized a nationwide election which returned 
a former military dictator, Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo as a civilian president to head 
the new republic. On a promise of strong moral leadership, General Olusegun Obasanjo was 
sworn in as the president in May 1999. 
Thirteen years of military rule between the first and second republics led to many changes in the 
federal structure of Nigeria. Chief amongst these was the dominance of the federal government 
over the other tiers of government, made possible by the vast concentration of wealth from 
petroleum resources, particularly in the 1970s (Ayogu 2000b). 
3.2: Nigeria's economic profile 
Nigeria has the second largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa (behind South Africa) and by no 
means the fourth largest in the African continent (Ayogu 2000b; The Nigeria Congress online 
2003; Ayogu 2000a) . The economy is agrarian, with about 
half to three quarters of the total 
population employed in agriculture; though basically at the subsistence level, it nevertheless 
contributes over 25 percent of the national output (Ayogu 2000b; Ayogu 2000; Adedipe 2004). 
However, the relative proportion of agriculture, livestock, forestry and fishing in the early 1960's 
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was 65.6 percent, with the agriculture subsector accounting for 56.6 percent, aithought it has 
declined to only 32 percent per annum in the 1990's (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). The 
structure of the economy revolves not only around agriculture but also on crude oil sales which 
account for a sizeable portion of its foreign exchange earnings. 
Oil accounts for approximately 70-90 percent of government revenues and 95 percent of foreign 
exchange earnings (The Nigeria Congress online 2003; Elekwa et al. 2004). Despite this, 
Nigeria is still one of the poorest oil producing countries in the world and its oil has been a major 
source of political strife. This is ironic, because Nigeria is the seventh largest oil producer and 
the sixth most important oil exporter in the world (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). At the 
same time, the management of the revenue accruing from crude oil is solely in the hands of the 
federal government, which has generated a huge controversy owing to the exclusion of other 
stakeholders i. e. disgruntled local oil producing communities. Notwithstanding Nigeria's status 
as a major exporter of oil, it frequently suffers from internal shortages, which contribute to the 
reason 34 percent of the population with access to electricity are prone to interruptions 
(Standard Bank of South Africa (2002)). Manufacturers and businesses that need to maintain a 
reliable power supply are forced to rely on expensive generators, thereby raising the cost of 
production (Standard Bank of South Africa 2002). The trends of the rising cost of production and 
rising population growth in Nigeria run counter to the economy, which keeps contracting year by 
year. (Obadina 1999; Ayogu 2000b; The Nigeria Congress online 2003) 
In addition, the economy in the 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a substantial appreciation in 
Nigeria's foreign exchange rate. This development has resulted in a steady decline in 
competitiveness of the non-oil sector, with a resultant decrease in food production and 
agriculture exports (The Nigeria Congress online 2003 ). Nigeria became a food deficit country, 
with rapidly mounting food imports bills which rose from 57.7 million naira in 1970 to 1.4 billion 
in 1980; it peaked at 1.7 billion naira in 1987 after a fall between 1984 and 1986 (The Nigeria 
Congress online 2003). It has steadily increased since then, reaching 88 billion naira in 1996 
and now roughly about 10 percent of the country's total import values. 
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According to the World Bank (1982) as reported by the Nigerian congress online (2003) and the 
World Trade Organization (1998), Nigeria's GDP in 1980 was US$91.13 billion, which has 
placed Nigeria 20th in world GDP ranking. In 1983, it fell to US$64.57 billion and rose to 
US$73.45 billion between 1984 and 1985. Nigeria's world ranking in those two years was 23rd 
and 21s` positions (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). From 1986 onward, the country began 
to experience political instability, economic stagnation and the pursuit of inappropriate and ill- 
fated structural adjustment programmes which has consequently necessitated an extreme 
devaluation of its currency (The Nigeria Congress online 2003; Adedipe 2004). This in turn 
devalued all its assets, its productive resources and its output successively by factors of 1: 4, 
1: 8,1: 22,1: 45,1: 89,1; 126 and 1: 256. In all, the collective effect on the country's GDP in 1987 
has crashed to US$24.39 billion and its ranking to 44th. In 1999 it rose to US$35.045 billion - i. e. 
about 26.2 percent of what it was in 1980 (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). Devaluation in 
Nigeria either explicitly or in effect scared away foreign investments and promoted 
macroeconomic instability, unemployment and poverty (World Trade Organization 1998; The 
Nigeria Congress online 2003). 
This structural economic adjustment made the Nigerian industrial policy inward-looking, with a 
heavy emphasis on protection and government controls, which led to an uncompetitive 
manufacturing sector (Obadina 1999; World Trade Organization 1998). Nonetheless Nigeria's 
economy has remained one of the most dominant in Africa (National Centre for Economic 
Management and Administration (NACEMA) 2003). 
Though Nigeria's economy has aspired to sub-Saharan African superpower status, its 
performance has fallen far short of the potential needed to fulfil this ambition. Since 1987, 
Nigeria's external debt service ratio has average between 4 and 5 percent of GDP, and since 
1958 the World Bank has approved 98 loans and credit for a total commitment of US$6.8 billion, 
the largest aggregate infrastructure in any country in sub-Saharan Africa (Ayogu 2000a) 
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Moreover, Nigeria's economy is presently overburdened with the biggest external debt in Africa, 
while its heavy dependence is on oil revenue has left it vulnerable to plummeting prices over 
years (Obadina 1999a; African IT Exhibitions and Conferences (AZTEC) and CIT Research 
Group 2003). According to the World Bank (1998) as cited in Obadina (1999a) its per capita 
gross national product (GNP) was $260 in 1997, compared with an average of $500 for sub- 
Saharan Africa and $350 for low income countries. 
3.3. The political economy of the influence of political positions and 
infrastructure delivery in Nigeria 
Since independence in 1960, criteria for allocation of infrastructure by federal administrations to 
states and their constituent regions have been based on ethnic and political considerations in 
contrast to economic efficiency (Ayogu 2000b; National Integrity system 2004). Furthermore, 
political expediency rather than economic viability govern key project parameters such as plant 
location, capacity planning, implementation timeframe, employment and product or service 
pricing. Some large scale projects, especially agriculture ones, have been on the drawing board 
for periods ranging from 10 to 35 years (Afeikhena 2003). Political influences on decisions 
associated with distribution of infrastructure to the geopolitical regions have resulted in an 
uneven development of the federating states, leading to huge political crises like the prevalent 
internal social conflicts in Nigeria (Ayogu 2000b). Further, the lopsided distribution of 
infrastructure has also been associated with the dominance of political power by the Nigerian 
military institutions which have ruled postcolonial Nigeria for 30 of its 40 years of independence 
from Britain (Adu-Asare 2001). 
However, Ayogu (2000) maintained that the distortions resulting from infrastructure allocations 
have not been due to the pervasive military influence in the Nigerian political landscape; it is 
rather the dominance of northerners in Nigeria's military that gave rise to undue political 
influence and the associated economic dilemmas. 
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From the beginning of the postcolonial period in Nigeria to May 1999, Nigeria had seven military 
heads of state, of which five were from the north and two from the south. The two southern 
heads of state rule for a cumulative period of just four years, while the five northerners 
accounted for the remaining 25 years. Moreover, both southern heads of states came to power 
by accidents of history: Aguiyi Ironsi on the heels of the failed 1966 coup and Obasanjo upon 
the assassination of Murtala Mohammed (Ayogu 2000b). The dominance of northerners in the 
Nigerian military since independence is demonstrated by the fact that in post-independence 
Nigeria, the military has produced 14 chiefs of Army Staff, out of which 12 were northerners and 
two came from the south (with a collective term of 5 years and 2 months (Ayogu 2000b). In 
addition, a southerner has held the position Minister of Defence just once, and even then it was 
a combined portfolio with the then Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo (Ayogu 2000b). 
In the political life of Nigeria, the Defence portfolio is so sensitive that it is given only to trusted 
loyalists, or otherwise the serving Head of States integrates it into his office. In fact, in all cases 
except Gowon and Babanbiga's regimes, when the portfolio was held by someone other than 
the Head of State, there have always been either actual or attempted coups d'etat (Ayogu 
2000b). 
In a further development, Ayogu (2000) in his empirical analysis on the influence of public office 
on infrastructure allocation, discovered that data do not support the oft-claimed influence of the 
northern political caucus called "Arewa". His work demonstrates that the direction of influence 
points specifically to positions of authority but not to group coalition, like "Arewa" (otherwise 
referred to as the Arewa consultative forum). 
From Ayogu's (2000) findings that the power associated with a particular public position has a 
tendency to influence political decision making regarding infrastructure distribution, it is 
therefore feasible to deduce that the more people in a particular region or state hold significant 
political appointments, the greater the transfer of infrastructure to that region. 
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Other public positions outside the military establishment with influence bearing on federal public 
sector decision making in Nigeria include the Ministry of Economic Development, Agriculture 
and Natural Resources, Trade and Industry, Communications, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Mine, 
Power and Steel as well as Works and Housing. Holders of the positions of Secretary to the 
Federal government, Managing Director of the National Electric Power Authority, Governor of 
Central Bank and Inspector General of Police have also influenced decisions affecting 
infrastructure allocation in significant ways (Ayogu 2000b). 
Furthermore, Ayogu (2000b) showed that there is a very weak correlation between the quality of 
allocated infrastructure and political influence. This led him to the conclusion that many of the 
political positions that would otherwise assume prominence fail to do so in most cases because 
infrastructure delivered was not sustainable. By implication, the assumption that certain political 
positions come with influence on infrastructure decision making is not absolute" (Ayogu 2000b). 
This means that influencing maintenance and quality is an equally important dimension in the 
process of infrastructure allocation especially in sub-Saharan Africa, where most societies 
experiences problems rooted in poor sustainability of infrastructure (Ayogu 2000b). 
Ayogu (2000b) found that some public positions in Nigeria , by virtue of the role played by the 
departmental unit in national budget decision making and policy implementation, tend to hold 
more sway relative to infrastructure projects allocation. He maintained that the Head of State, 
the Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Minister of Communications, and the 
Minister of Finance, were all found to be influential at conventional significance levels (between 
5 and 1 percent). At the 6 percent significance level, the Governor of Central bank and the 
Inspector General of Police (both non ministerial members) become influential. Ayogu (2000b) 
provided several examples of how significant infrastructure projects were built in certain regions 
and at some locations without economic relevance. 
Besides the wielding of influence by individual office holders, some important staff of significant 
ministries managed to include their preferred projects into developmental plans through the 
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manipulations of approved budgets. The way such projects are included derives from the fact 
that ministries are forced, almost regularly, to select and eliminate some projects due to budget 
shortfalls. This is when the selector and cohorts thus acquire strong influence (Ayogu 2000b; 
N). 
Another way in which staff influence infrastructure allocation is to fraudulently falsify a small 
project of interest to a bigger one, again as a result of managing budget shortfalls (TI Source 
Book 2000; National Integrity system 2004). Ayogu (2000b) cited road construction as typical 
examples of such fraudulent practices that enable the implementation of "false" projects. 
Through such perennial tendencies, it becomes possible for a short country road, for example, 
to be upgraded to a dualized trunk roadway when "fastened" unto the budget for a major 
highway (Ayogu 2000b). 
Ayogu provides a graphic spatial profile of the distribution of economic distortion in terms of 
gains and losses relative to the siting of infrastructure projects on a regional basis. The spatial 
profile was arrayed by geographical zones beginning with the South-south region and moving 
on through the South-east, South-west, Central and North-east to the North-West regions. A 
striking pattern emerged showing that the North and South-west regions are gainers under the 
status quo, with this trend most evident in the north (with Oyo state as the biggest single gainer) 
(Ayogu 2000b). On the other hand, the South-south and South east were seen to be losers. 
Ayogu (2000b) notes that these losses are concentrated on a small number of states, and on 
examination, these losses are more extreme than the apparent advantages, which are shared 
amongst many more states. It is possible that this lopsidedness could make the gainer less 
sensitive to the cruelty of the burden imposed on the losers. These disparities in infrastructure 
delivery became so obvious that Ken-Saro Wiwa, one of the foremost intellectuals from the 
South-south Nigeria, began the call for equity in resource and infrastructure distribution. 
However, things took a violent turn leading to his unfortunate, politically-motivated hanging by 
the then northern military administration. 
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There is a chance that if more Nigerians understood the social harm that such a disparity in 
federal allocation of regional infrastructure could create, there might be less pressure exerted by 
constituents and political parties on office holders and top bureaucrats. (Ayogu 2000b). It should 
not be going too far to suggest that the tendency of ethnic constituents and political parties to 
pressure' favourite sons (and occasionally daughters) with political positions and top 
bureaucrats to "do something" at home, have had a corrupting influence on such individuals to 
act contrary to their best judgement (Ayogu 2000b). The resultant effect tends to institutionalise 
corruption and fraudulent practices, as no geopolitical region would want to be left out of its 
share of the national cake. This is not surprising because economic attitudes in humans are 
deeply rooted in inequality, the state of poverty and the degree of economic peril suffered 
historically (Galbraith 1977) 
Ayogu's findings put forward the thesis that the political clout of individual office holders and 
staff, more so than power blocs or pressure groups, have accounted for the nature and level of 
allocation of infrastructure projects and resources from the Federal Government of Nigeria to 
the states and regions. In the same vein, it is plausible to say that individual office holders do 
not act in a state of vacuum; they do so in response to pressure from social forces such as 
political parties, local constituents and opinion leaders (Ayogu 2000b). 
3.4. Political Economy of infrastructural neglect and revenue sharing in 
Nigeria 
Nigeria gets about 90 percent of its petroleum from the Niger delta in the south, an area 
inhibited by minority ethnic groups such as the Itsekiris, Urhobos, Ijaws, Ibibios, Ogonis, 
Kalabaris, Efiks, Ikwerres. In spite of the enormous resources generated from this region, the 
Niger delta is perhaps the least developed area of the country (Dixon 2003). Less than 5 
percent of the oil revenue is spent directly on the oil producing areas (Kubeyinje and Nezianya 
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1999). The Niger delta therefore lacks good roads, electricity, potable water and good schools. 
Unemployment is high because the rivers, creeks and streams which provide people with their 
main source of livelihood - fishing - have been extensively polluted through the activities of over 
a dozen oil companies operating in the area (Kubeyinje and Nezianya 1999, Dixon 2003). 
Moreover, political insensitivity and the exploitation of these resident communities contribute 
immensely to frequent delays and dangerous changes in the environmental conditions in these 
regions, with enormous potential to stall project development. A practical example of this is the 
effects resulting from protests and repression of affected communities or regions plagued by 
environmental pollution, as in the Niger delta region. Such environmental pollution ranges from 
drinking water containing levels of petroleum hydrocarbons that are 350 times that allowed in 
European Union and an average of four oil spills per week, to an estimated 1.1 billion cubic feet 
of natural gas flaring each day between 1976 and 1991 causing acid rain that destroys crops 
and sickens residents. (Dixon, 2003). The human cost attributed to gas flaring and oil spillage is 
unclear, but doctors have found an unusually high incidence of asthma, bronchitis, skin and 
breathing problems in resident communities of oil producing areas (Obadina 1999b). Figures 
3.3.1 to 3.3.4 are clear depictions of the hazards resulting from cases of poorly maintained 
infrastructure, accidents and sometimes outright sabotage. 
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Figure 3.3.1. Polluted stream "Kpean" in Ogoni, Nigeria in 2002; formerly 
drinking source for locals 
Source: Sophia Evans (2002) 
,., 
Figure 3.3.2. Leaking Oil well head at "Kpor", Ogoni, Nigeria in 2003 
Source: Tim Nunn (2004) 
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Figure 3.3.3. A pair of sandals in spilled oil at Bormu flow station in 2002, Tai, 
Ogoni, Nigeria 
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Source: Sophia Evans (2002) 
Figure 3.3.4. Oil spill and fire caused by rupture in high pressured pipe line in 
Elikpokwudu community, Rukpokwu in Obio / Akpor Local government area of 
Rivers State, Nigeria 
Source: Stakeholders democracy network (2003) 
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Nevertheless, the national strategy for the environment recognizes the importance of arresting 
the rapid degradation of the natural environment. An important institutional reform already 
carried out by the present administration is the establishment of the Federal Ministry of 
Environment responsible for ensuring protection of the environment and conservation of its 
fragile natural resource base (World Bank Document 2002). The impact of this ministry is far 
below expectation, however. 
3.3.1. Revenue sharing 
Up to this point, any review of the sharing scheme had to be linked to a revision of the 
constitution, which is not easily practicable (Ehtisham and Raju 2002). The Raisman 
Commission suggested that the federal government appoint a review commission from time to 
time, whether the constitution was being reviewed or not. The Binns Commission (1964) was 
therefore appointed under section 164 of the 1963 republican constitution to review the pooled 
account. The principle of derivation was abandoned, and regional allocations were based 
instead on regions own efforts to mobilize revenue, and on the quality of services they were 
providing. The Commission's work was carried out in secret, leading to doubt and mistrust 
concerning its proposed distributions. Soon after the Binns report, the military took over and a 
process of recentralization started (Ehtisham and Raju 2002). The demand of the oil-producing 
regions to keep all the revenues from natural resources contributed to the Biafran civil war 
(Ehtisham and Raju 2002). 
After the civil war, Decree No 13 (1970) allocated the bulk of federally collected revenue to the 
Federal Government. The derivation principle was put aside and regional allocation was based 
on need, measured by population and a lump sum transfer to cover the fixed costs of running 
an administration. By Degree No 9 (1971), the federal Government appropriated all offshore 
rents and royalties. Decree No 6 (1975) channelled all revenues to be shared through a 
distributable pool account, with the exception of the 20 percent of on-shore mining rents and 
royalties, which went to the states of origin on the principle of derivation. Again the process was 
marred by lack of clarity and certainty in the transfer mechanism (Ehtisham and Raju 2002). 
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The Aboyade Technical Committee (1977) was set up to prepare for a distribution of resources 
during the transition to democratic rule. This Commission recommended a clear division in tax 
jurisdiction to provide all tiers of Government with a tax base. It also recommended that all 
federally-collected revenues, without exception, be paid into the pool account, thus becoming 
the Federation Account. The proceeds of this account were to be shared among the Federal 
Government, the states and - for the first time - the local government councils. The allocation 
for the States was based on the need to provide for minimum standards, but taking into account 
their absorption capacity. These recommendations were perceived as too radical and the 
constituent assembly (1978) declined to accept them (Ehtisham and Raju 2002). 
The Okigbo Commission (1980) was set up to pursue the work. It retained the idea that all 
federally collected resources be transferred to the federation account and that local councils 
should also have a share in this revenue. To distribute resources among the states, however, 
demands a focus on needs, defined by their population, the social services they provide and a 
lump sum transfer to run their administration. The Okigbo Commission recommended putting 
aside the principle of derivation. The recommendation was, however, rejected by the Federal 
Government, which preferred to introduce a special fund for mineral producing areas. This fund 
would receive a share of the transfers from the federation account and would redistribute it to 
the producing states according to the derivation principle (Ehtisham and Raju 2002). 
The subsequent Decree 36 (1984) and the Danjuma Commission (1989) did not significantly 
change this structure. A further step towards the derivation principle was made by the 1999 
constitution. Currently, not less than 13 percent of oil revenue is to be transferred to the oil 
producing states according to their production. Since January 2000, the practice has been to 
apply this derivation to on-shore oil production only (Ehtisham and Raju 2002). 
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3.4. The Nigerian political economy and infrastructure: a globalize 
perspective 
The attempts made after the Second World War to achieve political independence and 
decolonisation merely aggravated and strengthened the existing structures of dependence (The 
Nigeria Congress online 2003). Thus, the stage was set for neo-colonialism. This structure of 
dependence was based on the dispossession that began during the slave trade period from the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). Today this 
dependence manifests itself in different ways, and their categorization provides an 
indispensable background to the political economy of infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa 
particularly Nigeria. 
3.4.1. Uneven distribution of international trade 
Export trade accounted for 34 percent of GDP in 1999, whilst the corresponding figure for the 
United States was 12.2 percent. This is because the US economy has become more open than 
ever before in its history (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). In 1960, US international trade 
stood at only 4.6 percent of GDP; in spite of the great advances in opening up the US economy, 
it is still insular (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). This is in contrast to the long-established 
opening of the African economies in general and Nigeria's in particular. Indeed, Nigeria's 
monoculturalism, like the rest of the sub-Saharan Africa, has hindered its effective participation 
in international trade which has resulted in the slow growth of the rest of the economy (World 
Trade Organisation 1998; Obadina 1999a; Olawoye et al. 2002; The Nigeria Congress online 
2003). A wide range of export motivation has failed to offset the country's import regime, failing 
infrastructure and cumbersome export procedures (World Trade Organisation 1998). The 
uneven distribution of international trade resulting from inappropriate public policies has 
contributed to the continued dilapidation of the crude and refined oil infrastructure resulting to 
serious shortages of petroleum products in the domestic market and inefficiencies that have 
adversely affected transportation, telecommunications, electricity, chemicals, coal and bitumen 
production, steel and aluminium production (World Trade Organisation 1998). 
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3.4.2. Uncertainty of existing institutions and the monoculture economy 
The persistence of political and institutional uncertainty in Nigeria and the weakening of the rule 
of law have discouraged foreign direct investment in infrastructure and trade flows outside the 
oil export sector (World Trade Organisation 1998). Another significant failure of the Nigerian and 
indeed sub-Saharan African economy is its monocultural nature. A World Trade Organisation 
report also has it that the Nigerian economy remains structurally vulnerable to the fluctuations in 
oil prices in the relatively unstable oil sector. Figure 3.4.2.1 reveals the monoculture nature of 
the Nigerian economy and the other African countries. 
Figure 3.4.2.1 Africa's dependence on limited range of commodity 
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The monocultural nature of the African economies has made them be more dependent on 
primary commodities for their export earnings than any other region in the world. In east and 
south-east Asia only 8 out of 19 countries have a similar ratio, compared to 47 out of 53 African 
countries' primary commodities (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). Thus, the fluctuations in 
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the oil sector considerably affect all aspects of resource distribution. This situation is 
systematically transferred to funding for infrastructure maintenance and delivery. 
3.4.3. Price elasticity and income elasticity of African exports 
A third principal feature of Africa's commodity exports is that the demand for them is highly 
income-inelastic while their supply is price-elastic (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). This has 
been traced to global inequalities and trade barriers in developed countries (World Bank 2006) 
Furthermore, because of the monoculture nature of their economies, producers expend a lot of 
scarce resources to produce more and more of these commodities in order to make ends meet, 
with the inevitable price instability, made worse during the period of global economic recession 
and crises (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). The boom-and-bust cycles that accompany 
commodity exports are inimical to African economies (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). 
Commodity booms, which invariably result in high export earnings, lead to much-needed 
increases in public expenditure, particularly in the field of human development and infrastructure 
(Obadina 1999a; The Nigeria Congress online 2003). However, with the continuous price 
instability of these commodities, a bust eventually follows, resulting in a dearth and dilapidation 
of infrastructure and reduction or closure of essential services that are grossly inadequate at the 
best of times (The Nigeria Congress online 2003). 
3.4.4. Direction of African exports 
The table below illustrates economic dependence on Africa, particularly in the direction of its 
exports. Only 13 years ago, (1988), over two-thirds of Africa's exports (in value) went to the 
industrialised countries, with only 16.2 percent going to the developing world. Of these latter 
figures, only 6.2 percent was within Africa, with 4.5 percent, 1.6 percent and 1.4 percent 
exported to Asia, Latin America and the Middle East respectively. 
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Table 3.4.4.1. Direction of exports from 1988 to 1996 
11nrt: n mina of Airirnn F n. rt fin V11It1(i. KIMM lntl 14)(M (PFfepntnPPCY 
Ex port From Zlilr Isldw%tria 
Countries 
Developing 
("ounirkCB 
Africa 
Developing 
Asia 
P'1 iddie 
East 
Latin 
America 
Africa 1988 67.6 12.7 6.2 4.4 1.4 1.6 
1996 &4 7 23.9 10.1 9.1 1.4 2.9 
Nigeria 1498 88.1 11.3 6.5 0.5 0.1 4.2 
1996 72.9 19.7 8.5 7.5 - S. 7 
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In 1996 the industrial countries still received the majority of Africa's exports, about 64.7 percent. 
However, the share of the developing countries has since improved considerably to 24 percent. 
It is significant that although Africa's exports to Asia are still relatively small (9.1 percent) it has 
doubled as a proportion of the total between 1988 and 1996. In the case of Nigeria the increase 
has been exponential (from 0.5 to 7.5 percent), while its intra-African trade has remained more 
or less stagnant. 
3.5. Summary 
The first three sections of this chapter were used to introduce the political and economic profile 
of Nigeria. The political economy of the influence of political positions on infrastructure and 
service delivery in Nigeria was critically examined and revelations showed a disproportionate 
spread since Nigeria got her independence from Great Britain. Also presented in this chapter 
was the picture of the political economy of infrastructure neglect, and revenue sharing in 
Nigeria. Lastly, the political economy of the effects of globalisation on infrastructure in Nigeria 
was presented. 
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Chapter Four 
An empirical validation of the interface between infrastructure 
economic growth and development in sub-Saharan Africa 
4.0. Introduction 
The chronic poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is exacerbated not only by natural catastrophes but also 
by the obvious cases of stagnation in most economic processes meant to alleviate poverty in the 
region, as revealed in the literature review. This chapter will address the paramount need to 
critically and empirically validate this assertion, employing the method of descriptive statistics and 
multiple regression analysis to do so. Such validation would also establish the relationship between 
infrastructure, economic growth and development in the region. To this end, the dominant role 
between public and private infrastructure in the economic growth of sub-Saharan Africa will be 
established. The objective of this chapter is to reveal the nature of the stagnant economic 
processes and to empirically validate the interface between infrastructure, economic growth and 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. The model employed for the multiple regression analysis is 
explained in the next paragraph. 
This investigation employed the modified "adhoc conventional approach" model used in Wang 
(2002), which is based on the conventional neoclassical one-sector aggregate production function, 
where the public and private infrastructure constitute an input directly to the production function, It 
took the form of the following function: 
Y =. f (Lr,., X, ) ...................................... 
(1) 
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where Y is GDP per capita, W is public sector gross capital formation (Public Investments) 
and X, , 
Lr private sector gross capital formation (Private Investments) and labor services 
respectively. The subscript it denotes time series. Firstly, the initial application of this model is based 
on the assumption that L, has negligible effect on GDP. This is because its relative size as a 
subset of GDP is speculatively seen to be very small in comparison to the other independent 
variables in the model. Moreover, the initial exclusion of variable Lt would assist the primary focus 
of this investigation, which reveals the effects of the interrelationships between variables Xt and 
on GDP (i. e. testing the dominance on GDP between variable XX and variable). 
Furthermore, the accuracy of the assumption that labor services are of negligible effect in the 
preceding function of equation (1) will be verified. Thus, it is hoped that two substantive empirical 
models from the secondary data collected on sub-Saharan Africa validating the interface between 
infrastructure, economic growth and development will be developed, with the first model excluding 
variable LL and the second including this variable. 
4.1. Data and methodology used 
Data was collected from the Africa statistics year book (2003) and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (2003). Some of this data was re-modified on proxy to meet the required expectation. In 
particular, data that could have been used on proxy for labor services from the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) only covered fewer than 10 countries within sub-Saharan Africa. As an 
alternative, surrogate data was sourced from the World Bank (2005) and the United Nations 
development program (UNDP) (2004). However, data collected from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (2003) was from international financial statistics, which include gross capital formation 
as a percentage of GDP and final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP for sub- 
Saharan Africa (1991- 2001). Others gleaned from the African Statistical Yearbook include per 
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capita GDP (with a 1995 constant) in dollars, gross public capita formation and gross private capita 
formation (1995 -2002). 
Thus, percentage data for labour services as a percentage of GDP covering 1990 to 2002 was 
obtained by mid point range representation from the World Bank (2005). The proportion of the 
various percentages per capital GDP in dollars for each country was derived. The proportion for 
each of these countries was eventually multiplied by their relative income index value derived from 
the Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2004). The 
eventual data was used on proxy as labor services in dollars for sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 
4.1.1). 
85 
Table 4.1.1 Average GDP per capita, public and private investments and labor services 
Private 
Ave GDP Per capital Public investment investment Labour 
S/N COUNTRY (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) services(dollars) 
Y X W L 
1 Angola 499 41 122 92 
2 Benin 392 29 42 79 
3 Botswana 3207 407 491 1065 
Burkina- 
4 faso 228 32 35 47 
5 Burundi 151 11 3 13 
6 Cameroun 639 9 96 136 
Central 
7 Afr. Rep 345 19 16 33 
8 Chad 213 20 18 39 
9 Congo 811 51 177 123 
Congo 
10 Dem. Rep 107 12 4 11 
Cote d' 
11 Ivoire 817 39 69 182 
12 Eritrea 161 46 2 34 
13 Ethiopia 113 10 8 16 
14 Gabon 4396 233 936 1231 
15 Gambia 355 25 37 94 
16 Ghana 396 47 42 76 
17 Guinea 527 39 81 110 
Guinea 
18 Bissau 250 28 18 16 
19 Kenya 329 21 38 75 
20 Lesotho 522 175 84 115 
21 Madagascar 232 17 14 44 
22 Malawi 160 14 8 17 
23 Mali 260 24 33 36 
24 Mauritania 176 24 13 43 
25 Mauritius 4100 299 816 1871 
26 Mozambique 163 20 25 28 
27 Namibia 2306 182 357 907 
28 Niger 202 12 9 33 
29 Nigeria 286 25 31 26 
30 Rowanda 321 24 25 53 
31 Senegal 584 38 65 165 
Sierra 
32 Leone 194 6 0 9 
33 South Africa 3901 101 554 1803 
34 Sudan 290 5 51 30 
35 Swaziland 1704 95 252 431 
36 Tanzania 176 6 24 19 
37 Togo 341 11 45 62 
38 Uganda 322 19 37 55 
39 Zambia 370 35 23 52 
40 Zimbabwe 616 59 42 178 
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However, data collected from the international financial statistics was used to show the gulf 
between consumption and investment patterns in the sub-Saharan Africa'. This was achieved by 
means of the descriptive analysis mentioned earlier and a bar chart showing both sub-Saharan 
African and industrialized countries' gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP, and final 
consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP2. Moreover, in Table 4.1.1 above, the average 
GDP per capita is the dependent variable while public investment, private investment and labor 
services are the independent variables in the regression analysis. 
To test the extent to which the independent variable predicts the dependent variable in the model, 
several measures of variation were developed as illustrated in Levine et al. (1999). The first 
measure is the total sum of squares ( SST), which measures the variation of the Y, values around 
their mean Y and equals the sum of the squared differences between each observed Y and 
Y which is the mean value of observed "Y" 3. The second is the variation or regression sum of 
squares ( SSR ), this explains the relationship between X and Y and equals the sum of the squared 
differences between each predicted value of Y and the mean value of y 4. The unexplained 
variation or error sum of squares ( SSE) attributable to factors other than the relationship between X 
and Y is equal to the sum of the squared differences between each observed values of Y and each 
predicted value of Y(Levine et al. 1999)5. 
SST = SSR + SSE .......................................... 
(2) 
Where: 
n2 
SST=j(Y-Y) ........................................... 
(3) 
i-i 
'See Table 4.1.2; Table 4.1.3; Table 4.1.4; and Table 4.1.5. 
2 See Figure 4.1.1 and Figure 4.1.2 
3 See equation 2 and equation 3. 
4 See equation 4 
5 See equation 5 
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SSR = z(Vr -Y) 
i 
......................................... (4) 
, =º 
SSR = SST - SSE 
z 
SSE = 
(Y, 
-) ......................................... (5) i=1 
The coefficient of multiple determination r2 obtained represents the proportion of the variation in Y 
that is explained by the set of explanatory variables selected (Levine et al. 1999) and are expressed 
thus: 
Z SSR 
SST'*"* ............................ 
The coefficient of correlation r to test the strength of the relationship or association between two 
variables was carried out. It values range between -1 for a perfect negative correlation up to +1 for 
a perfect positive correlation (Levine et al. 1999). It is expressed thus: 
r= r2 ........................................................... (7) 
Residual analysis was then carried out to make sure that the multiple linear regression model is 
appropriate for the available data. Furthermore, to determine whether there is a significant 
relationship between the dependent variable and a set of explanatory variables, the F-test was 
carried out. Since there was more than one explanatory variable, the null and the alternative 
hypotheses were set up as follows: 
Ho : ßl = ßo =0 (There is no linear relationship between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables) 
H, : At least one J3, #0 (there is a linear relationship between the dependent variable and 
at least one of the explanatory variable. 
The F statistic is equal to the regression mean square (MSR) divided by the error mean square 
(MSE). 
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F_MSR 
MSE 
where 
P= number of explanatory variable in the regression model 
F= test statistic from an F distribution with p and n-p-1 degrees of freedom. 
The decision rule is: 
Reject Ho if F> FU 
The upper tailed critical value of an F distribution with p and n-p-I degrees of 
freedom; other wise do not reject Ho . 
In other to determine the contribution of each of the explanatory variables, the Partial F test criterion 
was applied. "It is a process of determining the contribution to the regression sum of squares made 
by each explanatory variable after all the other explanatory variable has been included in the 
model" (Levine et al. 1999). This process for testing the portions of the multiple regression models 
involves the following: 
SSR (XKI all variable except K) 
= SSR (all variables including K) - SSR (all variables except K).............. (9 ) 
The contribution of variable X, given X2 has been represented thus: 
SSR(X, 1 X2)=SSR(X, andX2)-SSR(X2) ...................................... 
(10) 
The contribution of variable X2 given X, has been represented thus: 
SSR(X2 (Xi)=SSR(XiandX2)-SSR(Xi) ...................................... 
(11) 
The terms SSR (X2) and SSR (X! ) respectively represent the sum of squares that is due to 
regression for a model that includes only the explanatory variable X2 and only the explanatory 
variable X1 . 
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To have a better understanding of the statistics of the numerical data for gross capital formation and 
final consumption expenditure for sub-Saharan Africa and the industrialised countries, the central 
tendency, variation and shape of the data were computed for each set. For central tendency the 
mean and median were of relevance while the mode, midrange and mid-hinge were not necessary 
for this investigation. 
To understand the variation within the data, the following computations were made: 
The first quartile, Q1, is a value such that 25 percent of the observations are smaller and 75 percent 
of the observations are larger. The third quartile, Q3, is a value such that 75 percent of the 
observations are smaller and 25 percent of the observations are larger. The range, inter-quartile 
range, variance and standard deviations were also included in the computation but the coefficient of 
variation was left out because it was not necessary for the investigation. The equations used are as 
follows: 
Range = XL, rgeu - 
Xs, ua, 
Ql _ 
(n+lý 
4 
3(n+1) 
Q3 = .................................................. 
(13) 
4 
ý14) Inter-quartile range = Q3- Q, ............................................................ 
Sample variance: 
S2 
n-1 
Standard deviation: 
............................................ 
(15) 
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ft(x, 
`Y)2 
S- '_` .................................................... 
(16} 
n 1 
All the analysis in this chapter was carried out using the PH statistical software. 
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Figure 4.1.1. Sub Saharan Africa Gross capital formation and final consumption 
expenditure against period 
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4.2. Discussion of Results 
The first bar chart plot shows sub-Saharan African gross capital formation and the final 
consumption expenditure against period and Table 4.1.2 and Table 4.1.3 revealed, from descriptive 
statistics, the following: 
" mean gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP = 18.7% 
" mean for final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP = 81.5% 
Thus, the mean final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP is 4.4 times larger than 
gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The second bar chart shows the industrial countries' gross capital formation and the final 
consumption expenditure against period and Table 4.1.4 and Table 4.1.5 also revealed, from 
descriptive statistics, the following: 
" mean gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP = 20.8 percent 
" mean final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP = 79 percent 
In addition this implies that the mean final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP for 
industrialised countries is 3.8 times larger than the gross capital formation for these countries. 
By implication, sub-Saharan Africa's final consumption expenditure over gross capital formation is 
1.15 times larger than the final consumption expenditure over gross capital formation for the 
industrialised countries. This is because sub-Saharan Africa's final consumption expenditure from 
1991-2001 was 2.5 percent higher, and its gross capital formation over the same period was 2.1 
percent lower, than that of the industrialised countries. The gross capital formation and final 
consumption expenditure data for sub-Saharan Africa and the industrial countries revealed greater 
homogeneity, as the range, inter-quartile range, sample variance and standard deviation were 
relatively very small for each. 
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However, the following multiple linear regression model for the data in Table 4.1.1, excluding labour 
services (L) as explained in the preceding section, was derived for sub-Saharan Africa: 
Y=3.37X + 3.22W =169.85 .................................................. 
(17) 
WHERE: X= Public Investments (public gross fixed capital formation) 
W= Private Investments (private gross fixed capital formation) 
Y= GDP 
The coefficient of multiple determination r2 computed for the above model was 0.9235, meaning that 
92.35 percent of the variation in GDP can be explained by the variation in public investment (i. e. 
public gross fixed capital formation) and those in private investment (i. e. private gross fixed capital 
formation). The value obtained for ? was satisfactory. The coefficient of multiple correlations 
showing the relative association between variables in the model was 96 percent, which is also 
considered satisfactory. This is shown in Table I of Appendix A. To check the validity of the model 
further, the residual plot was also examined, and there was little or no pattern in the relationship 
between the residual and the values of X (public investments) and W (private investments). 
Thus, it was concluded that the multiple regression model was appropriate. 
Testing the linear relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory or independent 
variables with the F test, the null hypothesis Ho was rejected since: 
F> FU (critical value). 
Therefore a linear relationship exists between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
in the model (see Table 1 of Appendix A).. In determining the contribution of the explanatory 
variable, the partial F-test criterion was used and the stages employed are as follows: 
0 Two simple linear regression model partial outputs with each having one of the mentioned 
explanatory variables were derived(see Table 2 and 3 in Appendix A). 
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" To determine whether X significantly improves the model after W is included, the following 
was derived using Table 1 and Table 2 in Appendix A. 
SSR (X/W) = 80568662.6 - 78949647 =1619015.6 
F_1619015.6 _11.40> F .. 141999.4 ý" 
Therefore the addition of variable X after W has been included, significantly improving the 
model. 
0 To determine whether W significantly improves the model after X has been included: 
SSR (W/X) = 80568662.6 - 68933355 11635307.6 
F=11635307.6=82> F 
141999.4 `ntica 
In addition, variable W significantly improves the model after variable X has been included. 
Thus, it has been possible to show that each of the explanatory variables significantly improves the 
model. However, the proportion of W (i. e. private gross fixed capital formation) was significantly 
greater, since 82 is greater than 11.40. Finally, the second multiple linear regression model, 
considering all the explanatory variables in Table 4.1.1, was derived (see equation 18 and Table 4 
in Appendix A). 
Y= 151+ 3W+ L .......................................... 
(18) 
WHERE: L= Labour services 
W= Private Investments (private gross fixed capital formation) 
Y= GDP 
The variable X (i. e. public investment) was excluded from the model in equation (18) because it 
was not statistically significant in comparison to the others (i. e. it was not significantly related to 
GDP as evidenced from the t statistics in Table 4 in Appendix A). Nonetheless, before checking the 
t-statistics, the multiple correlation coefficient (R), coefficient of determination (R square) and the F- 
statistics were all satisfactory shown in Table 4 in Appendix A. 
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4.3. Summary 
This investigation has been able to establish the following: 
" The sub-Saharan Africa final consumption expenditure (FCEssA) was 4.4 times larger than 
the region's gross capital formation (GCFssA) i. e. 
FCE 
,, =4.4(GCFss,, 
) ............... 
(19) 
" The industrialised countries' final consumption expenditure (FCE, c) was 3.8 times larger 
than their gross capital formation (GCF, c). i. e. 
FCE, c = 3.8(GCFic ) ............... 
(20) 
" (FCEssA) is 2.5% greater than (FCE, c) 
" (GCFssA) is 2.1 % less than (GCF, c) 
These results are derived from the fact that, as the findings above have shown, the sub- 
Saharan African region consumes so much and invests so little in comparison to the 
industrialised countries. 
" With the following assumptions, it was possible to deduce an inference relation for 
measuring and comparing the economic stability of any country or region. These 
assumptions are as follows: we assumed a negative sign for final consumption expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP (FCE ) and a positive sign for gross capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP (GCF ). The inference relationship for economic stability: 
SE =GCF+FCE ....................... 
(21) 
SE is the inference relationship for economic stability, and the higher its value in 
comparison to that of the industrialized countries (reference value), the higher the economic 
stability of that region or country. 
Industrialized countries: 
SE= 20.8 - 79 = -5 8.2% 
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Sub-Saharan Africa: 
SE= 18.7 - 81.5 = -62.8% 
Since: -58.2 > -62.8 
The industrialised countries are economically more stable than the sub-Saharan Africa, 
with a 4.6% margin of stability. 
" This investigation was able to show empirically that the private fixed capital formation (W) 
has a greater effect on GDP than the public fixed capital formation (X) in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The most striking revelation was that the effect of W on GDP was seven times 
greater than the effect of X. The implication of this finding is that the sub-Saharan African 
domestic economy is now in the hands of the private sector seven times over. This no 
doubt reflects a view contrary to the wide spread notion that the region's domestic economy 
is controlled by the public sector. This positive imbalance also reflects the private sector's 
much higher efficiency Hence, the need for more privatization in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
positive imbalance revealed that the economic predicament of the sub-Saharan African 
region was not really about the balance between public and the private sectors, but rather 
about the size of the region's GDP. 
" The inclusion of labour services as an independent variable in the production function 
revealed that the relationship between the public infrastructure and economic growth and 
development in sub-Saharan Africa was quite negligible. In addition, the final interface 
model in equation (18) further reaffirmed the dominant role of private investment or private 
infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Chapter Five 
Methodology of the Survey 
5.0. Introduction 
This investigation seeks to identify the causes and effects of infrastructure failures in Nigeria. It is 
clearly impossible with any conceivably available resources of time, money and people, to interview 
every one of the 150 million inhabitants (World Bank 2005) in a country of 923,768 km2. There is 
therefore a need for an effective sample that could adequately estimate the facts and predict an 
outcome for the population of Nigeria. A sample could therefore be defined as a subgroup of a study 
population (Kumar 1999). 
Though, sampling saves time and resources, it does not give a full picture but only an estimate or 
prediction (Kumar 1999; Gay 1996; Leedy and Ormrod 2001). By implication, estimating a situation 
in the total population leaves a possibility for an error. On the concept of sampling, Kumar (1999), 
as further observed by Leedy and Ormrod (2001), is of the view that the tolerance factor for errors is 
an important consideration in the selection of a sample. 
The sample size adopted for this investigation was 600. This size was chosen because one of the 
basic principles of sampling is that the larger the sample size, the higher the level of accuracy of the 
sample statistics or findings (Kumar 1999; Gay 1996; Leedy and Ormrod 2001). Nevertheless, Gay 
(1996) as observed by Leedy and Ormrod (2001) were of the view that beyond a population size of 
5000, a sample size equal or greater than 400 is adequate. From the sample size, the next stage is 
the sampling technique. A sampling technique can only be chosen after the adoption of a sampling 
type i. e. either random / probability sampling, non- random / non-probability sampling or a mixture 
sampling design. 
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5.1. Types of sampling 
A framework of sampling types and strategies can be found in Appendix A. They are briefly 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
5.1.1. Mixed sampling design 
This type of sampling design consists of just one sampling strategy called "systematic sampling". It 
is classed under mixed sampling because it exhibits the characteristics of both the random or 
probability sample design and the non-random or non-probability sample design. Kumar (1999) 
delineated the stages of systematic sampling as follows: 
" The listing of all the elements in the study population 
" Working out and deciding the sample size 
" The determination of interval width (K) i. e. the ratio of total or study population divided by 
sample size 
" The total population is subdivided into "K" number of segments or intervals 
" Using simple random sampling, an element is selected from the first interval 
" Other elements are selected using the width of the interval "K". For example, if K=5 and 
the first element selected by random sampling, the second and subsequent elements are 
selected bearing in mind the derived interval width of 5-i. e. the second element would 
then be the sixth element counting from the first selected element in the list of the total 
population; the third element to be selected would be the twelfth in the list counting from 
the first selected element, and so on 
Leedy and Ormrod (2001) described systematic sampling as the selection of clusters or strata in a 
predetermined sequence which originates by chance. For example, if a population is divided into 12 
clusters and each of these clusters numbered, the selection of a predetermined sequence could 
either be the selection of clusters numbered in odd numbers (i. e. 1,3,5,7,9 and 11) or those in 
even numbers (i. e. 2,4,6,8,10 and 12). Thus with the aid of a tossed coin a particular 
predetermined sequence of numbers is chosen. 
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This procedure is carried out continuously until the required sample size is achieved. However, this 
strategy was not adopted for this survey because it was not practical to get a list of all the elements 
in the study population running over a hundred million. Nonetheless, the non-probability technique 
later employed in the selection of elements makes it impossible to apply statistical tests based upon 
the theory of probability, which is vital to an investigation of this type. 
5.1.2. Non- random / probability sampling designs 
This sampling design consists of the following sampling techniques: 
" Quota sampling 
" Accidental sampling 
" Judgemental or purpose sampling 
" Snowball sampling 
These sampling techniques do not follow the theory of probability in selecting the elements making 
up the sample size from the sampling population (Kumar 1999; Gay 1996; Leedy and Ormrod 
2001). Non-random or non-probability sampling design is used when the sampling characteristics 
are rear i. e. when the number of elements in a population is unknown or very difficult to identify. 
Thus, the selection of elements is based on other considerations quite independent of the theory of 
probability. However, these strategies were not used in this investigation, because the sampling 
characteristics in question are not rear and are incapable of representing the sampling population. 
In addition, the inferences drawn from these sampling techniques can not be generalized for the 
total sampling population (Kumar 1999; Gay 1996; Leedy and Ormrod 2001), while statistical tests 
based on the theory of probability can not be applied. 
5.1.3. Random or Probability sampling designs 
These were the sampling strategies adopted for this investigation. They consist of the following: 
" Simple random sampling 
" Stratified random sampling 
" Cluster sampling 
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The sampling technique adopted for this investigation was the double stage stratified random 
sampling design. This sampling technique was adopted bearing in mind another basic rule of 
sampling which states that the higher the variation with respect to the characteristics under 
consideration in the study population, the greater the uncertainty or error for a given sample size 
(Kumar 1999). By implication, the more identical all the elements are in a population, the more 
accurate the sample estimates irrespective of the chosen sample size. For example, if geographical 
location in Nigeria is the characteristic under study, the error margin is higher if samples are drawn 
from each of the 36 states as opposed to the stratification of Nigeria into its six geopolitical zones. 
Alternatively, a sample drawn at random without considering stratification would give heterogeneous 
data with a high level of uncertainty compared with any sample stratification either by states or 
geographical location. 
However, questionnaire distribution was the method adopted for data collection in this survey. A 
questionnaire is a written list of questions that are read, interpreted and answered in writing by 
respondents. It takes into consideration the need for clarity and the questions being easy to 
assimilate. This method of data collection was chosen because it is cost effective and ensures 
anonymity (Kumar 1999). However, it is cost effective because potential respondents are expected 
to cover a wide geographical area, and anonymity must be guaranteed because the questionnaire 
covers some issues impinging on personal finances and corruption (see Appendix A for the 
questionnaire design). The questionnaire was administered to a sample drawn from a study 
population in Nigeria. 
Another reason for adopting the stratified random sampling technique was that this survey aims to 
achieve an aggregate cross-section of the study population. Nevertheless, stratified random 
sampling is a method whereby the sample size is subdivided into segments, otherwise referred to 
as strata, which are based on some unique or specified characteristics, before each of the 
segments is subjected to random sampling. Random sampling is a selection technique that gives 
equal and independent chance to each element within the study population. The method used to 
construct this random sample in this survey was the application of a table of random numbers. For a 
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thorough understanding of this method and how it was used in the survey, it is necessary to have an 
overview of the methodological framework. 
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Figure 5.1.3.1 Methodological frame work of survey 
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Figure: 5.1.3.2. Map of Nigeria showing the stratified geopolitical zones and states 
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Figure: 5.1.3.3. Map of Nigeria showing the stratified geopolitical area 
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From the framework in Figure 5.1.3.1, the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria are the first six stratums 
and in each of these geopolitical zones, a state was randomly selected as shown in Figure 5.1.3.1 
and Table 5.3.1. The selected states and their geopolitical zones are as follows: Lagos state was 
selected from the South-West zone, Edo from the South-South, Imo from the South-East, Kano from 
the North-West, Kaduna state the North-Central and Adamawa state from the North-East zone. 
Respondents from the second specified stratum, comprising the public and private sectors and non- 
governmental organizations, were eventually selected from these states using the table of random 
numbers, which is shown with its procedure in Appendix A. The sample size in each of the selected 
states was 100, with the public and the private sectors having sample sizes of 35 each and non- 
governmental organizations having a sample size 30. These sample sizes allocated to the public 
and private sectors were higher than that for non-governmental organizations because most of the 
infrastructures in Nigeria are usually provided by the public or private sectors. The 35 
questionnaires for the public sector in each state were further subdivided into 17 questionnaires for 
civil engineers in ministries and 18 for academics in reputable institutions. Civil engineers were used 
for the reason that they are directly involved in the production and provision of infrastructures in 
Nigeria. To balance the views from the public sector, there was the need to have respondents that 
could represent infrastructure users. Thus, questionnaires were randomly distributed to academics 
from reputable institutions. 
Similarly, 17 questionnaires were distributed to contactors and 18 to retailers of construction 
materials in the private sector. The remaining 30 questionnaires were distributed to respondents 
from non-governmental organizations, which included religious organizations and trade unions, 
each of which received a total of 15 questionnaires. In all, about 600 questionnaires were distributed 
to potential respondents throughout the country. 
The double-stage stratification method was used in this investigation; this involved the stratification 
of Nigeria into its six geopolitical zones and of each of the selected states into six segments, namely 
civil engineers in ministries, academics from reputable institutions, contractors, dealers in 
construction materials, members of trade unions and religious organizations. This amounts to a 
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double-stage stratified random sampling technique. However, this technique is not significantly 
different from the double-stage cluster sampling. Cluster sampling is when the sampling population 
is divided into groups called clusters from which elements are then selected by simple random 
sampling (Kumar, 1999). 
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Table 5.1.3: States within Geopolitical zones and the selected states 
S/N Geopolitical zones States Selected states 
Jigawa 
Kano 
Katsina 
Kebbi 
Sokoto 
1 North western Nigeria Zamfara Kano 
Benue 
Kaduna 
Kogi 
Kwara 
Nasarawa 
Niger 
2 North central Nigeria Plateau Kaduna 
Adamawa 
Bauchi 
Borno 
Gombe 
Taraba 
3 North eastern Nigeria Yobe Adamawa 
0 YO 
O gun 
Lagos 
Ondo 
Osun 
4 South western Nigeria Ekiti Lagos 
Akwa Ibom 
Edo 
Delta 
Rivers 
Bayelsa 
5 South south Nigeria Cross river Edo 
Abia 
Imo 
Anambra 
Enugu 
6 South eastern Nigeria Ebonyi Imo 
5.2. Problems and experiences during data collection 
One of the major problems experienced during fieldwork was limitation of funds: there were no 
special grants made available for this purpose. All trips made to the six states from which data was 
collected were privately financed. Hence, road travel was used as being the cheapest method of 
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travel. Although the logistics were very poor, this afforded an opportunity for a first hand experience 
of the people and the state of the infrastructure, including roads, telecommunication, electricity, 
water supply, sanitation and housing in Nigeria. 
The people were highly receptive towards the aims of the research data collection team in all the 
cities visited. The research data collection team comprised the author, five final year students of 
Civil and Structural Engineering at the University of Benin, and two year four students of the same 
department and university in each of the six geopolitical regions. These year four students were on 
industrial training in these regions, and were used to assist the research data collection team in 
finding their way round the region, as well as to bridge communication gaps when the need arose. 
They proved very useful in this role. The success of the data collection was partly due to their 
unmitigated support and dedication. For example, in the North-West geopolitical zone, prospective 
respondents were initially very reluctant to communicate with the research data collection team. 
However, this reluctance was overcome because the research data collection team understood their 
culture, religion and language. 
Another notable experience was at St. Saviours Road in Benin City, South-south Nigeria. The 
research data collection team observed a scene along the failed portion of this road involving some 
commercial bike riders (Scooter drivers). This road was in a complete state of disrepair and the 
research data collection team decided to take a photograph of it before thinking of a way to 
circumvent the failed portion. While the picture was being taken, some of the Scooters riders 
objected violently, demanding to know why the picture was being taken. They damaged one camera 
beyond repair and seized the other. They were of the view that members of the research data 
collection team were journalists out to report their activities on the failed portion of the road. 
Because the failed portion of this road was seriously waterlogged and could not be traversed by 
four-wheeled motor vehicles, the Scooter riders were making a lucrative amount of money by 
transporting people across the failed section. 
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Figure: 5.2.1: Part of the failed Portion of St. Savior's Road in Benin City (2004) 
i 
However, the seized cameras were later released after they were convinced that the team was 
made up of students and the information collected was purely for research purposes. Some of the 
Scooter riders confided to the team that their means of sustenance depends on failed infrastructure 
such as the one in St. Saviors Road to survive the prevalent poverty and unemployment. It was 
learnt that similar activities take place in parts of the City such as Ugbowo area, Ogida quatres, 
Uselu quatres, Upper Mission and Okhoro areas. 
Due to serious income disparity and unemployment some people have to take solace in failed 
structures like the one at St Saviors Road to survive. It was not surprising to find the Scooter drivers 
apparently ready to fight anything that could compromise their only means of sustenance. This is 
anecdotal evidence of the degree to which failed infrastructure can affect the thinking and behavior 
of the poor. 
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Figure 5.2.2: A failed portion of Uwelu road, Ogida Quarters in Benin City (2004) 
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Figure 5.2.3: Part of the failed portion of Upper Mission Road in Benin City during the 
dry season (2004). 
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Another interesting event during field work occurred in Imo State, South-east Nigeria. The local 
council barred team from taking any photographs in the town. Nonetheless, the level of 
infrastructure in this part of the country was the worst experienced in the survey, at least according 
to our observation. 
The people of Imo State were eventually very hospitable to the research data collection team. 
Initially, there were difficulties of data collection in the town as the response rate was extremely low 
(less than 10%). Potential respondents were very unwilling to return their questionnaires, which 
resulted in the extension of our stay in the town by three days. However, a similar technique used 
by the team in Kano State in North-west Nigeria produced the response the team had wanted and 
needed. It was observed that the people of this region respond quickly to anyone who could speak 
their language and understand their way of life. This observation was noticed throughout the team's 
stay in Imo town. Surprisingly, even the literate and enlightened amongst them exhibited these 
traits. While some respondents in this region demanded gratification for the return of the 
questionnaire during the first data collection exercise, these same persons became very 
accommodating during the follow-up. Their cooperation must have been due to the technique of 
bridging the communication gap with the use of their language and value system. However, extreme 
care was taken by the team not to interfere in the respondents' response to the questionnaire. 
5.3. Summary 
In this chapter, the theory of sampling was discussed. Also addressed were the various types of 
sampling procedures and probability sampling was adopted as the most relevant for the survey. The 
two-stage stratified random sampling method was presented. Thus the desire to have an aggregate 
cross-section of the study population prompted the adoption of the two stage stratified random 
sampling. The estimated sample size was 600. In the chapter, reasons were given for accepting 
questionnaire as the method of data collection and the questionnaire distribution replicated in a 
framework. Some very unique experience gathered during the field work was reported. 
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Chapter Six 
Analysis and Explanation of Survey results 
6.0. Introduction 
The data for this survey was collected through the distribution of questionnaires. This 
method of data collection was chosen because it is cost effective and ensures anonymity. 
The questionnaire (please see Appendix A, page 249) was sub-divided into three sections: 
section "A" comprised six personal questions; section "B" consisted of 13 questions aimed 
at knowing the present "state of infrastructure provision in Nigeria" and section "C" 
contained two questions addressing the "causes of infrastructure failures in Nigeria". Each 
of these sections and the analyses carried out on the results of the data obtained from 
them are explained in the following paragraphs. 
In section A, the personal questions give an insight into the personal circumstances of the 
prospective respondents, and encompass areas such as "willingness to respond to the 
questionnaire", "geopolitical regions or zones of respondents", "sector / organization of 
respondents", "respondent's rank or class in organization", "respondents range of monthly 
income" and the "age range of respondents". This collated data distribution was examined 
and further crosstabulation within the same section was carried out. For example, data on 
"geopolitical region" was crosstabulated with "sector / organization of respondents", 
"respondents' class or rank in organization" and "respondents monthly income". This was 
in order to reveal the distribution of respondents using the various criteria in the 
questionnaire. 
Section "B" of the questionnaire covered "stability of infrastructure services"; " 
infrastructure supply"; "quality of infrastructure"; "infrastructure maintenance"; "the 
response rate to infrastructure maintenance; "staffs of local infrastructure service 
providers" and "infrastructure monthly bills". A similar crosstabulation to the one in the 
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preceding paragraph was also carried out between data obtained in section "A", such as 
"geopolitical regions" and "range of monthly income", and those from section "B". The 
purpose of crosstabulating data from both sections was to see whether there were varying 
views on the state of infrastructure in Nigeria across "geopolitical regions" and "range of 
monthly income". The analysis carried out for each crosstabulation and subsequent 
correlation is presented in this chapter. 
Correlations between variables from section "B" of the questionnaire and the subsequent 
empirical models were developed using the ordinal data collected as a way of critically 
evaluating basic assumptions and hypothesis made on infrastructure failures in sub- 
Saharan Africa and Nigeria in particular, as revealed in the literature review. For example, 
relationships between "stability of infrastructure services'" and "infrastructure supply", 
"stability of infrastructure services" and " quality of infrastructure", "stability of infrastructure 
services" and "infrastructure maintenance", "stability of infrastructure services" and 
"response rate to infrastructure maintenance", "stability of infrastructure services and 
"staffs of local infrastructure service providers" were all confirmed. The empirical models 
developed from the data were through the means of multiple regression analysis. Each of 
these empirical models was validated using responses from 40 respondents selected at 
random specifically for this purpose. 
Data collected from section C of the questionnaire, covering the causes of infrastructure 
failures in Nigeria, was analyzed using a severity index in matrix order (SIMO) model 
(Omoregie et al. 2005). This model was applied taking Into consideration the peculiarity of 
the data collected in this section. The causes of infrastructure failures in Nigeria were 
revealed in order of severity using this model. These factors were analyzed against the 
severity expressed for each of them across the six geopolitical zones, and a coefficient of 
variation for each factor was calculated in order to establish its relative spread across 
geopolitical zones or regions. This is important because, while some factors in a survey 
' This refers to the constancy of infrastructure services in Nigeria. 
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could be significant in one or two geopolitical regions and not in others, they could still 
affect significantly the total national result. For this reason, measuring the variations of 
spread alongside severity of factors was very important. 
This chapter consists of: 
o Section 6.0: Introduction. 
o Section 6.1: Respondents distribution: Geopolitical regions and Sector 
Organization. 
o Section 6.2: Respondents class or rank distribution 
o Section 6.3: Respondents range of monthly income distribution 
o Section 6.4: Respondents age range distribution 
o Section 6.5: Stability of infrastructure services 
o Section 6.6: Infrastructure supply 
o Section 6.7: Quality of infrastructure 
o Section 6.8: Rate of infrastructure maintenance 
o Section 6.9: Response rate to infrastructure maintenance 
o Section 6.10: Stakeholders impression of staffs of local infrastructure 
service providers 
o Section 6.11: Respondents rating of average infrastructure monthly bills 
o Section 6.12: Correlation coefficients and Modeling of notable variable 
factors 
o Section 6.13: Observations of results tables on factors responsible for 
infrastructure failures 
o Section 6.14: Explanation of results on the causes of infrastructure failures 
in Nigeria 
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6.1. Respondents distribution: Geopolitical regions and Sectors / Organization 
The stratified random sampling technique adopted for this investigation meant that respondents 
were asked to identify their geopolitical region and the sector / organization to which they belong. 
The aim was to ensure that the population within each stratum (i. e. geopolitical region or sector) 
was homogenous, thereby giving estimates greater accuracy . The questionnaire distribution and 
responses within each of the geopolitical regions and sector / organization are as follows: 
Table 6.1.1: Questionnaire distribution and responses within each Geopolitical zone 
Number of 
uestionnaires 
Number of 
respondents Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
No response 0 2.0 .5 .5 
South west 100 59.0 14.6 15.1 
North west 100 70.0 17.4 32.5 
South east 100 61.0 15.1 47.6 
North east 100 54.0 13.4 61.0 
South south 100 99.0 24.6 85.6 
North central 100 58.0 14.4 100.0 
Total 600 403.0 100.0 
Table 6.1.2: Questionnaire distribution and responses within each Sector / 
organization 
Number of 
questionnaires 
Number of 
respondents Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
no response 0 6.0 1.5 1.5 
Public 210 133.0 33.0 34.5 
Private 210 130.0 32.3 66.7 
Non Governmental 
Organization 180 97.0 24.1 90.8 
Not applicable 0 37.0 9.2 100.0 
Total 600 403.0 100.0 
The "non-response" in first row of Table 6.1.1 and Table 6.1.2 above represents the number and 
percentage of respondents that failed to give an answer. However, percentages in both tables were 
derived from the proportion of respondents in each geopolitical region or sector / organization 
relative to the total number of 403 respondents. For example, the proportion of 59 respondents from 
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southwest region in the total of 403 in Table 6.1.1 was 14.6 percent, and the proportion of 133 
respondents from the public sector in the total of 403 respondents in Table 6.1.2 was 33 percent. 
In addition, the cumulative percentages in both Table 6.1.1 and Table 6.1.2 effectively totalled 100 
percent in the last option in each of the tables. This indicates validity in the percentage 
computation. On the other hand, the "Not applicable" option in Table 6.1.2 falls amongst the given 
alternatives in the question from which respondents were asked to choose. Moreover, it was an 
option meant for those respondents not willing to indicate their sector / organization. Furthermore, in 
order know how respondents were distributed within each sector / organization in each geopolitical 
region, there was a need to carry out a cross-tabulation between geopolitical regions and sector / 
organization. 
Table 6.1.3: Crosstabulation between Geopolitical region and Sector / organization 
Se ctor / Organization 
Non 
Governmental Not 
response .e Public Private Organization a licable Total 
Geo-Political No response Count 
E 
0 0 1 0 2 
Region in % within Goo-Political 
Nigeria Region in Nigeria . 0% . 0% 50.0% . 0% 100.0% 
South west Count a 24 22 13 0 59 
% wit hin G tical 
Region in Nigeria Nigeria . 0% 40.7% 37.3% 22.0% . 0% 100.0% 
North west Count 0 27 19 19 5 70 
aticý %within 
. 0% 38.6% 27.1% 27.1% 7.1% 100.0% geri Region In in Nigeria 
South east Count 0 19 21 16 5 61 
% within Geo-PoIkM, al 
. 0% 31.1% 34.4% 28.2% 8.2% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
North east Count 3 14 21 5 11 54 
% within Geo-PdRical 8% 5 25.9% 38.9% 9.3% 20 4% 100 0% Region In Nigeria . . . 
South south Count 1 35 32 30 1 99 
% within Ga tical 1.0% 35.4% 32.3% 30.3% 1.0% 100 0% Region in Nigeria . 
North central Count 1 14 15 13 15 58 
Mal % within G 1 7% 24.1% 25.9% 22 4% 9% 25 100 0% 
geria NiNigeria Region Region In R . . . 
Total Count 6 133 130 97 37 403 
% within Geo-Poliflcal 1 5% 33.0% 32.3% 24.1% 9 2% 0% 100 Region in Nigeria igeria . . . 
In Table 6.1.3, "count" simply represents the number or frequency of occurrence, and it should be 
viewed both horizontally and vertically. A horizontal view reveals the number of respondents across 
the various sectors in a particular geographical region (for example, the second row shows the 
distribution of respondents across all the sectors in South West Nigeria) while a vertical view reveals 
the number of respondents across the various geopolitical regions within a particular sector / 
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organization (for example, the second column shows the number of respondents in the public sector 
across the various geopolitical regions). However, "percent within geo-political region in Nigeria" 
indicates the percentage of frequency count of a particular occurrence in the total horizontal 
frequency counts. For example, in the second row and third column within the North-Central region, 
24.1 percent represents the percentage of frequency count 14 in the total count of 58 respondents 
for that region. 
6.2. Respondents class or rank distribution 
The class or rank of respondents elicited the relative distribution of views across social class or 
status. The extent to which any particular view cuts across all strata or classes in an organization or 
falls within a class could also give an indication of its relative spread or restriction. However, Table 
6.2.1 shows the total respondents' distribution within each class of rank in the organization they 
indicated 
Table 6.2.1: Respondents class or rank in the organization 
Number of 
res ondents Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
no response 9 2.2 2.2 
low class 57 14.1 16.4 
middle class 200 49.6 66.0 
high class 61 15.1 81.1 
not applicable 76 18.9 100.0 
Total 403 100.0 
From Table 6.2.1 above, about nine respondents left the question of indicating their class or rank in 
the organization unanswered. However, about 76 respondents answered the question by indicating 
the option "not applicable", which implies that they were not willing to disclose their class or rank in 
the organization. About 57 respondents, or 14.1 percent of the total, were "low class" while another 
61 (15.1 percent) were higher class, making a difference of only one percent. Approximately, 49.6 
percent, or about 200 respondents, fell within the "middle class". The percentage difference 
between the higher and low class respondents and the 200 respondents in the middle class 
indicates a relatively good spread across the sample population. Moreover, the cumulative percent 
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effectively added up to 100 percent at the last option ("not applicable") in the Table. Furthermore, to 
reveal how respondents were distributed within each class or rank within sector / organization in 
each geopolitical region, it was necessary to carry out a cross-tabulation between the geopolitical 
regions and the class or rank of respondents. Table 6.2.2 revealed a constant pattern of respondent 
distribution within specified strata or class in each of the geopolitical regions. It is evident that a 
sizeable percentage of respondents falls within the middle class stratum, with the upper and lower 
class respondents maintaining an acceptable difference in all the geopolitical regions. Thus, the 
distribution of respondents by class or rank could be considered acceptable. 
Table 6.2.2: Crosstabulation between Geopolitical region and class of respondents 
Class in Organizat ion 
no response low class middle class high class not applicable Total 
Goo-Political No response Count 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Region in % within Geo-Political Nigeria Region in Nigeria 100.0% . 0% . 0% . 0% . 0% 100.0% 
South west Count 2 14 28 8 7 59 
% within Political 3 4% 23.7% 47.5% 13.6% 11.9% 100.0% Region gion in Nigeria . 
North west Count 2 7 49 5 7 70 
% within Goo-Political 2.9% 10.0% 70.0% 7.1% 10.0% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
South east Count 0 18 19 13 11 61 
% within ßeo-Political 
. 0% 29.5% 31.1% 
21.3% 180% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
North east Count 2 3 26 10 13 54 
%within Geo"Political 
3 7% 6.6% 48.1% 18.5% 24.1% 100 0% Region In Nigeria . . 
South south Count 1 5 62 17 14 99 
% within Geo-Political 1.0% 6.1% 82.8% 17.2% 14.1% 100.0% Region in Nigeria 
North central Count 0 10 16 8 24 58 
% within Geo-Political 
Region in Nigeria . 0% 
17.2% 27.6% 13.8% 41.4% 100.0% 
Total Count 9 57 200 61 78 403 
% within Goo-Political 
Region in Nigeria 2. 
14.1% 49.6% 15.1% 18.9% 100.0% 
6.3. Respondents range of monthly income distribution 
The range of monthly income ascertained whether respondents' income levels are of any 
significance. This is very important in view of the direct relationship between income levels and 
infrastructure, as revealed in the literature review. The Table 6.3.1 below has not only shown the 
range of monthly income distribution in each of the geopolitical regions but also the total summary of 
income distribution for the country. This summary can be found in the last row of the table. 
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Table 6.3.1: Crossiabulation between Geopolitical regions and Range of monthly 
income. 
Ran e of montl inco me 
Between fifty 
thousand and One hudred 
under fifty one hundred thousand 
thousand thousand naira and Not 
No response naira naira above applicable Total 
o-Politics No response Count 2 2 
Region In % within Goo-Political 
Nigeria Region in Nigeria 100.0% 
100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 
5% 
South west Count 2 24 17 8 8 59 
% within Geo-Political 3.4% 40.7% 28.8% 13.6% 13.6% 100.0% Region in Nigeria 
% of Total . 
5% 60% 4.2% 2.0% 2.0% 146% 
North west Count 12 44 4 10 70 
% within Geo-Political 1% 17 62.9% 5.7% 14.3% 100.0% Region in Nigeria . 
% of Total 3.0% 10.9% 1.0% 2.5% 17.4% 
South east Count 23 17 8 13 61 
% within Geo-Political 37.7% 27.9% 13.1% 21.3% 100.0% 
Region in Nigeria 
% of Total 5.7% 4.2% 2.0% 32% 15.1% 
North east Count 7 11 3 6 27 54 
%within Geo-PoliBcal 
13.0% 20.4% 5.6% 11.1% 600% 100.0% Region in Nigeria 
% of Total 1.7% 2.7% . 7% 1.5% 6.7% 134% 
South south Count 3 32 22 14 28 99 
%within C Political 
3.0% 32.3% 22.2% 14.1% 283% 100.0% 
Region in Nigeria 
% of Total . 7% 
7.9% 5.5% 3.5% 69% 24.6% 
North central Count 20 5 7 26 58 
%within Geo-Political 34,5% 8.6% 12.1% 44.8% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
% of Total 5.0% 1.2% 1.7% 65% 14.4% 
Total Count 14 122 108 47 112 403 
%within Goo-Political 
3.5% 30.3% 26.8% 11.7% 27.8% 100.0% Region in Nigeria 
% of Total 3 5% 30.3% 268% 117% 27.8% 100 0% 
It can be seen from the last row in the table above that the number of respondents decreases with 
an increase in income level. A similar trend is found in each of the six geopolitical regions in the 
country. Nonetheless, about 27.8 percent of the total 403 respondents declined to indicate their 
range of monthly income. However, to check the significance of income levels to the views 
expressed on the stability of infrastructure services in Nigeria, the following cross-tabulation 
between range of monthly income and the stability of infrastructure services in Nigeria was carried 
out: 
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Table 6.3.2: Respondents Range of monthly income and stability of infrastructure 
services in Nigeria. 
Stabili of Infrastructure and service deliverv, in Ni eria 
No response Very Stable Stable Unstable Very Unstable Total 
Range of No response Count 5 1 6 2 14 
montly % within Range 
In 35.7% 7.1% 42.9% 14.3% 100.0% come of mostly income 
% of Total 1.2% . 2% 1.5% . 5% 
3.5% 
under fifty thousand naira Count 3 4 64 51 122 
n Range % 2.5% 3.3% 52.5% 41.8% 100.0% 
of mon Income tly of mos 
% of Total . 
7% 10% 159% 127% 30.3% 
Between fifty thousand Count 2 23 38 45 108 
and one hundred % within Range 
thousand naira 1.9% 21.3% 35.2% 41.7% 
100.0% 
of montly Income 
% of Total 
. 
5% 6.7% 9.4% 11.2% 26.8% 
One hudred thousand Count 1 2 2 20 22 47 
naira and above % within Range 2.1% 4.3% 4.3% 42.6% 468% 100.0% 
of mostly Income 
% of Total . 
2% 
. 
5% 
. 
5% 5.0% 5.5% 11.7% 
Not applicable Count 4 42 66 112 
%withinRange 3.6% 37.5% 58.9% 100.0% 
of montly income 
% of Total 1.0% 10.4% 16.4% 27.8% 
Total Count 6 7 34 170 186 403 
% within Range 1.5% 1.7% 8.4% 42.2% 46.2% 100.0% 
of montly income 
% of Total 1.5% 1.7% 6 4% 42.2% 462% 1000% 
A careful study of Table 6.3.2 above reveals that irrespective of the range of monthly income, a 
large number of respondents were of the view that infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was 
either "unstable" or "very unstable". For example, about 52.5 percent of respondents under the "fifty 
thousand naira" monthly income maintained that infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was 
"unstable", while another 41.8 percent with the same income observed that it was "very unstable". 
Adding both percentages gave a total dissatisfaction response of 94.3 percent. Similarly, 
respondents between "fifty thousand and one hundred thousand naira" monthly income and those 
above "one hundred thousand naira" monthly income gave approximately 77 percent and 89 
percent dissatisfaction rating respectively. The 77 percent dissatisfaction breakdown for 
respondents between "fifty thousand and one hundred thousand naira" monthly income are as 
follows: 35.2 percent indicated that infrastructure service delivery was "unstable" and 41.7 percent 
saw it as "very unstable". For the 89 percent of respondents above "one hundred thousand naira" 
monthly income who showed dissatisfaction, 42.6 percent pointed out that it was "unstable" while 
46.8 percent maintained it was "very unstable". 
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Respondents who left the question on range of monthly income unanswered but answered the 
question on stability of infrastructure services are represented as "no response" in the first row of 
Table 6.3.2. About 42.9 percent of these respondents indicated that infrastructure service delivery 
was "unstable" in Nigeria while 14.7 percent maintained that it was "very unstable". Some 
respondents ticked the option "not applicable" when answering the question on range of monthly 
income, which indicates that the particular question was not applicable to them or that they were not 
willing to specify the range of their monthly income. These respondents are coded "not applicable" 
in the last row of Table 6.5.1.2. About 37.5 percent of these respondents observed that 
infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "unstable" and 58.9 percent of them were of the view 
that it was "very unstable", giving a total dissatisfaction response for this group of 96.4 percent. 
Consequently, the frequency analysis so far proves that income levels have not significantly 
affected the views expressed by respondents on the matter of infrastructure stability in Nigeria, 
because a similar trend of dissatisfaction can be observed in the whole range of monthly incomes. 
Having analyzed if income affected the views expressed by respondents, the next stage is to 
examine if respondents' ages impacted on views expressed. 
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6.4. Respondents age range distribution 
Respondents were asked their age range in the survey in order to ascertain the level of similarity or 
dissimilarity of views across age groups and to check if the age range of respondents affects their 
responses. 
Table 6.4.1 : Crosstabulation of Geopolitical region and Age range of respondents 
Am Ra e 
Under 30 65 years 
No response years 30-60 ars 60-65 years and above Total 
eo-the No response Court 2 2 
Region in % within Goo-Political Nigeria Region In Nigeria 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 5% South west Count 1 15 31 9 3 59 
%within Geo-Polltkal 1.7% 25.4% 52.5% 15.3% 5 1% 100 0% Region In Nigeria . . 
% of Total . 2% 3.7% 7.7% 2.2% . 7% 14 6% North west court 1 33 24 6 6 70 
% within G icai 
Region in Nigeria igeria 1.4% 47.1% 34.3% 8.6% 8.6% 100.0% 
% of Total . 2% 82% 6.0% 1.5% 1.5% 17.4% South east Count 15 36 8 2 61 
% within Geo-Political 
Region in Nigeria 24.6% 59.0% 13.1% 3.3% 100.0% 
% of Total 37% 8.9% 2.0% . 
5% 15.1% 
North east Count 2 41 10 1 54 
% within Geo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 3.7% 75.9% 18.5% 1.9% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% 10.2% 2.5% . 2% 13.4% South south Court 27 66 4 2 99 
iced % within ia 
Region on In in Nigeria 
27.3% 66.7% 4.0% 2.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 8.7% 16.4% 1.0% . 5% 24.6% North central Count 8 29 12 9 58 
% within Geo-Political 13.8% 50.0% 20.7% 15 5% 100 0% Region In Nigeria . . 
% of Total 2.0% 7.2% 3.0% 22% 144% 
Total Court 6 139 196 40 22 403 
% within Geo-PolftIcal 1.5% 34.5% 48.6% 9.9% 5 5% 100 0% Region in Nigeria . . 
%ofTotal 1.5% 345% 486% 99% 55% 1000% 
The last row in Table 6.4.1 revealed that the highest number of respondents was within the age 
range of 30-60 years, making about 48.6 percent of the total, followed by those under the age of 30 
(34.5 percent). However, it should be emphasized that the questionnaire was not administered to 
anyone below the age of 25 years. About 83 percent of respondents fell within the age bracket 25- 
60 years when both percentages are added. The percentage of respondents within the age bracket 
of 60-65 years was just 9.9 percent. The cross-tabulation shown in Table 6.4.2 demonstrates the 
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levels of similarity or dissimilarity of views across age ranges and the effect (if any) of age on 
response. 
Table 6.4.2: Cross-tabulation of Age Range and Stability of Infrastructure in Nigeria 
Stabil' of Infrastructure and service delive in Ni eria 
No response Very Stable Stable Unstable Very Unstable Total 
Age No response Count 4 1 1 6 
Range % within Age Range 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.0% . 
2% 
. 
2% 1.5% 
Under 30 years Count 4 22 54 59 139 
% within Age Range 2.9% 15.8% 38.8% 42.4% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.0% 5.5% 13.4% 14.6% 345% 
30-60 years Count 1 1 8 97 89 196 
%within Age Range . 5% . 5% 4.1% 49.5% 45.4% 100.0% 
% of Total . 2% . 2% 2.0% 24.1% 22.1% 486% 
60-65 years Count 2 1 17 20 40 
% within Age Range 5.0% 2.5% 42.5% 50.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 2% 4.2% 5.0% 9.9% 
65 years and above Count 1 3 1 17 22 
% within Age Range 4.5% 13.6% 4.5% 77.3% 100.0% 
% of Total . 2% . 7% . 2% 4.2% 5 5% Total Count 6 7 34 170 186 403 
% within Age Range 1.5% 1.7% 8.4% 42.2% 46.2% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.5% 1.7% 84% 422% 46 2% 100.0% 
The "no response" row in Table 6.4.2 represents those respondents that were not willing to indicate 
their age. It was generally observed that across all ages, the number of respondents indicating that 
infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "very unstable" and "unstable" far exceeded those 
respondents that believed infrastructure service delivery was "very stable" or "stable". The last row 
summaries the whole table: about 46.2 percent of all respondents indicated that infrastructure 
service delivery in Nigeria was "very unstable" and 42.2 percent said "unstable", giving a total 
dissatisfaction level of 88.4 percent. However, this percentage was not different from the percentage 
of respondents that earlier expressed their dissatisfaction in Table 6.3.2. 
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6.5. Stability of infrastructure services in Nigeria 
Respondents were asked to rate the level of stability of infrastructure services in Nigeria. This is 
important because of the literature review's strong emphasis on the erratic nature of infrastructure 
service delivery in Nigeria. Results obtained can be seen in Table 6.5.1. 
Table 6.5.1 Crosstabulation of Geopolitical region and Stability of infrastructure 
services in Nigeria 
Stabilit of Infrastructu re and service delive in Ni ena 
No response Very Stable Stable Unstable Very Unstable Total 
Geo-Politcal No response Court 2 2 
Region in %wihin Geo-Politlcal 
Nigeria ' Region in Nigeria 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 5% 
South west count 1 4 3 20 31 59 
%within Geo-Political 1.7% 6.8% 5.1% 33.9% 52.5% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
% of Total . 2% 10% . 
7% 5.0% 77% 146% 
North west Count 1 19 26 24 70 
%within Geo-PolBical 1.4% 27.1% 37.1% 34.3% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
% of Total . 2% 
4.7% 6.5% 60% 174% 
South east Count 2 18 41 61 
%withinGeo-Political 3.3% 29.5% 87.2% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
%ofTotal . 5% 4.5% 10.2% 15.1% 
North east count 1 3 2 24 24 54 
% within Geo-Polftlcal 1 9% 5.6% 3.7% 44.4% 44.4% 100.0% Region ion In In Nigeria Nigeria . 
% of Total . 
2% 
. 
7% 
. 
5% 80% 80% 134% 
South south Count 1 3 57 38 99 
% within Geo-Polkical 1.0% 3.0% 57.6% 384% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
% of Total . 2% . 
7% 114.1% 94% 246% 
North central Count 5 25 28 58 
%within Geo"Political 8.6% 43.1% 48.3% 100.0% Region in Nigeria 
% of Total 12% 621/6 69% 144% 
Total Count 8 7 34 170 186 403 
% within Geo-Polftical 1.5% 1.7% 8.4% 42.2% 46.2% 100.0% 
Region In Nigeria 
% of Total 1.5% 1.7% 84% 42.2% 462% 11000% 
From the total 403 respondents in Table 6.5.1, about 46.2 percent were of the view that 
infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "very unstable" and another 42.2 percent that it was 
"unstable", giving a total of 88.4 percent. 8.4 percent said the infrastructure was "stable" and 1.7 
percent "very stable" yielding a total of just 9.8 percent. 
A regional breakdown is as follows. Results from the South-west region in Table 6.5.1 showed a 
total number of 59 respondents, about 52.5 percent of whom held the view that infrastructure 
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service delivery in Nigeria was "very unstable" and a further 33.9 percent "unstable", giving a total 
dissatisfaction rate of 86.45 percent -a difference of approximately 2 percent with the national 
figure. This is hardly a significant difference. On the other hand, 5.1 percent proportion of 
respondents from the South-west region maintained that infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria 
was "stable" and 6.8 percent proportion "very stable", giving a total satisfaction level of just 11.9 
percent. These are shown in Figures 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.1.7 percent proportion of respondents for 
South-west did not respond at all. 
Results collated from North-west region, revealed 70 respondents for the region out of a total of 
100. About 34.3 percent of these respondents observed that infrastructure service delivery in 
Nigeria was "very unstable" and 37.1 percent "unstable", giving a total of 71.4 percent. This figure is 
17 percent less than the level of dissatisfaction expressed nationwide. An additional 27.1 percent 
proportion of respondents maintained that infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "stable". No 
responses were recorded for the "very stable" option. Thus, the total satisfaction response was just 
27.1 percent. These are shown in Figure 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.1.4 percent of respondents failed to 
respond to this question. 
A review of the results collated from South-east Nigeria revealed that there were a total of 61 
respondents, about 67.2 percent of whom were of the view that infrastructure service delivery in 
Nigeria was "very unstable" and another 29.5 percent "unstable" totalling 96.7 percent. This figure is 
about 8.3 percent higher than the national one, 10.25 percent higher than that of the South-west 
region and 25.3 percent higher that in North-west Nigeria. 3.3 percent of respondents were of the 
view that infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "stable". There was no response for the "very 
stable". option. These figures are carefully shown in Figure 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. 
Results from the North-east region gave a total of 54 respondents, and of this number 44.4 percent 
affirmed that infrastructure service delivery was "very unstable" while another 44.4 percent were of 
the view that it was "unstable", amounting to a dissatisfaction rate of about 88.4 percent. This figure 
is identical to the national one. Meanwhile, about 3.7 percent of respondents were of the view that 
126 
infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "stable" and another 5.6 percent that it was "very 
stable", giving a total satisfaction rate of about 9.3 percent (about 1.9 percent failed to respond). 
This level of dissatisfaction was 1.95 percent higher than that of South-west region and a full 17 
percent higher than North-west Nigeria, although it was less than that of the South-east region by 
25.3 percent. Figures 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 clarify these comparisons. 
Results from South-south Nigeria in the Table 6.5.1 are based on a total of 99 respondents. Of this 
number 38.4 percent maintained that infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "very unstable" 
while another 57.6 percent said "unstable", giving a total dissatisfaction rate of 96 percent. This was 
approximately 8 percent higher than the national average. It was higher than the equivalent figures 
for the South-west, North-west and North-east regions by 9.55 percent, 24.6 percent and 7.6 
percent respectively. Only 3 percent scored infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria as "stable" and 
no one said "very stable". These are shown in Figure 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. There was a1 percent non- 
response rate to this question. 
Results from the North-central Nigeria revealed a total of 58 respondents; of this number, 48.3 
percent were of the view that infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "very unstable" and 43.1 
percent "unstable", resulting in a total dissatisfaction response of 91.4 percent - about 3 percent 
higher than the national figure. 8.6 percent were of the view that infrastructure service delivery in 
Nigeria was "stable" while none of the respondents said that it was "very stable". The level of 
dissatisfaction expressed for North-central Nigeria by respondents was greater than that expressed 
in South-west, North-west and North-east by 4.95 percent, 20 percent and 3 percent respectively. It 
was however less than the level of dissatisfaction articulated in South-east and South-south Nigeria. 
These figures are shown in Figure 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. 
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Figure 6.5.1 Dissatisfaction levels by respondents on stability of infrastructure and 
service delivery 
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The analysis and results of this section so far apparently support the views expressed in the 
literature review on the matter of the "stability of infrastructure services in Nigeria". 
6.6. Infrastructure supply 
In the bid to ascertain if the quantity of infrastructure meets required expectations or demands, 
respondents were asked to rate the level of infrastructure supply in Nigeria. This has become 
necessary because in the literature review the dearth of infrastructure was emphasized - and its 
gross inadequacy when it is present. Table 6.6.1 shows respondents' rating of infrastructure supply 
by geopolitical region. 
Table 6.6.1: Crosstabulation of Geopolitical region and infrastructure supply 
Infrastructure supply and service ' alive in Ni ena 
Very 
no response Very adequate Adequate Inadequate Inadequate Total 
o-Political No response Count 2 2 
Region in % within Geo-Politlcal 
Nigeria Region In Nigeria 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 
5% 
. 
5% 
South west Count 6 2 2 19 30 59 
% within Geo Politlcal 
Region In Nigeria 10.2% 34% 3.4% 32.2% 50.8% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.5% . 
5% 
. 
6% 4.7% 7.4% 14.6% 
North west Count 3 1 26 23 17 70 
% within Geo-Po9tlcal 4.3% 1.4% 37.1% 32.9% 24 3% 100 0% Region on In Nigeria . . 
% of Total . 7% . 2% 6.5% 5.7% 4.2% 17.4% 
South east Count 1 2 18 40 61 
% within Geo-Poiftlcal 
Region in Nigeria 
1.6% 3.3% 29.5% 65.8% 100.0% 
% of Total . 
2% . 5% 4.5% 9.9% 15.1% 
North east Count 1 1 2 28 22 54 
% within Geo-Polidcal 
Region in Nigeria 1.9% 1.9% 3.7% 51.9% 40.7% 100.0% 
% of Total . 
2% . 
2% 
. 
5% 6.9% 5.5% 13.4% 
South south Count 2 7 56 34 99 
% within Geo-Politlcal 
Region In Nigeria 2.0% 
7.1% 56.6% 34.3% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% 
1.7% 13.9% 8.4% 24.6% 
North central Count 4 15 39 58 
% within Geo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 6.9% 25.9% 67.2% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.0% 3.7% 9.7% 14.4% 
Total Count 15 4 43 159 182 403 
% within Geo Political 
Region in Nigeria 3.7% 1.0% 10.7% 39.5% 46.2% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.7% 1.0% 10.7% 39.5% 45.2% 100.0% 
The cross-tabulation between geo-political region in Nigeria and infrastructure supply in Table 6.6.1 
revealed that 45.2 percent of the total 403 respondents received were of the view that infrastructure 
supply in Nigeria was "very inadequate" and 39.5 percent "inadequate", giving a total dissatisfaction 
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of 84.7 percent. On comparison to the analysis in the preceding section, the level of dissatisfaction 
expressed was 88.4 percent - 3.7 percent higher than the level of dissatisfaction expressed now by 
respondents. Meanwhile about 10.7 percent proportion of respondents were of the view that 
infrastructure supply in Nigeria was "adequate" and just 1 percent felt it was "very adequate", giving 
a total satisfaction rate of 11.7 percent - 1.6 percent higher than the level of satisfaction with the 
stability of infrastructure services as analyzed in the previous section. Nevertheless, the difference 
between levels of dissatisfaction and satisfaction in this analysis was 73 percent in favour of those 
respondents that felt dissatisfied with the levels of infrastructure supply. A critical look at the levels 
of dissatisfaction and levels of satisfaction for each geopolitical region as revealed in Figures 6.6.1 
and 6.6.2 showed that, with an increase in levels of dissatisfaction by respondents across 
geopolitical regions, there was a corresponding decrease in their various percentage levels of 
satisfaction. 
Regionally, the results from South-west Nigeria revealed that of the 59 respondents, about 58.8 
percent were of the view that infrastructure supply in Nigeria was "very inadequate" and 32.2 
percent proportion that it was "inadequate", giving a dissatisfaction rate of approximately 83 percent. 
This is 1.7 percent lower than the national one - not significant enough to raised concern on this 
issue. About 3.4 percent of the same total for South-west Nigeria maintained that infrastructure 
supply in Nigeria was "adequate" and another 3.4 percent that it was "very adequate", giving a total 
satisfaction rate of just 6.8 percent. However, there was a non-response rate of about 10 percent. 
Results from North-west Nigeria as shown in Table 6.6.1 were from 70 respondents, 24.3 percent 
of whom were of the view that infrastructure supply in Nigeria was "very inadequate" and another 
32.9 percent that it was "inadequate". 37.1 percent maintained that infrastructure supply in Nigeria 
was "adequate" while 1.4 percent said "very adequate". the total dissatisfaction rate is therefore 
about 57.2 percent, and the total satisfaction rate is 38.5 percent. This dissatisfaction rate is 27.5 
percent less than that of the whole country, and 25.8 percent less than in South-west Nigeria. 4.5 
percent of respondents from North-west Nigeria did not answer the question. This great difference in 
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response rate relative to the other regions can probably be accounted for by the fact that most 
infrastructures supplied in Nigeria were slightly skewed during the second republic in favour of this 
region (Ayogu, 2001). The investigation discovered a significant correlation between states of origin 
of political office holders in Nigeria and the amount of infrastructure supplied (Ayogu, 2001). 
Of the 61 respondents in South-east Nigeria, 65.6 percent said that infrastructure supply in Nigeria 
was "very inadequate" and 29.5 percent said it was "inadequate", giving a total dissatisfaction rate of 
95.1 percent - 10.4 percent greater than the response nationally. It exceeded the proportion of 
dissatisfaction expressed in South-west Nigeria by 12.1 percent and North-west Nigeria by 38.1 
percent. Meanwhile, 3.3 percent from this region were of the view that infrastructure supply in 
Nigeria was "adequate". No one said "very adequate". This development is understandable since 
the level of dissatisfaction expressed by respondents earlier in South-east was very high. This goes 
a long way in revealing the feeling of the people in South-eastern Nigeria on the matter of 
infrastructure supply in the region. I percent did not respond at all to the question. 
About 40.7 percent of the 54 respondents from North-east Nigeria, as shown in Table 6.6.1, were 
of the view that infrastructure supply in Nigeria was "very inadequate" and. 51.9 percent said 
"inadequate", giving a total dissatisfaction rate of 93.1 percent. This was 8.4 percent higher than 
the national figure, but 2 percent less than the South-east, 10.1 percent greater than the South- 
west and 36.1 percent greater than the North-west. 3.7 percent proportion of respondents for 
North-east Nigeria was of the view that infrastructure supply in Nigeria was "adequate", while 
another 1.9 percent said "very adequate"; making a total satisfaction of 5.5 percent. These are 
plotted in Figures 6.6.1 and 6.6.2. 
About 34.3 percent of the 99 respondents from South-south Nigeria said that infrastructure supply 
was "very inadequate" and 56.6 percent "inadequate", totaling 90.9 percent. This was 6.2 percent 
higher than the national figure, 7.9 percent higher than that for South-west Nigeria, 33.9 percent 
higher than North-west Nigeria, 3.1 percent less than North-east Nigeria and 5.1 percent less than 
South-east Nigeria. 7.1 percent of respondents were of the view that infrastructure supply in 
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Nigeria was "adequate", and no one felt that is was "very adequate". These are shown in Figures 
6.6.1 and 6.6.2. The very high dissatisfaction rate for infrastructure supply in South-south Nigeria 
explains why the option "very adequate" was not used by respondents. There was a non-response 
rate of about 2 percent. 
A total of number of 58 respondents for North-central Nigeria, as shown in Table 6.6.1, was broken 
down into about 67.2 percent who said that infrastructure supply in Nigeria was "very inadequate" 
and 25.9 percent who said that it was "inadequate", giving a total dissatisfaction rate of 93.1 
percent. The level of dissatisfaction for this region was the second highest of all the regions and, 
and is exactly the same as that for North-eastern Nigeria. It was 2 percent higher than North- 
central Nigeria, and less than South-south Nigeria, South-west and North-west Nigeria by 3.1 
percent, 10.1 percent and 36.1 percent respectively. 6.9 percent of respondents were of the view 
that infrastructure supply in Nigeria was "adequate" with none of the respondents holding the view 
that it was "very adequate". These are shown in Figures 6.6.1 and 6.6.2. 
Finally, the literature review's second hypothesis that there exists a 'severe' dearth of infrastructure 
supply in Nigeria is validated by this section's analysis. Over 95 percent of respondents in the 
survey asserted that there is a dearth of infrastructure supply in Nigeria. 
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Figure 6.6.1. Dissatisfaction in infrastructure supply and service delivery in Nigeria 
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6.7. Quality of infrastructure 
Quality of infrastructure service delivery as used in this survey refers to the degree of conformity to 
set objectives, requirements or consumers' expectations (Crosby 1999; ISO 2000). In order to find 
out if the quality of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria is substandard, as maintained in the 
literature review, respondents were asked to rate the quality of infrastructure service delivery in 
Nigeria over an ordinal scale. The results have been tabulated in Table 6.7.1. 
Table 6.7.1: The quality of infrastructure service delivery rating by respondents 
Quality of Infrastructure and service delivery in N ' ena 
No response High Fair Low very tow Total 
Geo-Political No response Count 2 2 
Region In % within Geo-Political 
Nigeria Region In Nigeria 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 5% 
South west Count 7 3 8 15 28 59 
kical % within 
In Nigeria igeria Region In 11.9% 5.1% 10.2% 25.4% 47.5% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.7% . 7% 1.5% 3.7% 69% 146% 
North west Count 1 27 8 14 22 70 
% within Geo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 1.4% 38.6% 8.6% 20.0% 31.4% 100.0% 
% of Total . 
2% 6.7% 1.5% 3.5% 55% 17.4% 
South east Count 2 7 52 81 
% within Geo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 3.3% 11.5% 85.2% 100.0% 
%ofTotal 
. 5% 1.7% 129% 15.1% 
North east Count 5 1 7 21 20 54 
% within Geo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 
9.3% 1.9% 13.0% 38.9% 37.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.2% . 2% 1.7% 5.2% 50%_ ___13.4% South south Count 3 17 41 38 99 
% within Goo -Political 
Region In Nigeria 3.0% 17.2% 41.4% 38.4% 100.0% 
% of Total . 7% 4.2% 102% 94% 246% 
North central Count 5 13 40 58 
% within Geo-Poikkal 
Region In Nigeria 8.6% 224% 69.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 1.2% 3.2% 9.9% 144% 
Total Count 15 34 43 111 200 403 
% within Goo-Polkloal 3 7% 4% 8 10.7% 27.5% 49 6% 100 0% Region In Nigeria . . . . 
% of Total 3.7% 84% 107% 27.5% 496% 100.0% 
Table 6.7.1 reveals that approximately 49.6 percent proportion of respondents from the total of 403 
were of the view that the quality of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "very low" and 
another 27.5 percent said "low", with a total dissatisfaction rate of 77.1 percent. Compared to 
previous analysis in section 5.5 and 5.6, this figure was less than that expressed by respondents in 
section 5.5 regarding "stability of infrastructure services" by 11.4 percent, and was also less than 
that of section 5.6 on "infrastructure supply" by 18 percent. 10.7 percent of the total number of 
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respondents were of the view that the quality of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "fair" 
while another 8.4 percent maintained it to be "high", giving a total satisfaction response of 19.1 
percent. The remaining 3.7 percent left did not respond. 
From South-west Nigeria, about 11.9 percent of the total 59 respondents failed to respond to the 
question on "quality of infrastructure service delivery" in Nigeria. Approximately 5 percent of the total 
were of the view that the quality of infrastructure and service delivered to Nigerians was "high" and 
10.2 percent "fair", yielding a total satisfaction rate of about 15.3 percent. About 25.4 percent 
proportion of respondents for South-west Nigeria were of the view that the quality of infrastructure 
services delivered to Nigerians was "low" while another 47.5 percent said "very low". The total 
dissatisfaction rate was thus 72.9 percent. The levels of dissatisfaction by geopolitical region are 
represented in Figures 6.7.1 and 6.7.2. Although the results obtained from the South-west Nigeria 
has not significantly deviated from the general summary explained above, results received from the 
North-west region show some measure of difference. 
Responses from the North-west Nigeria showed that 1.4 percent of the total 70 respondents failed 
to respond to the question on "quality of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria". 20 percent of 
respondents were of the view that the quality of infrastructure and service delivered to Nigerians 
was "low" and another 31.4 percent said that it was "very low", making a total dissatisfaction rate of 
51.4 percent. The level of dissatisfaction expressed by respondents in this region was 21.5 percent 
less than that of South-west Nigeria. About 38.6 percent of the total said "high" and another 8.6 
percent saying "fair", making a total of 47.2 percent. This result differed somewhat from the national 
result in that it was much higher than those for the other geopolitical regions. This development has 
been noted in the previous analysis for North-west Nigeria; and reasons for it are the same. 
About 85.2 percent proportion of the 61 respondents from the South-east region were of the view 
that the quality of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "very low" and 11.5 percent that it 
was "low", making about 96.7 percent of dissatisfied respondents. The remaining 3.3 percent said 
that it could be rated "fair". A slight variation from the national summary can be observed from these 
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results, in that about 85.2 percent of South-eastern respondents rated the quality "low" as against 
49.6 percent nationally. This must have been due to the fact that this region had been worst hit by 
dearth of infrastructure; where it is provided, the quality is very poor (Ayogu 2001). The gross 
dissatisfaction expressed in these results for South-east Nigeria was similar to those expressed in 
the previous analysis (sections 6.5 and 6.6). The level of dissatisfaction for this region was 23.8 
percent higher than that expressed in the South-west and 45.3 percent higher than those expressed 
in North-west Nigeria. However, this slight deviation from the national picture as evident in the 
previous two geopolitical regions was not observed from the results for North-east Nigeria. 
About 37 percent of the total 54 respondents for North-east Nigeria were of the view that the quality 
of infrastructure service delivery was "very low", while about 38.9 percent rated it as "low". These 
results gave a total dissatisfaction response of about 75.9 percent, consistent with the national 
figure (the difference in levels of dissatisfaction was barely 1 percent). Compared with the South- 
western and North-western regions, the level of dissatisfaction for North-east Nigeria was 3 percent 
higher than that of the former and 24.5 percent higher than for the latter. It was also 20.8 percent 
lesser than the level of dissatisfaction expressed in South-east Nigeria. Meanwhile, 13 percent felt 
that the quality of infrastructure service delivery was "fair" and another 1.9 percent that it was "high", 
making a total satisfaction level of 14.9 percent. These are plotted in Figures 6.7.1 and 6.7.2. The 
non-response rate was about 9.3 percent. 
38.4 percent of the 99 respondents from the South-south region (Table 6.7.1) were of the opinion 
that the quality of infrastructure service delivery was "very low" and another 41.4 percent 
maintained that it was "low", giving a total dissatisfaction response level of 79.4 percent. About 17.2 
percent and 3 percent of respondents were of the view that the quality of infrastructure service 
delivery was "fair" and "high" respectively, giving a total satisfaction level of 20.2 percent.. The level 
of dissatisfaction expressed by respondents in South-south Nigeria was higher than those of the 
South-western, North-western and North-eastern regions by 6.5 percent, 28 percent and 3.5 
percent respectively. These are plotted in Figures 6.7.1 and 6.7.2. No deviation was observed from 
the national figures given earlier. 
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North-central Nigeria had a total of 58 respondents; about 69 percent of them maintained that the 
quality of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria was "very low", with another 22.4 percent saying 
"low", giving a total dissatisfaction response of 91.4 percent. This level of dissatisfaction was higher 
than the national one by 14.3 percent, and than the South-west, North-west, North-east and South- 
south by 18.5 percent, 40 percent, 15.5 percent and 12 percent respectively, although it was less 
than that for South-east Nigeria by 5.3 percent. 8.6 percent thought that the quality of infrastructure 
services in Nigeria was "fair". These have been shown in Figures 6.7.1 and 6.7.2. 
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Figure 6.7.1. Dissatisfaction in quality of infrastructure and service delivery in Nigeria 
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The results and analysis in this section have also validated the third hypothesis (the "quality of 
Infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria is very low") postulated in the literature review. Over 70 
percent of the total respondents assented to this view. 
6.8. Rate of infrastructure maintenance 
In order to test the assertion that infrastructures in Nigeria are hardly maintained (which has been 
adduced as a reason for their poor performance), respondents were asked to rate infrastructure 
maintenance in Nigeria. Results are tabulated below in Table 6.8.1. 
Table 6.8.1: Geopolitical region and Rate of infrastructure maintenance 
crosstabulation 
Rate of Infrastructure Maintena nce in Nigeri a 
No response High fair low very tow Total 
Geo-Political No response Count 2 2 
Region in % within Geo-Political 
Nigeria Region In Nigeria 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 5% 
South west Count 1 2 4 19 33 59 
%within Geo-Polltlcal 
1.7% 3.4% 6.8% 32.2% 55.9% 100.0% 
Region In Nigeria 
% of Total . 
2% . 
5% 1.0% 4.7% 82% 146% 
North west Count 22 6 27 15 70 
%within Geo-Political 31.4% 8.6% 38.6% 21.4% 100.0% Region in Nigeria 
% of Total 5.5% 1.5% 6.7% 3.7% 17.4% 
South east Count 1 10 50 61 
% within Geo-Political 1.6% 16.4% 82.0% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
%ofTotal . 2% 2.5% 12.4% 15.1% 
North east Count 1 5 16 32 54 
% within Geo-Polkical 9% 1 9.3% 29.6% 59.3% 100.0% Region In Nigeria . 
% of Total . 2% 
1.2% 40% 7.9% 13.4% 
South south Count 1 7 33 58 99 
% within Geo-Political 1.0% 7.1% 33.3% 58.6% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
% of Total . 2% 1.7% 8.2% 14.4% 24.6% 
North central Count 1 16 41 58 
% within Geo-PolitIcal 1.7% 27.6% 70.7% 100.0% 
Region In Nigeria 
% of Total . 2% 40% 102% 14.4% 
Total Count 5 24 24 121 229 403 
% within Geo-Political 1.2% 6.0% 6.0% 30.0% 56.8% 100.0% Region In Nigeria 
% of Total 1.2% 60%- 60% 30.0% 58 8% 1000% 
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Table 6.8.1 shows the cross-tabulation between geopolitical regions in Nigeria and the rate of 
infrastructure maintenance. The table also revealed an average dissatisfaction rate of 86.8 percent. 
This level of dissatisfaction could be subdivided (as in the cross-tabulation in Table 6.8.1) into 56.8 
percent who maintained that there exists a "very low" rate of infrastructure maintenance, 30 percent 
who held that it was "low". 6 percent that it was "fair" and 6 percent "high". The total satisfaction 
level was thus 12 percent. About 1.2 percent failed to respond. The level of dissatisfaction 
expressed by respondents on rate of infrastructure maintenance was comparable to those 
expressed in the preceding analysis. For example, it was just 2.4 percent higher than that 
expressed for "stability of infrastructure services"; 8.3 percent less than that for "infrastructure 
supply" and about 9.7 percent higher than for "quality of infrastructure services". Responses from 
the North-west and South-east regions slight deviated from the national figure, but the North-east, 
North-central, South-south and South-west's results were similar to the national one. 
Of the 59 respondents from the South-west, 55.9 percent said that the rate of infrastructure 
maintenance was "very low" and 32.2 percent that it was "low". The resulting dissatisfaction rate of 
88.1 percent is just 1.4 percent higher than the national figure. 6.8 percent scored infrastructure 
maintenance "fair" and 3.4 percent scored it "high", making a total satisfaction rate of 10.2 percent. 
About 1.7 percent failed to respond. 
Similarly, North-central Nigeria had 58 respondents with 70.7 percent scoring infrastructure 
maintenance in Nigeria "very low" and another 27.6 percent "low", making a total dissatisfaction 
response level of about 98.3 percent. 1.7 percent respondents were of the view that the rate of 
infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria was "fair". The level of dissatisfaction expressed in North- 
central Nigeria was about 11.3 percent higher than the national figure and 10 percent higher than 
that expressed by respondents in South-west Nigeria. These results can be seen in Figures 6.8.1 
and 6.8.2. 
About 59.3 percent of the 54 respondents for North-east Nigeria scored the rate of infrastructure 
maintenance "very low" while another 29.6 percent scored it "low". This gives a total dissatisfaction 
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response level of 88.9 percent, exceeding the national figure by 2.1 percent. This percentage was 
less than that for North-central Nigeria by 9.2 percent. Another 9.3 percent maintained that the rate 
of infrastructure maintenance was at least "fair", leaving 1.9 percent not responding. 
The situation in South-south region was similar, with about 58.6 percent of the total 99 respondents 
being of the view that the rate of infrastructure maintenance was "very low" and. another 33.3 
percent "low". The resulting dissatisfaction rate of 91.9 percent was higher than that for South-west 
Nigeria, North-east Nigeria by 3.8 percent and 3 percent respectively. The dissatisfaction response 
expressed in North-central Nigeria was higher than that of South-south Nigeria by 6.2 percent, as 
can be seen in Figures 6.8.1 and 6.8.2. Another 7.1 percent scored the rate of infrastructure 
maintenance in Nigeria "fair" and 1 percent failed to respond. 
Out of 70 respondents from North-west Nigeria, about 21.4 percent were of the view that the rate of 
infrastructure maintenance was "very low" while another 38.6 percent scored it "low". Thus, the total 
dissatisfaction rate was 60 percent. As can be seen in Table 6.8.1, another 8.6 percent were of the 
view that the rate of infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria was "fair" while 31.4 percent response 
said "high", which gives a satisfaction rate of 40 percent for North-west region. This figure is 
different slightly from the national one. The reasons for this are the same as those for the figures 
given in the preceding analysis. On comparison to the other geopolitical regions, the level of 
dissatisfaction expressed by respondents for North-west Nigeria was the least. 
Results as given in Table 6.8.1 revealed that of a total of 61 respondents from the South-east 
region, 82 percent scored the rate of infrastructure maintenance "very low" while another 16.4 
percent scored it "low". The resulting dissatisfaction level of 98.4 percent was the highest expressed 
in the survey. 1.6 percent proportion of respondents was of the view that the rate of infrastructure 
maintenance in Nigeria was "fair", as can be seen in Figures 6.8.1 and 6.8.2. This also slightly 
deviated from the national result. 
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The analysis of this section validates the fourth hypothesis of the literature review (that the rate of 
infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria is very low). Over 86 percent of respondents in the survey 
were of this view. 
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Figure 6.8.1. Dissatisfaction in rate of infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria 
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6.9. The response rate to infrastructure maintenance 
Respondents were requested to rate "response rate to infrastructure maintenance" in order to 
establish their attitude to infrastructure repairs in view of the fact that the literature review asserted 
that infrastructure repair in Nigeria takes a very long time. 
Table 6.9.1: Geopolitical region and response rate to infrastructure maintenance 
Response rate to Infrastructure Mai ntenance in N ena 
No response high fair low very low Total 
Geo-Political No response Count 1 1 2 
Region in % within Geo-Political 
Nigeria Region In Nigeria 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 2% . 2% . 5% 
South west Count 2 1 7 20 29 59 
% within Geo-Political 
Region in Nigeria 3.4% 1.7% 11.9% 33.9% 49.2% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 2% 1.7% 5.0% 7.2% 14 6% 
North west Count 1 3 28 22 16 70 
% within Geo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 
1.4% 4.3% 40.0% 31.4% 22.9% 100.0% 
% of Total . 2% . 7% 69% 55% 4 0% 174% 
South east Count 3 8 50 61 
% within Geo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 4.9% 13.1% 82.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 7% 2.0% 12.4% 15.1% 
North east Count 2 2 10 22 18 54 
% within Geo-Polkical 
Region in Nigeria 
3.7% 3.7% 18.5% 40.7% 33.3% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 
5% 25% 5.5% 4.5% 13.4% 
South south Count 1 2 10 34 52 99 
% within Geo-Polftlcal 
Region in Nigeria 1.0% 2.0% 10.1% 34.3% 52.5% 100.0% 
% of Total . 2% . 5% 2.5% 84% 12.9% 24.6% 
North central Count 2 12 44 58 
% within Geo-Political 
Region in Nigeria 3"4% 20.7% 75.9% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% 3.0% 10.9% 14.4% 
Total Count 7 8 61 118 209 403 
% within Geo-Political 1.7% 2.0% 15.1% 29.3% 51 9% 100 0% Region In Nigeria . . 
% of Total 1.7% 2.0% 15.1% 29.3% 519% 100 0% 
Table 6.9.1 revealed a dissatisfaction level of 81.2 percent and it was within the range as seen in 
previous sections. The dissatisfaction level is composed of 51.9 percent for those maintaining that 
there exists a "very Iow" response rate to infrastructure maintenance and another 29.3 percent that 
the response rate is "low". 14.6 percent said that it was "fair" and 2.0 percent that it was "high". 
Thus, there was a total satisfaction level of just 16.6 percent. Unfortunately, 2.2 percent of total 
respondents gave no response. When compared with the results from individual regions, it was 
observed that responses from North-west and South-east regions deviated slightly from the national 
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figure. However, results from North-east, North-central, South-south and South-west were similar to 
the national result. 
Out of 59 respondents received from the South-west Nigeria, 49.2 percent observed that the 
response rate to infrastructure maintenance was "very low" and 33.9 percent that it was "low". 
These made a total dissatisfaction response level of 83.1 percent for the region, 2 percent higher 
than the national figure. Another 11.9 percent of respondents scored the response rate to 
infrastructure maintenance "fair" and another 1.7 percent "high", making a satisfaction response 
level of just 13.6 percent. 3.4 percent failed to respond to the question. 
The North-central region had about 58 respondents and 75.9 percent of this number scored the 
response rate to infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria "very low", while 20.7 percent scored it "low", 
giving a total dissatisfaction response level of about 96.6 percent. 3.4 percent of respondents were 
of the view that the response rate to infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria was "fair". The level of 
dissatisfaction expressed in this region was 15.4 percent higher than that for the whole country and 
about 13.5 percent higher than that for South-west 
About 33.3 percent of the 54 total respondents for North-east scored the response rate to 
infrastructure maintenance "very low" while another 40.7 percent of respondents scored it "low". 
These values gave a total dissatisfaction response level of 7 percent, 7.2 percent less than the 
national figure and about 9.1 percent less than that for South-west Nigeria. It was 22.6 percent less 
than the level of dissatisfaction expressed for North-central Nigeria. 16.7 percent maintained that 
the response rate to infrastructure maintenance was "fair" while another 3.7 percent scored it "high". 
This gave a total satisfaction response level of 20.4 percent. 5.6 percent of respondents gave no 
reply. 
The situation in the South-south region was similar, about 52.5 percent of the total 99 respondents 
received for the region being of the view that the response rate to infrastructure maintenance was 
"very low" and another 33.3 percent saying it was "low", giving a total dissatisfaction level of 85.8 
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percent. About 10 percent of the respondents scored the response rate to infrastructure 
maintenance in Nigeria "fair" and about 2 percent "high", giving a total satisfaction response level of 
12 percent. 1 percent did not respond. The national dissatisfaction level was 4.6 percent less than 
that of South-south Nigeria, that for North-central Nigeria was more by 15.8 percent, and those of 
the North-east and South-west were less by 11.8 percent and 2.7 percent respectively. These 
results are shown in Figures 6.9.1 and 6.9.2. 
Out of the 70 respondents for North-west Nigeria, 22.9 percent were of the view that the response 
rate to infrastructure maintenance was "very low" while another 31.4 percent scored it "low", giving a 
total of 54.3 percent. A further 40 percent of respondents were of the view that the response rate 
was "fair" and 4.3 percent respondents of the same total for this region scored it "high". The 
satisfaction response level of 44.3 percent deviated slightly from the national results, quite clearly 
not a survey error but a real difference of opinion among the respondents from this region. This 
difference could be due to the actual state of infrastructure maintenance in the region. The level of 
dissatisfaction expressed in North-west Nigeria was the least of all the country's regions. These 
results are shown in Figures 6.9.1 and 6.9.2. 
A total of 61 responses were received from South-east Nigeria; 82 percent scored the response rate 
to infrastructure maintenance "very low" and 13.1 percent scored it "low", yielding a total 
dissatisfaction level of 95.1 percent 4.9 percent scored it "fair". The level of dissatisfaction 
expressed for this region was 13.9 percent higher than the national figure. It was also higher than 
what was expressed in South-west Nigeria, North-west Nigeria, North-east Nigeria and South-south 
Nigeria by 12 percent, 40.8 percent, 21.1 percent and 9.3 percent respectively. These results are 
shown in Figures 6.9.1 and 6.9.2. 
In summary, the fifth hypothesis advanced in the literature review (that the response rate to 
infrastructure maintenance is very poor in Nigeria) has also been validated from this analysis. Over 
80 percent of the total respondents in the survey were in support of this view. 
146 
Figure 6.9.1. Dissatisfaction in response rate to infrastructure maintenance 
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6.10. Stakeholders impression of staffs of local infrastructure and service 
providers 
From the literature review and the chapter on political economy of infrastructure, staff operating 
infrastructure services in Nigeria has been accused of being dishonest over the years. Dishonesty, 
as used in the survey, is defined as being corrupt or fraudulent. Thus the respondents were asked 
to comment on this, and the results are tabulated below in Table 6.10.1. 
Table 6.10.1: What the people think of the staff of their local infrastructure service 
providers in Nigeria. 
Staffs of local infrastructure service roviders in N igeria 
No response Honest fairly honest dishonest I don't know Total 
eo-Political No response Count 2 2 
Region In % within Geo-Political 
Nigeria Region in Nigeria 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 5% South west Count 4 2 8 35 10 59 
% within iitical 6.8% 3.4% 13.6% 593% 18 9% 100.0% Region ion In Nigeria . 
% of Total 1.0% . 5% 2.0% 87% 2.5% 14.6% 
North west count 2 8 17 41 2 70 
% within Geo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 2.9% 11.4% 24.3% 58.6% 2.9% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% 2.0% 4.2% 10.2% . 5% 17.4% South east Count 2 5 53 1 61 
% within Geo-Political 
Region in Nigeria 3.3% 8.2% 86.9% 1.8% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% 1.2% 13.2% . 2% 15.1% 
North east Count 2 2 18 26 8 54 
% within Geo-Political 3.7% 3.7% 33.3% 48.1% 11 1% 0% 100 n Nigeria Nigeria Region on In . . 
% of Total . 5% . 5% 4.5% 65% 1.5% 13.4% South south Count 1 2 30 48 18 99 
% within Goo-Political 
Region in Nigeria 1.0% 2.0% 30.3% 48.5% 182% 100.0% 
% of Total . 2% . 
5% 7.4% 11.9% 45% 24.6% 
North central Count 1 5 46 6 58 
% within Geo-Political 1.7% 8.6% 79.3% 10 3% 100 0% Region in Nigeria . . 
% of Total . 2% 1.2% 11.4% 1.5% 14.4% Total Count 14 14 83 249 43 403 
%within Goo-Political 
3.5% 3.5% 20.6% 81.8% 10.7% 100 0% Region on in Nigeria . 
% of Total 35% 35% 20.5% 618% 10 7% 100 0% 
Table 6.10.1 revealed that about 10.7 percent indicated that they didn't know if the staffs of their 
local infrastructure service providers are honest or not. An additional 3.7 percent did not respond to 
the question. 61.8 percent were of the view that the staffs were "dishonest" while another 20.3 
percent held that they were "fairly honest". Fairly as used in the ordinal scale, is a rating that lies in 
between 40 percent to 49 percent. 3.7 percent affirmed the honesty of their local staff. The total 
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dissatisfaction level was thus 61.8 percent while the satisfaction level was 24 percent. This was a 
lower level of dissatisfaction than any of the preceding analyses. A similar pattern was witnessed in 
the other geopolitical regions, notably in the South-west. 
Approximately 16.9 percent of the 59 respondents from this region were of the view that they did not 
know if the staff of their local infrastructure service providers were "honest" or "dishonest". 59.3 
percent called them "dishonest", 13.6 percent "fairly honest" and only 3.4 percent "honest". The 
difference between this regional level of dissatisfaction and the national level was insignificant. 
About 6.8 percent did not respond. 
Results from North-west Nigeria revealed that about 58.6 percent of the 70 respondents for this 
region maintained that the average staff of their local infrastructure service provider were 
"dishonest"., 24.3 percent "fairly honest" and 11.4 percent "honest", giving a satisfaction level of 
35.7 percent. 2.9 percent made no response. The dissatisfaction level was just 2.2 percent higher 
than that in North-west Nigeria. However, the level of satisfaction was 11.7 percent higher than the 
national level. Differences between dissatisfaction levels in this region and in South-west Nigeria 
were negligible: less than 1 percent. Satisfaction levels, however, were 15.7 percent higher. 
About 1.6 percent of the total 61 respondents from the South-east region observed that they do not 
know if the staffs of their local infrastructure service providers were honest or dishonest. 86.9 
percent said they were dishonest and only 8.2 percent that they were "fairly honest". The level of 
dissatisfaction (i. e. those who saw staff as dishonest) was 25.1 percent higher than the national 
figure, and 27.6 percent and 28.3 percent, higher than for South-west Nigeria and North-west 
Nigeria respectively. Figures 6.10.1 and 6.10.2 show these figures. About 3.3 percent provided no 
response. 
About 11.1 percent of the total 54 respondents for North-east region did not know if the staffs of 
their local infrastructure service providers were honest or not; 48.1 percent called them dishonest, 
31.5 percent "fairly honest" and 3.7 percent of respondents "honest". Not counting a non-response 
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rate of 5.6 percent, the satisfaction level was 32.2 percent. The dissatisfaction level for this region 
was about 13.7 percent less than the national level, and less than that for the South-west, North- 
west and South-east. This is shown in Figures 6.10.1 and 6.10.2. The reasons for these 
comparative levels are the same as before. 
18.2 percent of the total 99 respondents from the South-south region were of the view that they did 
not know if the staff of their local infrastructure service providers were honest or not. 48.5 percent 
respondents called them "dishonest", 30.3 percent "fairly honest" and 2 percent "honest" with a non- 
response rate of about 1 percent. These results were similar to those of North-east Nigeria. 
Of the 58 respondents for North-central Nigeria, about 10.3 percent did not know if the staff honest, 
another 79.3 percent of respondents said that they were "dishonest", about 8.6 percent said "fairly 
honest", and about 1.7 percent did not respond. This level of dissatisfaction was higher than the 
national level by 17.5 percent. Regional levels of dissatisfaction revealed that that for South-west 
Nigeria was 20 percent less, while that for North-west Nigeria was 20.7 percent less than the 
proportion expressed for North-central. Similarly, the level of dissatisfaction expressed by 
respondents in North-east Nigeria was 31.2 percent less than North-central Nigeria and in South- 
south Nigeria it was 30.8 percent less than North-central Nigeria. These are shown in Figures 6.10.1 
and 6.10.2. 
Summarily, the view as expressed in the literature review, that the "average staff of local 
infrastructure service providers in Nigeria is fraudulent or corrupt, is supported by the analysis in this 
section. Over 61 percent of respondents nationwide agreed. 
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Figure 6.10.1. Dissatisfaction levels in staffs of infrastructure service providers 
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6.11. Respondents rating of average infrastructure monthly bills 
Respondents were asked if they were satisfied with their average infrastructure monthly bills in 
order to verify the view that infrastructure users are often made to pay for services not delivered to 
them or not commensurate to the rate of usage. 
Table 6.11.1: Rating of average infrastructure monthly bills in each geopolitical 
region 
Ratan of average Infr astructure m ontlbills in Ni aria 
Very 
No response Very satisfied satisfied Unsatisfied unsatisfied Total 
Geo-Political No response Count 2 2 
Region in % within Geo-Political 
Nigeria Region in Nigeria 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total . 5% . 5% 
South west Count 5 3 8 22 21 59 
% within Goo-Political 
Region in Nigeria 8.5% 
5.1% 13.6% 37.3% 35.6% 1000% 
% of Total 1.2% . 
7% 2.0% 5.5% 52% 14.6% 
North west Count 5 17 24 24 70 
% within Goo-Political 
Region In Nigeria 
7.1% 24.3% 34.3% 34.3% 100.0% 
% of Total 1 2% 42% 60% 6.0% 174% 
South east Count 3 15 43 61 
%within Geo-Po118ca1 
Region in Nigeria 4.9% 24.6% 70.5% 100.0% 
%ofTotal 
. 
7% 3.7% 107% 15.1% 
North east Count 3 7 23 21 54 
%within Geo"Poli6cal 
Region in Nigeria 
5.6% 13.0% 42.6% 38.9% 100.0% 
% of Total . 7% 1.7% 57% 5.2% 13.4% South south Count 3 4 14 55 23 99 
%within cal 
Region n In in Nigeria Nigeria 
3.0% 4.0% 14.1% 55.6% 23.2% 100.0% 
%ofTotal 
. 7% 1.0% 35% 136% 5.7% 246% 
North central Count 1 3 22 32 58 
% within Geo-Political 1.7% 5.2% 37.9% 55.2% 100 0% Region In Nigeria 
% of Total . 2% . 7% 5.5% 7.9% 144% 
Total Count 14 12 52 161 164 403 
% within Goo-Political 
Region in Nigeria 3.6% 
3.0% 1129% 40.0% 40.7% 100.0% 
% of Total 3.5% 3.0% 12.9% 400% 40.7% 100.0% 
Table 6.11.1 shows the cross-tabulation of geopolitical region in Nigeria and the rating of average 
infrastructure monthly bills. 40.7 percent of respondents nationally indicated that they were "very 
unsatisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bills while another 40 percent of respondents 
said they were "unsatisfied", making a total dissatisfaction level of 80.7 percent. This level of 
dissatisfaction was high, but not significant, as it was within the range of dissatisfaction expressed 
by respondents in the preceding analyses. Another 12.9 percent of respondents indicated that they 
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were "satisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bills and 3 percent "very satisfied", making 
a satisfaction response level of 15.9 percent. 3.5 percent did not respond. 
Out of 59 respondents in South-west Nigeria, 35.6 percent were "very unsatisfied" with their average 
infrastructure monthly bill and 37.3 percent were "unsatisfied", making a total of 72.9 percent. The 
national dissatisfaction level was 7.8 percent higher than that of South-west Nigeria. 13.6 percent of 
respondents for South-west Nigeria indicated that they were "satisfied" with their average 
infrastructure monthly bills and another 5.1 percent were "very satisfied" with their average 
infrastructure monthly bill, giving a satisfaction response level of 18.7 percent. About 8.5 percent 
failed to respond. These are shown in Figures 6.11.1 and 6.11.2. 
Results from the North-west Nigeria showed that 34.3 percent of the 70 respondents were 
"unsatisfied and 34.3 percent were "very unsatisfied", giving a total dissatisfaction level of 68.6 
percent - less than the national level by 12.1 percent. By contrast, 7.1 percent of respondents 
indicated that they were "very satisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bill and 24.3 
percent "satisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bills, giving a total of 31.4 percent who 
were satisfied. The level of dissatisfaction expressed by respondents in South-west Nigeria was 4.3 
percent higher than what was expressed for North-west Nigeria (see Figures 6.11.1 and 6.11.2). 
The South-east revealed a slight deviation from the pattern for this question so far: about 70.5 
percent of the 61 respondents were "very unsatisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bills 
and a further 24.6 percent were "unsatisfied", making a total dissatisfaction response level of 95.1 
percent. This was a full 15 percent higher than the national figure, 22.2 percent higher than that for 
South-west Nigeria and about 26.5 percent higher than for North-west Nigeria. 4.9 percent held that 
they were "satisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bills. The reasons given in previous 
sections could account for the very high level of 70.5 percent level of those who answered "very 
unsatisfied" to this question. 
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Table 6.11.1 reveals that, of 54 respondents from North-east, 42.6 percent were "unsatisfied" with 
their average infrastructure monthly bill while another 38.9 percent of the 54 respondents for the 
region were "very unsatisfied", yielding a total dissatisfaction level of 81.5 percent, less than 1 
percent higher than the national figure. Regional comparisons show that it was 9 percent less than 
South-west Nigeria and 12.9 percent less than North-west Nigeria. However, it was less than in the 
figure for South-east Nigeria, only 13 percent of whom were "satisfied" with their average 
infrastructure monthly bills; 5.6 percent did not respond. 
Of the 99 respondents from South-south Nigeria, 55.6 percent were "very unsatisfied" with their 
average infrastructure monthly bills and another 23.2 percent of respondents indicated that they 
were "unsatisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bill giving a total dissatisfaction level of 
78.8 percent. This was 1.9 percent less than the national figure, 16.3 percent less than that for 
South-east Nigeria, and 2.7 percent less than the North-east. It was, however, greater than that for 
the South-west region by 5.9 percent, and by 10.2 percent for North-west Nigeria. 14.1 percent of 
respondents in the South-south region were "satisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bills 
and 4 percent were "very satisfied", totaling 18.1 percent. These are shown in Figures 6.11.1 and 
6.11.2.3.0 percent failed to respond to the question. 
Table 6.11.1 shows that, of 58 respondents in North-central Nigeria, 55.2 percent were "very 
unsatisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly bill and 37.9 percent were "unsatisfied", giving 
a total of 93.1 percent - 12.4 percent higher than the national figure. It was higher than the figures 
for South-west Nigeria, North-west Nigeria, North-east Nigeria and South-south Nigeria, but less 
than those for South-east Nigeria by 2 percent. About 5.2 percent of the total respondents for North- 
central Nigeria were of the view that they were "satisfied" with their average infrastructure monthly 
bills, while 1.7 percent of respondents did not respond. These are clearly shown in the graph plot of 
Figures 6.11.1 and 6.11.2. 
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From this analysis it is evident that consumers in Nigeria are not satisfied with their average 
infrastructure monthly bills, proposed in the literature review. Over 80 percent of respondents 
throughout Nigeria supported this view. 
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Figure 6.11.1. Dissatisfaction response level on infrastructure monthly bill 
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6.12. Correlation coefficients and modeling of notable variables 
Having carried out frequency analysis to validate the several hypotheses drawn from the 
literature review, it is necessary to have an understanding of the relationship between one 
variable and another - i. e. to know the extent of variation between considered variables. This 
would further substantiate results obtained from the frequency analysis. Thus, to establish the 
extent to which any two variables under consideration vary together, the following types of 
parametric and non-parametric coefficients are derived: Pearson correlation (p), Kendall's tau_b 
(t) and Spearman's rho (r). However, non-parametric correlation approaches such as Kendall's 
taub (t) and Spearman's rho (r) are more relevant to this investigation because the data under 
consideration is in an ordinal scale2. Thus, Table 6.12.1 reveals the non-parametric Kendall's 
tau_b (t) correlation coefficients matrix between variables in order to illustrate quantitatively the 
extent of variation amongst variables considered in this study. These variables are the stability of 
infrastructure services, infrastructure supply, quality of infrastructure service delivery, rate of 
infrastructure maintenance, response rate to infrastructure maintenance, conduct of staff of local 
infrastructure service providers, and average infrastructure monthly bills. 
Z Ordinal scale places different respondents in relation to each other in terms of the intensity of their attitude 
towards an issue. It shows the strength of one respondents view in relation to another. 
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In the correlation Table 6.12.1 there were 7 variables, and the correlation coefficients between a 
particular variable and the other six with itself to make seven has been tabulated. For example, in the 
first row of the Table 6.12.1, the variable "stability of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria" was 
correlated with itself and the other variables as shown in the first row. The results of each of these 
seven correlations are expressed in the corresponding cell found in the second row - i. e. the first cell 
shows the correlation results between "Stability of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria" and itself, 
the second cell shows the correlation results between "stability of infrastructure services in Nigeria" and 
"infrastructure supply" , the third cell reveals the correlation results between "Stability of infrastructure 
services in Nigeria" and "quality of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria". Similarly, results for the 
others can be found in their various corresponding cells. 
Results found in each cell comprise the correlation coefficient, the sig (significance) value and the total 
number of respondents in the survey. The correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed), and if the sig 
(significance) value is less than 0.01 the correlation is statistically significant. However, the results in 
Table 6.12.1 are carefully explained in the following sections. 
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6.12.1. Relationship between Stability of Infrastructure Services and Infrastructure Supply. 
From Table 6.12.1, correlation between stability of infrastructure service delivery and infrastructure 
supply gave the following results coefficients using Kendall's tau_b (t): 
Kendall's taub (t) = 0.510; N= 403; P<0.01; r (0.51 0)2 = 0.2601 
Where N is the total number of respondents, P is the significant level and ? is the co-efficient of 
determination which indicates how much of the variance or changes in one variable are explained by 
the variance or changes in another. For example, 0.2601 (26 percent) of the variance or changes in 
respondents' responses for "stability of infrastructure service delivery" could be explained by the 
variance or changes in responses given by respondents for "infrastructure supply". Nonetheless, a 
careful examination of the scatter diagram of these variables gave an indication that we could 
reasonably assume the existence of a linear relationship. This is shown in Figure 6.12.1. 
Consequently, the best fitted (regression) line model was drawn between the variables to represent 
this relationship, with "Stability of infrastructure service delivery" (Y) as the dependent variable while 
"infrastructure supply" (S) was the independent variable. This is shown in Figure 6.12.1. The "F" 
statistics which confirm the existence of a significant linear relationship and the "t" statistics which 
show whether the independent variable or explanatory variable is capable of predicting the dependent 
variable beyond or greater than chance level were all statistically significant, thus, confirming both the 
existence of a linear relationship, and that the independent variable could predict the dependent 
variable beyond or greater than chance level. The derived mathematical model showing the 
relationship between the two variables from the collected data is: 
Y=2.022 + 0.3975 ............................... (1) 
This has been carefully represented in Figure 6.12.1. The graph had a positive orientation and an 
intercept of 2.022 on the vertical axis; beyond this point of intercept, it could be positively said that an 
increase in "infrastructure supply" corresponds to an increase in the "stability of infrastructure 
services". The slope is 0.397, which could be approximated 0.4. The slope tells the rate at which the 
value of "Y" (dependent variable) changes relative to changes in the value of "S" (independent 
variable) i. e. it tells the change in the value of "Y" if "S" increases by one unit. Thus, it could be said 
from equation (1) that for every one percent increase in infrastructure supply is a corresponding 0.4 
percent increase in the stability of infrastructure services. In other words, to increase infrastructure 
supply in Nigeria by one percent, there is the need to improve on the stability of existing infrastructure 
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services by at least 0.4 percent. However, this model was validated by 21 respondents out of a total 
of 40 randomly selected for this purpose. This implies that the calculated value for variable "Y" using 
equation (1) corresponded practically by 52.5 percent to the actual options chosen by respondents. It 
should be clearly stated that these respondents were not part of those used to generate the model. 
Figure 6.12.1. Regression line between stability of infrastructure services and 
infrastructure supply 
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6.12.2. Relationship between Stability of Infrastructure Services and Quality of 
Infrastructure. 
Similarly, from the correlation Table 6.12.1, the correlation between "stability of infrastructure 
service delivery" and "quality of Infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria" gave the following 
coefficients: 
Kendall's tau_b (t) = 0.445; N= 403; P<0.01; r2 _ (0.445)2 = 0.1980 
where N is the total number of respondents, P is the significant level and rz is the coefficient of 
determination. Thus, 0.1980 (20 percent) of the variation in "stability of infrastructure service 
delivery" is explained by the variation in "quality of infrastructure service delivery". However, a 
careful examination of the scatter diagram of these variables gave an indication that we could 
reasonably assume the existence of a linear relationship. As a result, the best fitted (regression) 
line model was drawn between the variables to represent this relationship; with "Stability of 
infrastructure service delivery" (Y) being the dependent variable while "quality infrastructure 
service delivery" (Q) as the independent variable. This is represented in Figure 6.12.2. The "F" 
and "t" statistics derived were statistically significant. Therefore, we could confirm both the 
existence of a linear relationship, and that the independent variable could predict the dependent 
variable beyond or greater than chance level. Thus the derived mathematical model is: 
Y=2.243 + 0.338Q .............................. (2) 
The intercept of the plot was 2.243 on the vertical axis. This gives the value of "Y" when the rate 
of change or slope is zero. Beyond this point on the vertical axis, an increase in the "stability of 
infrastructure service delivery" will lead to an increase in the "quality of infrastructure service 
delivery" at a rate of 0.338 (approximately 0.34). Therefore, a one percent change in quality of 
infrastructure services would mean a 0.34 percent change in stability of infrastructure services or 
vice visa. The rate of change in the empirical model of equation (2) was less than that of 
equation (1). This indicates that improving infrastructure supply in Nigeria is of more impact to the 
stability of infrastructure services. This model was validated to practical trend at the rate of 42.5 
percent i. e. only 17 responses out of 40 respondents set aside for this purpose validated this 
model. 
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Figure 6.12.2. Regression line between Stability of infrastructure services and quality of 
infrastructure and service delivery 
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6.12.3. Relationship between Stability of Infrastructure Services and Rate of Infrastructure 
Maintenance. 
The correlation between stability of infrastructure services and the rate of infrastructure maintenance in 
Nigeria gave the following coefficients: 
Kendall's tau_b (t) = 0.386; N= 403; P<0.01; r2 = (0.386)2 = 0.1490 
where N is the total number of respondents, P is the significant level and ? the coefficient of 
determination. The scatter diagram of the plot between "Stability of infrastructure services" and "the 
rate of infrastructure maintenance" nonetheless gave an indication of a linear relationship. This is 
represented in Figure 6.12.3. Consequently, the best fitted (regression) line model was drawn 
between the variables to represent this relationship; with "Stability of infrastructure services" (Y) being 
the dependent variable while "rate of infrastructure maintenance" (M) is the independent variable. This 
has been carefully represented in Figure 6.12.3. The "F" and "t" values from both the "F" and "t" 
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statistics were statistically significant, substantiating both the existence of a linear relationship and 
that the independent variable could predict the dependent variable beyond or greater than chance 
level. Therefore derived model is: 
Y=1.735 + 0.463M ................................ (3) 
The plot is represented in Figure 6.12.1.3. From the model in equation (3), the intercept is 1.735 i. e. 
the value for "y" in the absence of any change. Beyond this point in the plot one could confidently say 
that for an increase in the rate of infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria there is a corresponding 
increase in stability of infrastructure service delivery. Similarly a reduction in either of these two 
variables would lead to a reduction in the other. However, with a slope of 0.46 it means that for every 
one percent increase in the rate of maintenance, there is a corresponding 0.46 percent increase in 
stability of infrastructure services in Nigeria. 
Figure 6.12.3. Regression line between stability of infrastructure services and rate of 
infrastructure maintenance 
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However, the slope was steeper or higher than the previous plots in Figure 6.12.1 and 6.12.2 for 
equation (1) and (2) respectively. As mentioned earlier, the higher the slope of the plot, the stronger the 
relationship between the variables under consideration. Thus, respondents supported more strongly in 
comparison to previous plots that with increasing "infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria", would 
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certainly lead to an increase in the "stability of infrastructure services". Thus, improving infrastructure 
maintenance is of greater impact in the stability of infrastructure services compared to the improvement 
of infrastructure supply or the quality of infrastructure services in Nigeria. Lastly, this model was 
validated at 57.5 percent of the 40 selected respondents exclusively set aside for this purpose. 
6.12.4. Stability of Infrastructure Service Delivery and Response Rate to Infrastructure 
Maintenance. 
An additional correlation between stability of infrastructure service delivery and the response rate to 
infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria was performed and gave the following results: 
Kendall's tau_b (t) = 0.393; N= 403; P<0.01; r2= (0.393)2 = 0.1545 
where N, is the total number of respondents, P is the significant level and ? the coefficient of 
determination which indicates how much of variance in one variable is explained by the variance in 
another. From the plotted scatter diagram between "Stability of infrastructure service delivery" and "the 
response rate to infrastructure maintenance" gave an indication of a linear relationship. As a result, the 
most appropriate line graph, a regression graph, was drawn between these variables to represent this 
relationship, with "Stability of infrastructure services" (Y) being the dependent variable while "response 
rate to infrastructure maintenance" (R) the independent one. This is represented in Figure 6.12.4. In 
addition, the "F" and "t" statistics were significant, indicating both the existence of a linear relationship, 
and that the independent variable could predict the dependent variable beyond chance level. Therefore 
the derived mathematical model is: 
Y=1.999 + 0.394R ................................ (4) 
The plot was positive and the intercept was approximately 2. From the point of intercept, the plot reads 
that an increase in "response rate to infrastructure maintenance" corresponds to an increase in the 
"stability of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria". Similarly, a decrease in any of these would 
definitely lead to a decrease in the other. This model was validated at 45 percent response rate of the 
40 respondents set aside for this purpose. 
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Figure 6.12.4. Regression line between stability of infrastructure services and response rate to 
infrastructure maintenance 
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6.12.5. The Relationship between Stability of Infrastructure Services and Staff Infrastructure 
Service Providers 
Results from the Correlation Table 6.12.1 between "stability of infrastructure services" and the "staffs of 
local infrastructure service providers in Nigeria" gave the following coefficients: 
Kendall's tau_b (t) = 0.204; N= 403; P<0.01; r2= (0.204)2 = 0.0416 
Where N is the total number of respondents, P is the significant level and ? is the coefficient of 
determination which indicates how much variation in one variable is explained by variation in another. 
For example, 0.0416 (4 percent) of the variation in "stability of infrastructure service delivery" could be 
explained by the variation in "staff of local infrastructure service providers in Nigeria" While, r2 
measures the extent of a linear association, it is worthwhile emphasizing that it does not measure the 
appropriateness or suitability of the straight line model for future predictions - i. e. the ability of the 
explanatory variable to predict the dependent variable beyond chance level. However, the plotted 
scatter diagram between "Stability of infrastructure service delivery" and "staffs of local infrastructure 
service providers in Nigeria" gave an indication of a linear relationship. As a result, the most 
appropriate (i. e. regression) line model was drawn between the variables to represent this relationship, 
with "Stability of infrastructure service delivery" (Y) being the dependent variable while "staffs of their 
local infrastructure service providers in Nigeria" (P) the independent variable. These are shown in 
Figure 6.12.5. The "F" and "t" statistics were significant, thus, confirming both the existence of a linear 
relationship, and the confirmation that the independent variable could predict the dependent variable 
beyond chance level. Therefore the derived mathematical model is: 
Y=2.499 + 0.291P .......................... (5) 
Analyzing this plot reveals that the point of intercept on the vertical axis was higher than previous plots 
and the slope was less steep compared to previous plots. The slope of the model in equation (5) was 
the least in comparison to the others previously analyzed. It shows that though the activities of staffs of 
local infrastructure services providers are important but not as significant as improving the quality, 
supply, maintenance of infrastructure. The model reveals that for every one percent change in the 
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services offered by staffs of the local infrastructure service providers there is a corresponding change 
of 0.29 percent in the stability of infrastructure services. 
Figure 6.12.5. Regression line between Stability of infrastructure services and Staffs 
infrastructure service providers 
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The plot reveals a positive orientation which indicates that as "staff of local infrastructure service 
providers in Nigeria"improves their dedication to duty and put aside fraudulent and corrupt practices, it 
will lead to improvements in the "stability of infrastructure services" in Nigeria. However, this model was 
validated by just 5 (12.5 percent) of the total 40 respondents set aside for this purpose. 
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6.13. Observations of Results on Factors Responsible for Infrastructure Failures 
Excluding non-response values, the first set of Tables3 in Appendix A shows the questionnaire 
distribution and response, while Table 5 shows the variable factors responsible for the causes of 
infrastructure service delivery failures in Nigeria as revealed from the literature review. The third set of 
Tables4 shows the frequencies of variable factors in their various different ranking positions in the 
order of priority accorded by respondents. This order of priority is in a decreasing arithmetic pattern, 
where the variable factor with the highest severity is ranked as 1. Thus, the number of times a 
variable factor is ranked under a particular ranking position is represented as its frequency counts for 
that ranking position. Moreover, the index factor column in the table is used to multiply the variable 
factor frequency counts in the different ranking positions due to prioritization and the reoccurring 
cases of multiple occurrences as explained in Omoregie et al. (2005). 
The effects of multiple occurrence of a variable factor in different ranking positions (variable factor 
"inadequate maintenance" for example, appearing in 18 different variable factor ranking positions) 
cannot be accounted for by mere frequency counts of one ranking position independently of the other 
ranking positions. For example, in ranked position number two in Table 7 in Appendix A, the second 
highest frequency count for a particular variable factor was 55 and this variable factor reappeared in 
all the ranked positions numbering from 1 to18 with the frequency counts of 22,55,39,41,25,11,14, 
9,9,1,3,4,1,1,1,1,2, and I respectively. Thus, ranking this variable factor "inadequate 
maintenance" solely with the highest frequency count magnitude of 55 without considering the effects 
of the frequency counts in other ranking positions undervalues the severity of this variable factor 
(Omoregie et al. 2005). 
To consider all frequency counts in all the variable factor ranking positions for a particular variable 
factor without due consideration for the preference of ranking or ranking positions accorded it by 
respondents negates the actual severity of this variable factor. As a way of tackling these problems or 
observations, the Severity Index in Matrix Order (SIMO) model for ranking procedures was applied 
(Omoregie et al. 2005). 
3 Table 6; Table 8; Table 10; Table 12; Table 14; Table 16 and Table 18 
4 Table 7; Table 9: Table 11; Table 13; Table 15; Table 17 and Table 19 
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6.13.1. Severity index in matrix order (SIMO) 
The following are the steps employed in building the model: 
" The factors were coded from 1 to 18 i. e. F(1), F(2), F(3)...... F(18) (see Table 5 in Appendix A). 
0 Ranking positions are created in decreasing order of severity corresponding to the number of 
factors under consideration i. e. P1, P2, P3,..., P18 (see Table 7 in Appendix A). 
0 The frequency counts of each factor are entered under the various ranking positions 
respondents have given them (see Table 7 in Appendix A). Thus, it is expected that a particular 
factor could have frequency counts in multiple ranking positions. 
" The column of index factors as shown in Table 7 in Appendix A is derived by each of the 
numbers or items in the inverse array of arithmetic numbers - i. e. 18,17,16,15,14,..., 1 
multiplied by the inverse of 18 or (1/18 ). 
" The severity of all factors is calculated by multiplying the matrix of frequency counts under the 
various ranking positions (i. e. 18 X 18 matrix) by the column of index factors (i. e. 1X18 matrix) to 
give an the array of severity magnitudes in first matrix as shown in Table 20 in Appendix A. 
0 The variable factors and their severity magnitudes as explained above are re-arranged in a 
decreasing order of severity i. e. p(1), p(2), p(3)...... p(18) (see second matrix in Table 20 in 
Appendix A). 
0 The threshold value or demarcation point is the midhinge of Table 20 in Appendix A (see 
equation 7 to 10) 
These processes could also be represented in a mathematical format (see equation (1)) 
i=n, '=n 
, ai F(J) _ µiß n ...................................... 
(1) 
i=1, j=1 
where: (Ti =(n+1)-i 
j is the variable factor under consideration: for j=1,2,3,..., n-1, n 
vi is the factor for ranked position of the variable factor under consideration: 
fori=1,2,3....... n-1, n 
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Thus: 
a,, represent variable factor position 1; a2: represent variable factor position 2..., 
an: represent nth variable factor position. 
'= Severity index factor, for i=1,2,3,....., n 
n 
µij = is the frequency of variable factor j under ranked variable factor position i. Thus, 
equation (1) becomes 
1)_µll 
n 
+µ12n + t13 n3 +----+µ1n 
6n 
............ (2a) 
Cli 
ý2) -µ21 +µ22n +µ23n +----+µ2n 
ýn 
n ............ 
(2b) 
6 lyl f(3) µ31n +µ22n +µD3 n3 +----+µ3n n ............ (2c) 
f(n) =µn1 
nl 
+ µn2 
an 
+ µn3 
n3 
+---- +µn ari (3) 
transfering from equations (2) to equations (3) gives : 
f(1) X11 µ1n 
n 
................................... (SI'IO) 
f(n) µn1 µnn an/ 
n 
Actual variable ranking position matrix (AVARP) 
P(1) 
_ ............................ (4 ) 
P(n) 
And : 
P(1) Al) 
_ ........................... (5) 
P(n) f(n) 
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f(1)Zf(2)Zf(3Z.... Zf(n) 
P(1) f(1) 
Otherwise =t....................... (6 ) 
P(n) f(n) 
where : 
f(1) 
t" implies an ascending order of magnitude in 
f(n) 
p(l) is the highest severity position 
p(2) is 2nd highest severity position 
P(n) is the least severe position. 
Stage 2: Threshold value (Demacation point) : 
h +h 
The Threshold value (Midhinge) in the matrix of equation (6) =12....................... (7) 
2 
where: 
h is the corresponding value to D 
11 
h is the corresponding value to D 
23 
n+l 
D =- .......................................... (8 ) 
14 
3(n+1) 
34 
n is the total number of observations or variable factors under consideration in equation (6) 
D and D are specified observations within the matix of equation (6). 
13 
Rules for D and D 
13 
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1. If D1or D3 is an integer, the numerical observation or item corresponding to the position of that integer in 
the matrix is chosen for either D or D 
13 
2. If D or D is halfway between two integers, the average of the corresponding items or observations is chosen. 
13 
3. If D or D is not an interger or halfway between two intergers then the resulting value should be approximat 
13 
to the nearest interger 
and the corresponding item or observation is chosen. 
N. B: All the variable factors (elements) in the matrix of equation (6) above cannot be accounted for in 
policy formulation as most severe at the same time. In order to over come this problem, variable factor's 
magnitude greater than or equal to the threshold value are to be considered most severe. 
See equation (10) 
Thus : IP(a)In = Threshold value .............. (10) a=1,2.. 
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6.14. Explanation of results on the causes of infrastructure failures in Nigeria 
From the overall results received for Nigeria as shown in Table 20 in Appendix A after applying the 
threshold value5 of the SIMO model, the following variable factors were identified as critical to the 
causes of infrastructure service delivery failures in Nigeria: corruption; misallocation of investments; 
inadequate maintenance; lack of transparency and accountability; insufficient funding for 
infrastructure; lack of supportive institutions; inconsistent political, social and economic policies; and 
lack of suitable technical and managerial skill. 
Corruption: 
The survey revealed that corruption° is the most prevalent variable factor responsible for 
infrastructure service delivery failures In Nigeria. This is because responses received from most 
geopolitical regions in the country upheld the view that corruption was most severe compared to the 
other variable factors responsible for infrastructure service delivery failures. For example, corruption 
came foremost in regions such as South-eastern Nigeria, North-eastern Nigeria, North-central 
Nigeria and South-western Nigeria. (Refer to the relevant Tables7 in Appendix A). However, 
corruption was ranked second in South-south Nigeria and third in the North-western region of 
Nigeria. (See the relevant Tables$ in Appendix A). It is Important to note that these variations in the 
actual ranking position of this factor from one geopolitical region to the other was not due to any 
known survey errors like sampling errors, coverage errors or non-response errors, but as a result of 
the choice or severity accorded variable factors by respondents in these regions. Thus, the need to 
understand the relative spread of choices or positions accorded variable factors from one region to 
another as a means of validating the relative positions they were accorded. Furthermore, to 
establish these variations in quantitative terms and measure the uniformity or levels of agreement in 
the choices accorded variable factors by respondents from one geopolitical region to another, the 
coefficient of variation (CV) was derived for each variable factor. This was carefully tabulated in 
Table 27 of Appendix A. 
s Threshold value as used in this survey defines the critical variable factors. If a numerical magnitude of any 
variable factor In the matrix is equal or greater than this value; that variable factor is to be considered critical. 
6 Corruption in the context used is the abuse of public office or public trust for private gain. 
7 Table 21; Table 22; Table 24; and Table 26. 
8 Table 25; Table 23. 
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From results in Table 27 of Appendix A, the coefficient of variation (CV) for corruption was 
approximately 33 percent when compared to other variable factors under consideration across the 
geopolitical regions. The CV for Corruption in this context defines the average spread of choice 
accorded by respondents relative to the factor's (corruption) mean or average score. The higher its 
percentage, the more varied or less homogenous the choices accorded the variable factor across all 
the geopolitical regions. However, the 33 percent was the third prevalent least in the table, which 
gives an indication that corruption was the third most homogenous variable factor or third least 
varied amongst the eighteen considered. Thus, the average severity of corruption across the six 
geopolitical regions in Nigeria from responses received was relatively uniform. 
Besides, one could make significant comparisons between the responses given by respondents 
from the North-western Nigeria in Table 6.10.1 on " people's impression of staffs of local 
infrastructure service providers" with the present ranking accorded corruption in the North-western 
region in Table 23 in Appendix A. Approximately 36 percent of the responses received from North- 
western Nigeria in Table 6.10.1 were satisfied with the staff of their local infrastructure service 
providers. The 36 percent comprises 11.4 percent asserting that staff were honest, and 24.3 
percent maintaining they were fairly honest. It is notable that this 36 percent was the highest 
regional level of support received for the staffs of local infrastructure service providers. Thus, it is 
not surprising to find that the response received from North-western Nigeria ranked other variable 
factors: misallocation of investments and lack of adequate maintenance before corruption. By 
implication, respondents did not rank corruption as highly as those from other regions did. Since, 
North-western Nigeria could be classed as one of the regions with the highest amount of public 
infrastructure due to the fact that this region has produced the highest number of key public officers 
in successive military governments in the country (Ayogu, 2002) one could argue that this 
development must have affected the responses received from this region. 
Nevertheless, the same line of argument do not holds true for the South-south region. Corruption 
was accorded the second highest position, a result which must have being due to glaring evidence 
175 
of the effects of failed or abandoned infrastructure projects. Infrastructure, seldom provided in this 
region, often fail to address the immediate needs and yearnings of the peoples of these region. 
Misallocation of Investments: 
Misallocation of investments was next in order of severity when compared to other variable factors 
responsible for infrastructure service delivery failures in Nigeria (see Table 20 in Appendix A). 
Though second in severity, however there was a much wider variation of views from one region to 
another. For example, the severity of "misallocation of investments" as a variable factor came 
topmost in South-south Nigeria and North-western Nigeria in comparison to other variable factors9 
as shown in Appendix A. However, in terms of severity, it came second in South-eastern Nigeria, 
fourth in North-eastern Nigeria and North-central Nigeria. It also came ninth in the South-western 
Nigeria (see the relevant Tables in Appendix A1°). 
To measure its average spread across all the geopolitical regions relative to its average mean, its 
coefficient of variation (CV) was derived. This coefficient would reveal if the present second position 
in terms of severity accorded this variable factor in Table 20 in the Appendix A is lopsided or largely 
uniform across all geopolitical regions. Surprisingly, the coefficient of variation was 87 percent (see 
Table 27 in Appendix A). This percentage indicates that "misallocation of investment" was the least 
homogenous or most varied variable factor amongst the eighteen under consideration across all the 
geopolitical regions in the country. Thus, the view that misallocation of investments was the second 
most severe variable factor responsible for infrastructure service delivery failures was uneven 
between geopolitical regions. This unevenness was not due to survey error, but was predominantly 
because of the very high responses to the ranking of this variable factor from both the North- 
western Nigeria and the South-south Nigeria. Moreover, misallocated investments results when too 
much attention is paid to low priority projects with less attention to essential services and adequate 
cost recovery. Misallocated Investment also results when too much attention is also being paid to 
new investments and not sufficient attention to maintenance. 
9 Table 23 and Table 25. 
10 Table 24; Table 22; Table 21; and Table 26. 
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Inadequate maintenance 
The third most severe variable factor ranked as being responsible for infrastructure and service 
delivery failures in Nigeria was inadequate maintenance (see Table 20 in Appendix A). The ranking 
accorded "inadequate maintenance" in both the South-western and North-western regions was 
second most severe amongst the variable factors". It was third most severe in the other four 
geopolitical regions12. Thus, this variable factor fluctuates between two consecutive positions 
regionally. A coefficient of variation (CV) of 28 percent was derived (see Table 27 in Appendix A). 
This value indicates that the level of variation of this variable factor across all regions was the least 
amongst the variable factors. Consequently, inadequate maintenance as the third most severe 
variable factor was a widely held or uniform view across all geopolitical regions in the country. 
It is also appropriate to know that inadequate maintenance shortens the infrastructural life span and 
increases expenditure for new infrastructure, as well as creating low capacity utilization. For 
example, World Bank assisted projects on maintenance In sub-Saharan Africa revealed that a 
reconstruction cost of US$45 billion would have been saved if timely maintenance expenditure of 
about US$12 billion were invested (World Bank, 2002); The World Bank (1994) also revealed that 
power systems in sub-Saharan Africa work on the average less than 60 percent of their installed 
capacity, and water supply systems function at less than 70 percent of installed capacity due to 
inadequate maintenance. Poor maintenance reduces service quality and also increases users' costs 
due to the installation of backup facilities. When facilities are not adequately maintained, vandals, 
dishonest staff and users of infrastructure services takes advantage of the situation to engage in 
some sort of rent-seeking behavior or outright vandalism of facilities. In such situations, it would be 
very difficult to make users and even staff accountable for their excesses. 
Lack of transparency and accountability 
This was the fourth identified variable factor responsible for infrastructure service delivery failures in 
Nigeria (see Table 20 in Appendix A). In examining the ranking of this factor across the six 
geopolitical regions, it was found that in North-eastern Nigeria the "lack of transparency and 
11 Please refer to Table 26 and Table 23 In Appendix A 
12 Please see Table 21; Table 22; Table 24; and Table 25 in Appendix A 
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accountability" was ranked second13 to corruption as the cause of infrastructure service failures. 
However, in South-western Nigeria, "lack of transparency and accountability" was ranked in third 
position, while it was ranked fifth in the South-south Nigeria14, sixth in South-eastern and North- 
central Nigeria1s and eighth in North-western Nigeria16. These variations were measured relative to 
its mean average using the coefficient of variation (CV), and it was found to be approximately 37 
percent (Refer to Table 27 in Appendix A). This percentage placed the ranking of this variable factor 
as the fifth most homogenous or uniform amongst eighteen considered variable factors. 
Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
The fifth most severe factor of the eighteen was "insufficient funding for infrastructure" (see Table 20 
In Appendix A). The ranking accorded this variable factor in each of the six geopolitical regions in 
Nigeria is as follows: South-western Nigeria ranked it fourth, South-eastern, North-central and 
North-eastern Nigeria fifth, South-south Nigeria sixth and North-western Nigeria ranked it 
eleventh. (see the relevant Tables in Appendix A17). In order to measure the variation in ranking 
relative to the mean of this variable factor, a coefficient of variation of approximately 34 percent (CV) 
was derived (see Table 27 in Appendix A). This value is an indication that the level of variation of 
this factor across regions was not high. Nonetheless, it was fourth when its variation across regions 
was compared to other variable factors. Thus, there was a much higher uniformity in the ranking 
position accorded this variable factor by respondents across regions. 
Furthermore, insufficient funding of infrastructure must have been due to the very limited financial 
resources available. For example, World Bank (1994) and United Nations (1996) studies classed 
Nigeria in the second half of the 1990s as one of the world poorest countries with an average per 
capita income of $0.72 per day and an average per capita consumption of $0.57 per day. Hence, 
only $0.15 a day is left on the average to spend on private capita formation, public investment in 
infrastructure and the running of vital public services. Moreover, insufficient funding for infrastructure 
13 Please see Table 24 In Appendix A. 
14 Please see Table 26 and Table 25 in Appendix A. 
15 Please see Table 24 and Table 21 In Appendix A. 
16 Please see Table 23 In Appendix A. 
17 Tables 26,24,21,22,25, and 23 
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in Nigeria could also be accounted for or aggravated by the country's heavy debt burden. For 
example, external debt as a share of the total gross national product (GNP) was almost 82 percent 
in the first half of the 1990's (USAID, 1996). This means that only 18 percent of current GDP is 
available to fulfill all competing demands in the economy. As often as it is the case, this 18 percent 
is consumed in recurrent expenditure, leaving capital expenditure to the vagaries of multilateral and 
unilateral financial assistance. Some of these limited funds available for infrastructure are often 
wasted due to corruption or to other areas of immediate need. Lastly, indiscriminate diversion of 
financial resources from intended purposes without recourse to the conventional checks and 
balances is an identifiable institutional lapse (North, 1990; Ostrom et al, 1996). 
Lack of supportive institutions 
Lack of supportive institutions was identified as the sixth most severe factor. This is clearly revealed 
in Table 20 in Appendix A. However, lack of supportive Institutions was ranked fourth most severe in 
both South-south Nigeria and North-western Nigeria18, eighth in south-western Nigeria and north- 
eastern Nigeria19, and tenth and twelfth most severe in North-central Nigeria and South eastern 
Nigeria respectively20. 
Measuring the proportion of variation in ranking relative to the mean average of this variable factor 
as described earlier, the coefficient of variation (CV) derived was approximately 64 percent. This 
value indicates that the level of variation across all the regions was very high - fourteenth out of the 
eighteen factors. This is shown in Table 27 of Appendix A. Consequently, lack of supportive 
institutions as the sixth most severe variable factor in this survey was not a uniformly strong view 
across all the geopolitical regions within the country. The variation in this variable factor nationwide 
was purely a function of respondents views, and was not due to any known survey errors. The 
reason for this variation could be that several institutional strategies to address the dearth of growth 
inducing infrastructure and services to check the growing level of poverty in Nigeria have been very 
unsuccessful, as they have failed to provide the enabling supportive framework for development. 
18 Please see Table 25 and Table 23 In Appendix A. 
19 Please refer to Table 26 and Table 22. 
20 Please see Table 21 and Table 24 In Appendix A. 
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Another argument is that institutional support has been slow at meeting required expectation. Thus, 
the slow pace or failure might be due partly to poor enforcement mechanisms which stern from the 
insincerity at actualizing set objectives and corruption. 
Further, when corruption becomes more or less the norm as evidenced in Nigeria, the 
constitutional rule of law and its enforcement mechanisms becomes subverted. As a 
consequence, transparency and accountability in governance becomes void. However, 
subverted rule and its enforcement mechanisms are core institutional problems with enormous 
potential for crippling any existing system or organization. Nevertheless, the whole idea of 
institutionalization in most cases is stereotyped or fashioned along the lines of established 
models elsewhere without bearing in mind the singular conditions of those to be served. To this 
end, the uniqueness of cultures and value systems could be suggested as parameters that 
should form the framework for building effective and supportive institutions in Nigeria. Once 
there is an enabling supportive institutional framework the hope for consistency in political, 
social and economic policies is high. 
Inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
"Inconsistent political, social and economic policies" was ranked the seventh most severe. This is 
shown in Table 20 in Appendix A. It was ranked fourth in South-eastern Nigeria and in South- 
western Nigeria it was ranked seventh21. In South-south Nigeria and North-central Nigeria ninth, in 
North-eastern Nigeria twelfth and In North-western Nigeria fourteenth22. 
In order to measure the proportion of variation in ranking positions of this variable factor relative to 
its mean, the coefficient of variation (CV) for the variable factor was derived as 47 percent. This 
percentage value gives an indication of a relative fair spread across country. However, it was the 
seventh most homogenous or widely spread view amongst the eighteen variable factors considered. 
It is interesting to note that "inconsistent political, social and economic policies" was practically the 
only variable factor amongst those identified to be major causes of infrastructure failures that 
21 Please see Table 24 and Table 26 In Appendix A 
22 Please see Table 25 and Table 21 In Appendix A 
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achieved a balance between the level of spread and the level of severity across geopolitical regions. 
This is because it occupied the seventh position as the most homogenous factor and seventh 
position in level of severity. 
Policy can be classified as any rule set by an organization to govern its operations (Cummine, 
1999). In most cases these come as programs intended to lessen or resolve social, economic or 
physical problems. Thus, it also defines the boundaries of an organization or individual in any 
field of endeavor. However policies as a rule are themselves institutions and they are also 
product of an institutional arrangement with the aim to foster effective management and 
development (World Bank, 2002; Ostrom et al, 1993; North, 1990). To this end the inconsistent 
political, social and economic policies plaguing infrastructure and service deliveries in Nigeria is 
also due to the institutional failures earlier identified. 
Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill: 
Lack of suitable technical and managerial skills is the last in severity of the major factors responsible 
for infrastructure service delivery failures in Nigeria. It was ranked sixth in North-eastern and South- 
western Nigeria, ninth in the North-west and south-east Nigeria, eighth in South-south Nigeria and 
twelfth in the North-central region23. In order to check the variation of spread of this variable factor 
relative to its average mean from one region to another its coefficient of variation (CV) was derived 
at approximately 44 percent. This is shown in Table 27 in Appendix A. From the Table, it can be 
seen that it was the fifth most uniformly spread factor. 
23 Please see Tables 20,21,22,23,24,25 and 26 In Appendix A 
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6.15. Summary 
1. In this chapter, the following distributions and cross-tabulations in the survey were 
analyzed: 
" Questionnaire distribution and responses within each geopolitical region and sector / 
organization of respondents 
" Crosstabulation between geopolitical region and sector/ organization of respondents 
" Class or rank distribution of respondents. 
o Crosstabulation between geopolitical region and class or rank of 
respondents 
" Respondents range of monthly income distribution 
o Crosstabulation between geopolitical regions and range of monthly income 
o Crosstabulation between respondents' ranges of monthly income and 
stability of infrastructure services in Nigeria 
" Respondents age range distribution 
o Crosstabulation of geopolitical region and age range of respondents 
o Crosstabulation of age range and stability of infrastructure in Nigeria 
" Respondents rating of the Stability of infrastructure service delivery in Nigeria 
o Crosstabulation between geopolitical region and stability of infrastructure 
services in Nigeria 
" Respondents rating of Infrastructure supply in Nigeria 
o Crosstabulation of geopolitical region and infrastructure supply in Nigeria 
" Respondents rating of the quality of infrastructure in Nigeria 
o Crosstabulation of geopolitical region and quality of Infrastructure in Nigeria 
" Rate of infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria 
o Crosstabulation of geopolitical region and rate of infrastructure maintenance 
in Nigeria 
" Response rate to infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria. 
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o Crosstabulation of geopolitical region and response rate to infrastructure 
maintenance in Nigeria 
" Respondents impression of the staffs of their local infrastructure service providers 
o Crosstabulation of geopolitical region and staffs of infrastructure service 
providers 
" Respondents rating of their average infrastructure monthly bills 
o Crosstabulation of geopolitical region and average infrastructure monthly 
bills 
2. In this chapter, the correlations and subsequent mathematical models from regression 
analysis between the following variables were developed: 
" Stability of infrastructure services and supply in Nigeria 
" Stability of infrastructure services and rate of maintenance in Nigeria 
" Stability of infrastructure services and the people's response rate to infrastructure 
maintenance in Nigeria 
" Stability of infrastructure services and conduct of staff of service providers in Nigeria 
" Stability of infrastructure services and average monthly bills in Nigeria 
3. The analysis of the collected data in this survey gave rise to a new mathematical model 
called Severity Index in Matrix Order (SIMO) to aid the analysis and identification of core 
variable factors in future investigation of this kind. 
4. Finally, this survey was also able to identify unambiguously the following as the major 
causes of infrastructure service delivery failures in descending order of severity in 
Nigeria: 
" Corruption 
" Misallocation of investments 
0 Inadequate maintenance 
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" Lack of transparency and accountability 
" Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
" Lack of supportive institutions 
" Inconsistent political, economic and social policies 
" Lack of technical and managerial skills 
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Chapter Seven 
Infrastructure Procurement 
7.0. Introduction 
Another major objective of this research was to examine the existing procurement framework for 
infrastructure and service delivery in sub-Saharan Africa, taking Nigeria as a case study. Firstly, 
it is necessary to understand the meaning and concept of the term "procurement". This refers to 
the process used for the acquisition of goods, works and related services (e. g. transport, 
insurance, installation, training and maintenance) required in the execution of a project, 
excluding consultancy services (UNCITRAL 1994; African Development Bank 1997a). Before 
discussing this subject mater, it would be appropriate to have a clear understanding of the 
meaning of the terms "works", "goods" and "services" relative to infrastructure procurement. 
The United Nation Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in its twenty-sixth and 
twenty-seventh sessions in Vienna (1993) and New York (1994) defined goods, works and 
services as follows: a "good" is an object of any kind or description either in solid, liquid or 
gaseous form, including raw materials, products, equipment, electricity and services required to 
supply the goods, so long the value of such incidental services does not exceed the value of the 
goods. "Works" refers to all construction, reconstruction, demolition, repair or renovation of 
buildings, structures, site preparation, excavation, erection, building, installation of equipments 
or materials, decoration and finishing, as well as services incidental to construction such as 
drilling, mapping, satellite photography, seismic investigations and similar services provided 
pursuant to the procurement contract, so long the value of these services does not exceed that 
of the construction itself . In addition to the UNCITRAL 1994 definition of services, this term is 
also defined by the World Bank Group (2003) and African Development Bank (1997a) as any 
object of procurement other than goods or works. A brief overview of international best practice 
for procurement follows. 
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International best practice for procurement as spelt out by UNCITRAL, otherwise referred to as 
the "UNCITRAL Model law" on procurement of goods, works and services, is to serve as a 
model for evaluation and the modernisation of procurement laws, practices and the setting out 
of procurement legislation where none exists within member countries. This model legislation on 
procurement by UNCITRAL was a direct response to outdated and inadequate legislation 
governing procurement in member countries that has resulted in inefficiency, ineffectiveness, 
abuse and the failure to obtain value in return for the expenditure of public funds. Thus, the 
reform of the procedure and practices of the public procurement system is the foundation for the 
application of the "Model law" (Yearbook of the UNCITRAL 1994). 
However, the inadvertent disregard for procurement procedures and best practice for 
procurement has been identified as one of the major root causes of infrastructure delay and 
cost escalation in sub-Saharan Africa, and indeed in developing countries in general (World 
Bank Group, 2003; Omoregie et al. 2005; Omoregie and Radford 2006). 
7.1. Procurement Objectives 
This apparent disregard for the procurement process as evident in sub-Saharan Africa negates 
basic international principles or policy underpinning procurement of works and services. These 
basic principles as cited in the Yearbook of the UNCITRAL (1994), the World Bank Group 
(2003) and the African Development Bank (1 997a) include in summary the following: 
" The need for economy and efficiency in procurement of works, goods and services 
0 The importance of transparency, accountability, responsibility and objectivity in the 
procurement process 
0 Equal opportunity aimed at maximising competition for all eligible contractors and 
suppliers from the developing and developed countries 
0 To encourage the development and participation of indigenous contractors and 
suppliers in the procurement process 
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The procurement process could be subdivided into four major parts: the mode of procurement, 
prequalification process, bidding process and the awards of contracts. These processes are 
briefly explained in the following sections. 
7.2. The modes of procurement 
The mode of procurement is simply the method or type of procurement pattern chosen for the 
project or services (African Development Bank, 1997a; Webster's reference, 2003). It is 
important to note that certain differences exist between procurement of works and goods and 
procurement of services. This is due because procurement of services usually involves the 
supply of intangible objects that are difficult to quantify in terms of exact content and quality 
(UNCITRAL 1994). Therefore the quality of services provided is largely a function of the skill 
and expertise of suppliers or contractors. Unlike the procurement of works and goods where the 
governing criterion is price, the price of services is often not considered as important in the 
evaluation and selection process as the quality and competence of contractors and suppliers 
(Year Book of the UNCITRAL 1994). 
However, in the procurement of goods and works, the UNCITRAL Model law mandated the use 
of tendering otherwise referred to as bidding under normal conditions. As a method of 
procurement, tendering is widely reputed for its ability to promote competition, economy and 
efficiency, objectivity, transparency and accountability in the procurement process (UNCITRAL 
1994; Aniekwu and Nwanchukwu 1996; World Bank Group 2003). Similarly, under normal 
circumstance in the procurement of services, the Model law prescribes the use of "principal 
method for procurement of services" designed to give "due weight" in the evaluation process to 
the qualification and expertise of the service providers. In exceptional circumstances, where 
tendering and the principal method for procurement of services become inappropriate, the 
Model law offers alternative methods of procurement. Nonetheless, these alternative methods 
are subject to the acceptance of member states, and where inconsistent requirements exist to 
the directives of regional economic integration groupings, the regional economic directives 
prevail (UNCITRAL 1994). 
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7.2.1. Tendering (Bid) 
According to general rules in the UNCITRAL Model law as shown Appendix IV and the Year 
Book of the UNCITRAL (1994), tendering involves the following features: 
9 Unrestricted solicitation of participation by suppliers or contactors 
0 Comprehensive description and specifications in solicitation documents, thus providing 
a common basis on which contractors and suppliers are to prepare their tenders 
0 Full disclosures to suppliers or contractors of the criteria to be used in evaluating and 
comparing tenders and in selecting the successful tender 
0 Strict prohibition against negotiations between the procuring entity' and suppliers or 
contractors as to the substance of their tenders 
0 Public openings of tenders at the stipulated deadline for submission of tenders 
0 Disclosure of any formalities required for entry into force of the procurement contract 
7.2.2. Principal method of procurement of services 
The main features of the principal method of procurement of services in accordance with the 
UNCITRAL Model Law Include the following: 
" Unrestricted solicitation of suppliers and contractors 
" Pre-disclosure in the request for proposals of the criteria for evaluation of proposals 
" Pre-disclosure of the selection procedure among the three options available in the 
selection process 
The three selection procedures in the principal method of procurement of services are: 
" Selection procedure without negotiation 
0 Selection procedure with simultaneous negotiations 
0 Selection procedure with consecutive negotiation 
In the first selection procedure as spelt out in article 42 of the Model law (see Appendix IV), 
proposals that exceed in technical rating the threshold set by the procuring entity aresubjected 
I Any governmental department, agency, organ or other unit, or any subdivisions in member state that engages in 
procurement 
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to a 'straightforward price competition'. In the second selection procedure with simultaneous 
negotiation as shown in article 43 of the Model Law (see Appendix IV), the procuring entity 
negotiates with contractors and suppliers, after which they submit their best and final offers. In 
this process, the price is considered separately and only after completion of the technical 
evaluation. This process is similar to the request for proposals procedure in article 48 of the 
Model Law (see Appendix IV). Under the third selection procedure with consecutive negotiation 
(article 44 of the Model law), negotiation solely on price is held with the contractor or supplier 
with the highest technical rating. The procuring entity is allowed under this procedure to 
negotiate in a sequential fashion with other suppliers or contractors one by one on the basis of 
their rating. This can only be done after terminating negotiations with the previous higher ranked 
supplier or contractor and negotiations terminated cannot be reopened. 
However, under exceptional circumstances, the Model law offers the following modes of 
procurement for goods, works and services: two-stage tendering, request for proposals, 
competitive negotiation, restricted tendering, request for quotations and single source 
procurement. 
7.2.3. Two-stage tendering, request for proposals and competitive negotiation 
Two-stage tendering is subdivided into two consecutive stages. In stage one, the procuring 
entity solicits various proposals in order to obtain an idea of the specifications required for the 
project on the basis of technical and qualitatitive specifications characteristics of the 
procurement as well as contractual terms and conditions. In the second stage, a regular 
tendering proceeding follows. 
Request for proposals is a procedure in which the procuring entity solicits proposals from a 
limited number of suppliers and contractors. The procuring entity also negotiates with them as 
to possible changes in the substance of their proposals, request best and final offers from them, 
and evaluates them on the basis of a predisclosed criteria (Yearbook of the UNCITRAL 1994). 
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Unlike the two-stage tendering, at no stage in this procedure are tendering proceedings 
conducted. Competitive negotiation is an unstructured method of procurement, which 
differentiates it from two-stage tendering and requests for proposals; it may be applied during 
cases of urgency. 
The conditions for use of two-stage tendering, requests for proposals and competitive 
negotiation can be found In article 19 of the UNCITRAL Model law in Appendix IV. 
7.2.4. Restricted tendering 
Restricted tendering is a procurement procedure where by the procuring entity is restricted in 
the number of invitations to tender it sends out to suppliers and contractors. Thus, a limited 
number of suppliers and contractors are invited to tender in most cases for specialised and 
technically complex goods, works or services that only a limited number of suppliers are 
capable of providing. This procedure is also employed in cases where it is economically and 
efficiently viable to restrict tenders. The conditions for use of restricted tendering are found in 
article 20 of the UNCITRAL Model law in Appendix IV. 
7.2.5. Request-for-quotation, single-source procurement 
Under the request-for-quotation procedure, the procuring entity solicits quotations from a small 
number of suppliers and selects the lowest priced responsive offer. In practice, this method is 
sometimes referred to as "shopping". According to the African Development Bank (1994), there 
are two types of shopping: international shopping and national shopping. These are briefly 
explained in the following paragraphs. 
International Shopping is a procurement method based on comparing relative price quotations 
from several suppliers (generally soliciting at least three tenders) with the aim of achieving 
competitive prices (African Development Bank, 1997a). International involvement Is used in the 
event that the goods to be procured are so diversified that it would be of no commercial interest 
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for any single supplier to bid for them, or if the good is a standard specification commodity and 
cannot be purchased locally (African Development Bank, 1997a). National Shopping is similar 
to International Shopping except that the goods required can be acquired within the member 
country. The procuring entity may invite quotations, on the grounds that there is a sufficient 
number of national suppliers and agents of qualified foreign suppliers to guarantee competitive 
pricing (African Development Bank, 1997a). 
Exceptional circumstances such as urgency due to catastrophic events and the availability of 
goods, works and services only from a single supplier or contractor require the single-source- 
procurement procedure to be applied. sSee articles 21 and 22 in the UNCITRAL Model law for 
comprehensive details of the conditions for use of request-for-quotations and single-sourced- 
procurement. 
7.3. Prequalification Process 
This is the next stage after a specific mode of procurement has been adopted. Prequalification 
is a procedure specifically meant for the selection of competent bidders; it precedes the 
invitation to tender or bid (African Development Bank, 1997b; World Bank, 2002). Article 6 of 
the UNCITRAL Model law in Appendix IV emphasises the need for prequalification Irrespective 
of the method of procurement utilised; suppliers and contractors must be qualified before 
entering the procurement contract. Another standard similar to the Model law by UNCITRAL 
(1994) is the standard prequalification document for procurement of works and user's guide by 
the World Bank based on the master procurement document "Prequalification Document for 
Procurement of Works and User's Guide" prepared by the Multilateral Development Banks and 
International Financial Institutions (World Bank, 2002). It reflects the majority views of these 
institutions and, by the World Bank's directive, Is to be used when a prequalification process 
takes place prior to the bidding process for procurement of works through International 
Competitive Bidding (ICB) (World Bank, 2002). However, the standard procurement 
prequalification documents for procurement of works in sub Saharan Africa expected to serve 
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as models are that of the World Bank Group, African Development Bank (ADB), African 
Development Fund (ADF), and Nigerian Trust Fund (NTF) and the UNCITRAL Model Law. 
Some notable benefits of the prequalification process are given below. 
Usually, prequalification enables the bidders who may not be qualified on their own to avoid the 
expense of bidding but be encouraged on joint ventures, which increases the chance for a 
successful bid (African Development Bank, 1997b). The guarantee that inadequately qualified 
competitors will be excluded from bidding has the inevitable effect of raising the quality of bids. 
(World Bank Group, 2003; African Development Bank, 1997b). 
The process facilitates both the assessment of the interest generated by the project among the 
qualified firms, and the making of any necessary adjustment in the procurement process 
(African Development Bank, 1997b). This change could benefit their resources and experience, 
as well as significantly reduce problems associated with low prices submitted by bidders of 
doubtful competence (World Bank Group, 2003; African Development Bank, 1997b). 
7.3.1. Invitation for prequalification (IFPQ) 
The IFPQ provides essential information that would enable a decision on whether to participate 
by potential bidders. It also indicates an important prequalification criteria or minimum 
requirements apart from the very important items listed in the standard prequalification 
documents (SPQ) (African Development Bank, 1997b). In accordance with the African 
Development Bank (1997b), UNCITRL (1994) and World Bank Group (2003) the IFPQ should 
be issued as follows: 
0 An advertisement in at least one general newspaper in the procuring entity's country 
and in the official gazette, if any 
0 An advertisement (Invitation to Bid) is required in the form of a specific procurement 
notice in Development Business published by the United Nations 
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" An advertisement in well-known technical magazines, newspapers and trade 
publications of wide international circulation is mandatory for complex and highly 
specialised projects 
0A letter is to be issued to interested bidders that have indicated their willingness to 
partake in the prequalification process following the publication of the General 
Procurement Notice (GPN) for which the Invitation was issued 
0A notice to consular or diplomatic representatives of eligible member countries of the 
Bank group within the Borrowing country 
7.3.2. Evaluations of submissions to prequalify 
Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Model law in Appendix IV specifies the criteria and procedures to be 
used in the assessment of suppliers and contractors. It involves the pre-disclosure of the criteria 
for evaluation of suppliers and contractors in the prequalification process. These criteria must 
be fairly applied to all suppliers and contractors participating in the prequalification process. In 
article 6 of the Model Law, sufficient flexibility is given to the procuring entity as to the number of 
times it is appropriate to carry out the prequalification of contractors and suppliers in the 
procurement proceedings. Thus, in the early stages of the procurement proceedings, 
prequalification of suppliers and contractors is carried out, and those contractors and suppliers 
that have been prequalified are later revalidated. 
In addition, the assessment of applicants must be based on the evidence submitted by the 
applicant, and not a black list, which may be based on out of date information or irrelevant data. 
So current poor performance may be a criterion for disqualifying an applicant if suitable steps 
are not being taken to correct it (World Bank Group, 2003; African Development Bank, 1997b). 
The procuring entity's ability to verify the claim made by the applicant and request information 
from their past employers and financial institutions is crucial to the procurement process. The 
extent of confirmation should be limited to the major issue, with the applicant being afforded the 
benefit of reasonable doubt. Transparency should be noted as the chief basic consideration in 
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the procurement process (World Bank Group, 2003; African Development Bank, 1997b). While 
transparency is crucial throughout the project, its importance at the bidding process of the 
procurement system is overriding. 
7.4. International competitive bidding (ICB) 
ICB procedures are detailed in the guidelines Procurement under International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Loans and International Development Association 
(IDA) Credits (World Bank Group, 2003); they could also be found in UNCITRAL (1994). The 
procedures have certain special features and requirements: 
Public Notification: For each project involving ICB, a general procurement notice for goods 
and works will appear in the United Nations publication "Development Business"; the notice 
gives general information on the nature of the procurement to be carried out (African 
Development Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 2003). Invitations to bid for specific contracts 
will also be advertised in at least one major local newspaper (UNCITRAL 1994; African 
Development Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 2003). For large specialized contracts, 
invitations will be advertised in Development Business and/or in well-known technical 
magazines, newspapers and trade publications with wide international circulation (UNCITRAL 
1994; African Development Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 2003). 
Currency of bid: Bidders are entitled to express their bid price in any currency of a member 
country; If the bidder wishes to break the bid price into more than one foreign currency it may do 
so, provided that the price is made up of not more than three foreign currencies (African 
Development Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 2003). However, the procuring entity may 
require bidders to state the portion of the bid price representing local costs in the currency of the 
procuring entity's country (World Bank Group, 2003). Alternatively, for works, bidding 
documents may require bidders to state the bid price entirely in the local currency, along with 
the requirements for payment In up to three foreign currencies for anticipated inputs from 
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outside the procuring entity' country (African Development Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 
2003). For the purpose of comparing prices, bid prices will be converted to a single currency as 
stated in the bidding documents (African Development Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 2003). 
Payments: Successful bidders are entitled to receive payments in the currencies of their bid, 
thereby minimizing the bidder's exposure to exchange rate fluctuations (African Development 
Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 2003). The bank also requires that contracts include price and 
payment adjustment where appropriate and in accordance with commercial practices (World 
Bank Group, 2003). 
Language and clarity of bidding documents: Documents will be in English, French or 
Spanish, and be worded so as to permit and encourage international competition (World Bank 
Group, 2003). Bidders have the right to request clarification before bid opening, and all 
prospective bidders will be provided with the same information (Year book of the UNCITRAL 
1994; African Development Bank 1997a; World Bank Group 2003). 
Public bid opening: Bids will be opened and read aloud in the presence of the bidders or any 
representatives who wish to attend (African Development Bank 1997a; World Bank Group 
2003). Other than clarifying the purchaser's questions, there must be no discussions or 
negotiations and all bids are final after the public opening (UNCITRAL 1994; African 
Development Bank 1997a; World Bank Group 2003). 
Preferences: Qualified suppliers and contractors from each of the member countries should 
have equal access to information, equal opportunity to bid for contracts, and a fair and impartial 
consideration of award, independent of national origin (UNCITRAL 1994; African Development 
Bank 1997a; World Bank Group 2003). Contracts are awarded to the lowest bidder, regardless 
of nationality (African Development Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 2003). However, to 
promote the development of local industries, the procuring entity may give a margin of 
preference to locally manufactured goods, plant, and civil works contractors when they are 
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competing against foreign suppliers or contractors (UNCITRAL 1994; African Development 
Bank, 1997a; World Bank Group, 2003). 
7.4.1. The evaluation of bid and contract award 
The purpose of bid evaluation is to determine the value of each bid in comparison to other 
responsive and responsible bids and to determine the lowest evaluated cost bid (World Bank, 
2000; African Development Bank, 1997a). The bid evaluation shall be consistent with the terms 
and conditions set in the bidding document (World Bank, 2000). Generally, only quantifiable 
factors will be taken into consideration, and in the case of exceptions; methods and terms of 
quantification would be specified (World Bank, 2000; African Development Bank, 1997a, 
UNCITRAL 1994). 
In addition to the bid price being adjusted in order to correct arithmetical errors, factors such as 
the time of completion and execution or the efficiency and compatibility of the equipment, cost 
of inland transport to the specified site, payment schedule, delivery time, operating costs, the 
availability of service and spare parts and related training, safety and environmental benefits will 
be taken into consideration (World Bank, 2000; African Development Bank, 1997a). To the 
greatest possible extent, these factors are to be quantified in monetary terms or issued relative 
weights as relevant according to the evaluation criteria in the bidding documents. As critical as 
the evaluation of bids is to the procurement process, its overriding objective is the award of the 
contract to the most suitable bidder. 
Award of contracts is the final stage of the procurement process and must be made within the 
period of bid validity to the bidder whose bid has been determined to be the lowest evaluated 
cost bid. The lowest evaluated cost bid do not necessary imply the lowest offered price but that 
which have met the appropriate standards of required and financial resources (African 
Development Bank, 1997a). The successful bidder is then informed and invited to sign the 
contract within the period of the validity of bid (African Development Bank, 1997a). 
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For the successful execution of contracts for large buildings, civil engineering supply, installation 
projects and high-tech equipments, contracts are to be awarded to experienced contractors, 
after thorough competitive bidding (Mansfield et al. 1994; African Development Bank, 1997a; 
World Bank Group 2003). Having looked at the international best practice for procurement 
through the UNCITRAL model law (1994), African Development Bank (1997) and the World 
Bank (2002) and (2003) documents on procurements, it is necessary at this stage to examine 
the Nigerian procurement systems. 
7.5. Procurement systems in Nigeria 
The modes of procurement commonly used in Nigeria are competitive tendering and selective 
tendering (Esenwa 2004; Ogunje 2002; Mansfield et al. 1994). The World Bank country 
procurement assessment report for Nigeria as cited in Ekpenkhio (2003) identified the following 
gaps in the country's procurement system: 
" The lack of a legal framework regarding a public procurement system 
0 The lack of a supervisory body to provide guidance and monitor procuring entities 
0 Faulty implementation of existing regulations on procurement, which has created the 
opportunity for bribery and corruption 
" Gaps and deficiencies in existing laws and regulations 
0 Proliferation, ineffective mandates, limited power and authorisation thresholds of the 
tender's board has encouraged abuses such as the splitting of contracts, delays and 
non-transparency 
" Cumbersome customs systems and procedure resulting in delays and corruption 
" The lack of relevant training and skills on procurement procedures by those carrying 
out procurement duties 
This investigation was carried out, on the request of the federal government of Nigeria to the 
World Bank in collaboration with some Nigerian private sector specialists, to study its financial 
systems and general procurement-related activities. This was aimed at reforming the Nigerian 
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public procurement system. The objective of the study was to reduce the scope of malpractice 
in public procurement and improve on the management of the country's public expenditure. The 
method of investigation applied was the participatory approach involving all the key 
stakeholders: the federal government, state government and local government, together with 
representatives of the private sector. Finally, the country's procurement assessment report 
(CPAR) was produced. 
As a way of tackling the problems identified from the study, the following recommendations 
were made in the CPAR: 
0 The need for a procurement law based on the United Nations Commission for 
International Trade and Law (UNCITRAL) 
" The need to establish the Public Procurement Commission (PPC) to serve as the 
regulatory and oversight body on public sector procurement 
" Some key areas of the financial regulations need revising in order to make them more 
transparent 
" The streamlining of Tender Boards and the strengthening of their functional authority 
and powers to award contracts 
"A critical need to rebuild procurement and financial management capacity in the public 
sector 
"A comprehensive review of the businesses related to export, import and transit 
regulations, procedures and practices, including the automated system for customs 
data (ASYCUDA) 
In response to the recommendations in the CPAR, the Nigerian government issued new policy 
guidelines on public procurement and contract award procedures in 2002. The new guidelines 
(tagged: Circular No. F. 15775) as cited in Ekpenkhio (2003) and Etomi and Partners (2006) are 
as follows: 
0 The establishment of a public procurement commission that would be the top policy 
making body on all procurements and award of contract matters in the public service. 
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" The abolition of both federal and departmental tenders boards, thereby compelling the 
permanent secretary and the newly created ministerial tenders board to assume their 
responsibilities. 
" The permanent secretary under the new arrangement has the power to approve 
contracts not exceeding US$8,000 (N1,000,000) without a competitive open tendering 
procedure. However, he must obtain at least three written proposals from suitably 
qualified contractors or suppliers. Incurred expenditures from the process are to be 
forwarded to the minister on a quarterly basis. 
"A ministerial tenders board established in each ministry or extra ministerial department 
can approve contacts between US$8,000 (N1,000,000) and US$400,000 
(N50,000,000). However, all decisions made by the board are subject to the approval 
of the minister. This board consists of the chairman (the permanent secretary / chief 
executive of the ministry or extra-ministerial department) and directors / heads of 
department in the ministry or establishment. 
0 All contract valued at US$400,000 (N50,000,000) and above are to be approved by 
the federal executive council. 
0 Deliberate contract splitting to circumvent the procedures of the guidelines is a serious 
offence and subject to disciplinary action. 
0 The ministerial tenders board must adopt open competitive tendering procedures, and 
where such tendering procedures are inappropriate, the board is to apply selective or 
limited tendering procedures. 
0 Contracts above US$80,000 are to be advertised in at least two national dailies and or 
governmental gazette. Notice of all other tenders must be posted on the notice board 
of the procuring entity. A minimum period of six weeks is to be given before the bid 
submission deadline. 
" The opening of bid envelope is to be carried out publicly at designated date and time 
immediately after the close of the bidding period to avoid undue influence or bids being 
tampered with. 
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0 The criteria for evaluation of tenders must be clearly spelt out in the bidding document 
and all contracts are to be awarded on the basis of those criteria. 
0A committee made up of professionals are to evaluate bids, and officials involved in the 
tendering process are to declare any conflict of interest and exempt themselves from 
the bid evaluation and approval process. 
0 All contracts award with a value of US$165,000 (N20,000,000) and above are to be 
published in two national dailies with details of the contract, the name of the contractor 
and the contract price clearly stated. 
0 All contract variations are to be subject to the recommendations of the ministerial 
tenders board and method of determining price variation during contract execution 
must be incorporated into the contract. 
0 All contracts valued at US$80,000 and above attract a bid security of not less than 2 
percent of the bid price. 
0A performance bank guarantee of 10 percent is necessary for all contract prices of 
US$80,000 and above. 
0 Interest shall be paid on any delayed payments by government ministries or extra 
ministerial departments to contractors or suppliers. This takes effect from the sixtieth 
day of the submission of invoice or certificate of job completion 
9 Where a mobilisation fee is necessary, it must not exceed 25 percent of the contract 
sum. 
0 All eligible contractors or suppliers are to be registered with the federal ministry of 
works and housing or its representatives at the various ministries or extra-ministerial 
departments. 
0 Funds are to be released on the basis of a realistic, approved and updated 
procurement plan. A procurement plan is to be drawn up to determine the requirements 
for funds for various government offices at different quarters during the fiscal year. 
0 Certified true copies of all contract agreements and minutes of the tender board's 
meetings are to be sent to the office of the auditor general of the federation. The 
auditor general must co-sign the certificate of final payment. 
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0 International procurement agents are to be enlisted to assist in medium and large scale 
contracting where necessary. 
The CPAR as cited by Ekpenkhio (2003) was accepted by the government, with due exceptions 
for the registration of contractors and the involvement of political office holders like ministers / 
commissioners in the awards of contracts. 
7.6: Comments and recommendations 
The recommendations of the World Bank CPAR for Nigeria and the efforts by the present 
federal government to reform the Nigerian procurement system based on the CPAR report are 
commended. These recommendations are aimed at building sustainable and supportive 
institutions to strengthen the existing procurement framework in Nigeria, thereby ushering in 
efficiency, accountability, transparency and integrity in the Nigerian procurement system. As 
well-intentioned as these objectives are, the findings gathered from this study (most especially 
the survey) revealed that these efforts are likely to fail. 
The experience of the data collection team points to the fact that the average Nigerian may 
have a divided loyalty to his country; the order of allegiance is from the small to the large scale 
- i. e. firstly to his immediate family, then his ethnicity and then his religion. Allegiance to his 
country is in the last of his priorities. Hence, the spate of corruption, religious conflicts and other 
malpractices such as favouring a particular ethnic group or community over others. Sometimes, 
census figures are manipulated to justify the increase in revenue allocation, dominance in the 
military, political positions and even contract awards (Mbeke-Ekanem, 2000 and 2006). This 
presents an obvious contrast to some parts of the world. In the west, for example, patriotism is 
commonly seen as overriding other interests. 
This unique difference in the levels of commitment to one's country or place of birth, from one 
region or country to another reveals distinctiveness in perceptions, trust in society, beliefs and 
value systems. These ought to reflect policies, guidelines or strategies underpinning 
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infrastructure and service delivery. On the appropriateness of procurement systems 
Kumaraswamy (1994) as cited in Mcdermont (1999) and in Rowlinson and Mcdermont (1999) 
argues that sustainable and synergistic procurement strategies must evolve from those for 
which the project was intended. He discussed further the inappropriate nature of superimposing 
developed countries' procurement strategies or mechanisms on developing economies. 
Procurement systems must be appropriate to circumstances. Thus, it is the view of this study 
that when the users of infrastructures or services are not involved in its conceptualisation and 
delivery, the likely chance of success is very slim if not entirely absent. Who are the users? The 
people - and what makes a people? Culture, common religion, language or inherited conditions 
of life (American Heritage dictionary, 2000; Liu and Fellows, 1999; McDermott, 1999). Ng 
(1994), as cited in Martins and Taylor (1996) and in Mcdermott (1999) on the role of culture in 
institutions argues, that the people's participation in the procurement process is essential for 
community development. 
On the review of public procurement regulations of the European Communities (EC), the World 
Trade organization (WTO), the World Bank and the United Nations (UN), Craig (1996) as cited 
in Mcdermott (1999) was of the view that they were designed to promote competitive tendering 
and to prevent the use of technical standards. He argues that it was only the WTO and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that discriminated positively for developing 
countries. Even contractual arrangements and forms of contracts currently being practiced in 
many developing countries like Nigeria are out of date in the various environments they were 
designed for. Fellows (1989) observed that this has been the cause of the major problems of 
the construction industry worldwide. For example, the standard forms co jointly developed by 
the Joint Contract Tribunal (JCT) and the Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE) has been used 
extensively (whether appropriate, amended or not) in areas they were not designed for 
(Mcdermott, 1999). 
The Latham Report (1994) emphasised the need for a thorough re-examination of the JCT 
forms in the UK. Consequently, the engineering and construction contract is been encouraged 
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as an alternative. Even the ICE Conditions of Contract are constantly being amended to meet 
the prevailing conditions within the UK construction industry (Hill 1991 as cited in McDermott 
1999). It is the view of the author that as long as there is uniqueness in cultures and people, 
international best practice and appropriate international implementation procedures for 
procurement, contractual arrangements and forms of contract that could be perfectly adapted 
for universal use is a futile attempt. Every instance of the delivery of infrastructure and service 
must bear in mind the uniqueness of its intended users. Rowlinson and Root (1997) and Crook 
(1996) have emphasised cultural uniqueness in the analysis of procurement systems. 
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7.6.1: Recommendations 
This identification of the importance of culture to a sustainable infrastructure and service 
delivery implies a demand to effectively involve the users of infrastructure, who would after all 
be the best custodians of their respective cultures, beliefs and value systems. They would be 
expected to be key players in the conceptualisation of the project; they would identify the type of 
infrastructure needed and on offer, its quantity, its quality, the finance strategy, design, 
construction, ownership, operation and maintenance. They thus partake in managing its risks 
and opportunities and eventually become major stakeholder in the project. However, it is 
unlikely that users alone could bear this burden, especially the financial responsibilities 
involved. It is necessary therefore, to have a cross-section not only of the likely users but also 
the public and private sectors involved. 
In the Polycentric Cultural Framework (PCF) model for infrastructure and service delivery to be 
presented as an alternative proposal in this thesis, the cross-section of users comprises the 
traditional institutions charged, among other things with, the responsibility of identifying cultural 
norms, beliefs, values and the coordination of elders within the various communities and 
villages that would benefit from the intended infrastructure, as well as the women, youths, non 
governmental organisations, trade unions and the various religious organisations. Before 
introducing the Polycentric Cultural Framework (PCF) in detail, it is expedient to firstly give an 
overview of the nature, influence and relevance of the traditional institution in the formal 
structures of the modern state power in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa in general. 
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7.7. The nature of traditional institution in sub-Saharan Africa 
In context, the traditional institution could be seen as an umbrella network of indigenous 
governing systems which include the council of elders, titled men or women, people of the same 
age grade and other similar associations (Agbese 2004). At the institution's apex is the 
traditional ruler, whose role is often misunderstood as being synonymous with that of the 
institution itself. Actually, however, the scope of the traditional institution is much broader and 
sometimes far beyond that of its ruler. The National Conference of Traditional Rulers in Nigeria 
(NCTR) as cited in Agbese (2004) defines a traditional ruler as anyone who by virtue of his 
ancestry occupies the throne or stool of an area, who has been appointed to it in accordance 
with the customs and traditions of the area, and whose throne has been in existence before the 
advent of British colonial power in Africa. Traditional institutions in sub-Saharan Africa before 
and after the colonial administration were either decentralized or centralized, as the following 
sections explain. 
7.7.1 Decentralized system 
In a decentralized traditional institution as observed by Osei-Tutu (2004), there is no hierarchicy 
headed by a sovereign, but rather a system of clanship. The principal characteristic of this 
system is the presence of well established codes of conduct, usually enforced by heads of 
segments (clans), and in more serious cases by spontaneous community action. Some 
examples of a decentralized traditional state within sub-Saharan Africa are the Tallensi of 
Northern Ghana, the Sukuma of Tanzania, the Nuer of Southern Sudan, the Kikuyu of Kenya 
and the Igbos of South eastern Nigeria. Osei-Tutu (2004) highlights two major features of this 
system: 
9 The existence of well defined norms despite the absence of a hierarchical system 
headed by a sovereign 
" Pronounced popular participation in decision making by clan members, various 
segments and age groups, ensuring a transparently democratic process through 
consensus building 
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7.7.2 Centralized system 
This is a more structured and sophisticated political system than the decentralized one. Some 
examples of centralized states in sub-Saharan Africa are the Edo (predominantly Binis) and 
Delta peoples of Midwestern Nigeria, the Yoruba people of western Nigeria, Zulus of South 
Africa, Barotse of Zambia, Baganda of Uganda and the Asante and Mole-Dabgani of Ghana. 
Notable features of the system as explained by Osei-Tutu (2004) are: 
" The existence of a political sovereign backed by well organized law enforcement 
agencies 
" Well articulated legal norms 
" Council of elders and advisors who articulate functions in accordance with traditional 
laws 
" Governance carried out with the assistance of lower ranked rulers as well as large 
numbers and levels of advisers who occupy their positions by virtue of their family or 
clan origins and status 
" The cardinal feature of governance being the rule of law 
" There is accountability and when liable rulers could be deposed or ostracised upon the 
violations of traditional norms 
" The entire political structure being complemented by a hierarchy of courts presided 
over by the king, head chief or village chief 
" Provision for participation in decision making by groups of the citizenry, either indirectly 
by clan heads or families or directly by consultation and discussion among various 
types of organisations or affected parties in order to arrive at a consensus 
7.7.3 Consensus building in the African traditional system 
On consensus building, the traditional Indigenous political institution guarantees and provides 
more meaningful political participation (through emphasis placed on extensive discussions and 
deliberations of public issues) than the orthodox (Anglo-Saxon) type of democracy (Agbese 
2004; Osei-Tutu 2004; Erediauwa 2002; Oladipo 2000). Extensive debates and discussions 
usually become vital prerequisites for a sustainable resolution, a process that continues until a 
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consensus is reached. To arrive at a consensus, deliberations begin within the various major 
families in each clan and decisions reached within each family are conveyed by the various 
family heads to the clan council of elders, made up of all the family heads and the various age 
groups' representatives. The head of each clan is usually selected from the heads of major 
families that make up that clan. Please see Figure 7.7.3.3 for the clan structure of a typical 
African society 
For example, in Ogbaru Local Government Area of Anambra State (an Igbo speaking state that 
comprises 21 local government areas) in south eastern Nigeria, there is an average of 10 major 
families within each clan and a minimum average of six clans within each village (Ochijie 2006). 
Each village is in turn headed by a council of chiefs / elders (clan heads), although youths and 
women are also represented in this council. The activities of this council are coordinated by an 
lgwe who is selected from the heads of clans within the village. Please see Figure 7.7.3.4 
showing a typical village structure in Africa. Ogbaru Local Government area is made up of 16 
villages: Ogwu-lkpele, Odekpe, Atani, Ossomala, Akili-Ozizor, Akili-Ogidi, Ochuche-Umuodu, 
Ochuche-Ogbakuba, Agwu-Aniacha, Ohita, Umunankwo, Ubeagwe (I), Ubeagwe (II), Umuzu, 
Amiyi and Mputu. However, if the issue in question goes beyond a single village, it is tabled in 
the council of Igwes. Issues to be discussed or deliberated on are usually communicated 
through the various town criers to the various families. Decisions taken are also conveyed 
through this means to the people or affected parties. This forms a consensus ring like structures 
like the one shown in Figure 7.7.3.1 and 7.7.3.2. By implication, there is widespread 
participation by the people in the formation of decisions which affect them at various levels, as 
well as consultations with relevant bodies with a concern in the outcome, in order to reach a 
consensus. Nonetheless, the increased obsession with "modernity" and the belief that the 
traditional institutions in sub-Saharan Africa are undemocratic and therefore should be left as 
historic relics best for antiquity, as cited in Badejo and Ogunyemi (1989), is at best erroneous 
and misleading. 
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Figure 7.7.3.1 Consensus ring structure within a village in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Q The Wage Families 
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Figure 7.7.3.2 Consensus ring structure of several villages in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Group of Various 
villages families 
illage Clans AV 
4c:. 14- 
208 
Figure 7.7.3.3 The Clan structure within an African traditional society 
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Figure 7.7.3.4 The village structure within an African traditional society 
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Erediauwa (2002) in his opening address during an international conference on politics, and on 
prescriptions for contemporary nation building in Nigeria, was of the view that although African 
traditional institutions do not organize political parties and periodic elections, traditional societies 
and institutions did not therefore lack the core features of a democratic structure. Besides, 
kingship in some societies or places is elective, thus capturing the true essence of democracy 
as "the government of the people, by the people and for the people". Even the rule of law and 
respect for human dignity and rights are recognisable practices that are reflected in numerous 
African traditional proverbs and sayings. 
Therefore, any consensus in the indigenous democratic order via the traditional institution 
incorporates the wishes of the majority and the minority, thus invariably reflecting the general 
will of the people of the community or society. This contrasts with the perception that the current 
situation in sub-Saharan Africa is no more than a majoritarian democratic understanding, which 
consistently sidelines the minority (Oladipo 2000). This situation can easily engender 
dissatisfaction and disaffection within society leading to a quest for power becoming fierce and 
confrontational. Oladipo (2000) argues that it is this scenario that the African consensual 
democratic model sought to prevent. However, what has become all too clear is that the so- 
called modernised institutions have not helped the country much (Erediauwa 2002). 
Indeed, one could further argue that in the traditional society there exists a catalogue of norms 
for checks and balances that is meant to ensure justice and equity for all concerned. Hence, if 
the king or council of elders were to become authoritarian in their rule, they would face the risk 
of being removed from office by the people, and if this were impracticable they could lose their 
popularity and respect in the eyes of the people; in some cases they could even be ostracised. 
A punitive sacred sanction like ostracisation in African society helps to curb deviance, which 
indirectly advances the cause of harmonious communal life (Ejizu 2000). These rules and 
procedures for deposition are laid down and transmitted from generation to generation (Osei- 
Tutu 2004). The intended objectives of these sanctions are not different from those currently 
practiced by multilateral organisations or global institutions like the United Nations. In addition, 
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when a conflict between (for instance) member states of the international community becomes 
intense, sustainable resolutions are only possible by a consensus among the affected parties. 
Fortunately, consensus as a "win for all" model is not new to sub-Saharan Africa, as it has been 
present there for centuries. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that sacred sanctions as 
exemplified in sub-Saharan Africa were only used in very rare cases of oppression, arbitrariness 
in governance, corruption, negligence of state affairs and other serious traditional violations. 
7.8 The influence of traditional systems (institution) in contemporary 
African societies. 
Mbiti (1990) as cited in Ejizu (2000) observed that the concept of individualism is alien to the 
traditional African system. Thus, the individual does not and cannot subsist in isolation to 
corporate realities within his environment. "Whatever happens to the individual is believed to 
happen to the whole group and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the 
individual.... the individual can only say: I am because we are and since we are therefore I am. 
This is the cardinal point in the understanding of the African view of man" (Mbiti 1990). In the 
traditional African context, a 'family' by definition includes one's parents, grand- and great 
grandparents, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces and nephews. A child could refer 
to his uncles or aunts as his father or mother, his cousins as his brothers or sister, his nephews 
and nieces as his brothers or sister or even children (if much older) as the case may be. Mbiti 
(1990) was of the view that the extended family system was the model for understanding the 
African perspective of a 'family'. In sub-Saharan Africa, the molecular (nuclear) family structure 
is alien and inimical to the traditional value of community life. These values, which accord 
unique recognition not only to status and hierarchy but also to age, still influence contemporary 
societies within the region. Thus, the aged are cared for by their children in mutual love and 
respect. 
In addition, as the custodian of culture and traditions, the institution of traditional ruler still plays 
a critical influence in the politics of some countries within sub-Saharan Africa. As stated during 
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the inauguration of the national constitutional conference by the then Head of States and 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the federal republic of Nigeria, General Sani 
Abacha (1994) was of the view that the traditional institutions are closely linked with the 
grassroots of society, and so enable an intimate understanding of the problems of ordinary 
people. The institution serves as an instrument of peace, order and stability in the Nigerian 
society. On the issue of chiefs, constitutions and policies in Nigeria, Agbese (2004) was of the 
view that the traditional institution is more assessable to ordinary people and more relevant to 
the daily lives of most Nigerians, particularly those in rural areas. Thus they are often used for 
mobilizing the citizens and to disseminate government policies and views. Lawal (1989) as cited 
In Agbese (2004) observed that whenever policy makers fear failure by their inability to carry the 
people along with them in their programs, the help of the traditional rulers is usually sought. For 
example, the total break down of law and order triggered by the annulment of the June 12,1993 
presidential election and the brutal execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others was 
judiciously prevented by the influence of the various traditional institutions in the country. 
Miles (1993) and Ayeni (1985) as cited in Agbese (2004) maintained that the traditional 
institutions in Nigeria could foster communal solidarity and provide administrative services in 
situations where central government is ineffective or even disintegrating. They saw traditional 
rulers as ombudsmen between communities and the state bureaucracy. 
Notwithstanding efforts aimed to weaken the political significance of traditional rulers in the. 
1979,1989, and 1995 constitutions in Nigeria by refusing them explicit executive, legislative or 
judicial roles, they still exercise enormous power and influence over the lives and wellbeing of 
millions of Nigerians (Agbese 2004; Ochoche 2006). Most traditional institutions according to 
Agbese (2004) are the only means of governance in rural areas where no structures of the 
national Nigerian state exist. It is noteworthy that local infrastructure, trade, social services, 
conflict resolution and law and order are maintained in rural areas through indigenous political 
structures and mechanisms. It is not uncommon to find similar situations in many sub-Saharan 
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African states such as Ghana, Uganda, Lesotho, Swaziland, South Africa and Botswana (Osei- 
Tutu 2004). 
As a further mark of their influence, disputes over succession to the traditional stool in Nigeria is 
capable of causing severe social political strife in many parts of the country. The high level of 
tension sparked among communal elites such as academics, civil servants, business leaders 
and teachers by such disputes is sometimes surprising. "Many Nigerians have lost their lives in 
the process". For example, the political tussle over the sultanate in Sokoto in November 1988 
led to the death of 13 people within the city; a similar riot ensued over the traditional stool of 
Oluo of Okeoyi, Kwara state where several lives and properties were lost in September, 1993 
(Agbese 2004). Several deaths were also recorded in Agilla village in Benue state and parts of 
Yoruba land. 
Unlike most institutions in Nigeria, which are riddled with corruption, high-handedness and other 
vices, the traditional institution commands greater confidence and legitimacy in the minds of 
many Nigerians. For instance, Agbese (2004) argues that the new political dispensation in 
Nigeria is dominated by retired military officers and their civilian associates who maintain 
political power by restricting access to political participation and by bribery, repression and the 
introduction of autocratic policies. 
The influence of the traditional institution is reinforced by federal and state government 
appointments of traditional leaders to key positions such as the chancellorships of state and 
federal universities, and even as emissaries to several governments in helping to explain 
governmental policies to the people. In addition, open homage is usually paid to the leading 
traditional ruler in every state by successive military administrators or governors as a way of 
popularly legitimising their administration (Agbese 2004). 
Furthermore, traditional institution in Nigeria have survived several national administrations, a 
clear indication of its relevance to both federal and state governments. Usually, this takes place 
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through the form of demotion, deposition, or even banishment of some traditional rulers. Emir 
Sanusi of Kano, Olateru Olagbegi (the Oluwo of Owo), Ibrahim Dasuki (Sultan of Sokoto) are 
among notable traditional rulers that were not only deposed by their state military governments 
but also banished from their kingdoms. In each of these occasions there were massive revolts 
and riots which claimed several lives - another clear indication of the relevance and influence of 
the traditional institution in the lives of the people. There have been similar attempts on the 
throne of Benin in Midwestern during the last military administration in Nigeria. This was strongly 
resisted by the Edo people, indicating to the then military governor (Onyeregbulem) that their 
Oba (traditional ruler) has no 'replacement' due to his cultural significance in their lives. The 
administration's scheme was thus foiled. As a further demonstration of the significance and 
influence of the traditional institution in the lives of Nigerians, the Zango-Kataf mayhem in 1992 
that resulted in the deaths of over 1,700 people was due primarily to resentment felt by 
indigenous Katafs over being traditionally ruled by Fulanis that were hand-picked by the far-off 
Emir of Zaria and the then Kaduna state military administrator. 
There is no doubt the Influence and relevance of the traditional institution in contemporary 
Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa is overwhelming. It would be a great disservice to the whole 
region, not just to Nigeria, if such influence is not properly harmonised for the benefit of the 
people. Apparently, in the rural areas as indicated above, traditional institutions are the only 
governing structures known to the people. They are thus predominantly in charge of the 
management of both social and physical infrastructures and service delivery within their domain. 
Bearing in mind this, and the influence the institution holds even in the urban environment, there 
is the need for an adequate framework that would employ the services of these institutions to 
address the dearth of infrastructure and service delivery in Nigeria. Similar schemes exist at the 
very micro levels in countries such as Malawi, Bostwana, South Africa, Swaziland, Ghana, 
Senegal, Uganda and Lesotho (Osei-Tutu 2004). Successful and practical examples of projects 
pioneered and financed by indigenous participations include: 
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0 The bottom-up indigenous participatory stakeholders' partnership approach for the 
sustainable Ibadan city project (SIP) aimed at improving the urban environmental 
infrastructure (Ogu 2000). 
0 The indigenous demand-driven approach for infrastructure provision with variable levels 
of service aimed at improving both the rural and urban physical infrastructures in South 
Africa. The central issue of the South African Model is the communities' right to choose 
and finance projects that are of relevance to them (Abbott 1996). 
" Success stories of developmental infrastructure projects in Senegal that have improved 
the lives of millions of Senegalese in rural areas through community participation (World 
Bank 2005). 
0 Most importantly, the huge success stories in Ghana regarding the provision of both 
social and physical infrastructure at the local level in predominantly Asante communities 
due to the direct involvement of their traditional ruler (Osei-Tutu 2004; Agbese 2004; 
Eberlee 2001). 
0 The various successful World Bank projects, in partnership with traditional authorities, in 
developing countries, and especially in Ghana, where sanitation facilities for over 41 
communities and projects for safe drinking water for 1000 communities is currently in 
progress, as well as the encouragement of health education projects (most especially 
for HIV/AIDS) and programmes aimed at the preservation of traditional values and 
culture. 
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7.9 Polycentric cultural model for infrastructure and service delivery 
The traditional polycentric cultural model involves the traditional institution and users as outlined 
in the preceding sections and shown in Figure 7.9.3. However, in the traditional African system 
(either decentralize or centralize system) the main representatives of the people as shown in 
Figures 7.7.3.3,7.7.3.4 are predominantly the elders (whose make up has been extensively 
explained) the youths and the women. In most instances, the age group and women are 
classed as ex-official members of the elders' council. In some centralize traditional systems like 
the Benin and Asante Kingdoms of Midwestern Nigeria and Ghana they are given full 
recognition and status. The coordination of the elder's council usually lies with the head of the 
traditional authority that is usually more powerful in the centralized system. A simplified structure 
is shown in Figure 7.9.1. Nevertheless, the addition of association / organisation like NGOs, 
trade unions and religious organisation in the polycentric structure of Figure 7.9.3 is to 
strengthen the traditional structure in order to meet contemporary realities. Please see Figure 
7.9.2. 
The traditional polycentric model is subdivided into three major stages: conceptualisation, 
identification of cultural norms and values affecting the project, and the infrastructure and 
service procurement referendum. However, the traditional institution with the assistance of the 
government is expected to coordinate all meetings of the users' representatives - i. e. the 
elders, youths, women, non-governmental organisations, trade unions and religious 
organisations. 
The traditional institution is also expected to identify cultural norms and values of significance 
and to coordinate the conceptualisation process. During conceptualisation, representatives 
discuss the type of infrastructure that is of relevance to them and the means of project 
financing, bearing in mind the various stakeholders and the polycentric governing structure of 
the model. At this stage of conceptualisation, the design of the project and a suitable 
procurement procedure adaptable to the prevailing circumstance is discussed. Bearing in mind 
the polycentricism of this model, ownership or ownership structure, operation, and maintenance 
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of the project is also discussed. After the conceptualisation stage, selected options are further 
subjected to a referendum: "infrastructure and service delivery referendum" as shown in Figure 
7.9.3. 
This referendum on the choice of infrastructure is an opportunity for every adult in the 
community, city or state In which the Infrastructure would be located to have a say as to the type 
of infrastructure that would be provided them. Thus, transparency and accountability is 
strengthened right from the conceptualisation stage of the project, since the various 
representatives or leaders are directly accountable to the people. It is also the users that make 
the final choice on the type of infrastructure and service to be delivered to them. This model has 
the potential to reduce considerable cases of misallocated Investments, which have been 
identified as one of the major causes of infrastructure failures in Nigeria, as shown in Figure 
7.9.3. The traditional polycentric model gives room for an independent monitoring and 
verification team. Members of this unit are selected from the representatives, the local, state 
and federal levels of government and from the private sector. This team is given the 
responsibility of identifying and verifying areas of malpractice and of recommending ways of 
dealing with them. They monitor the procurement and construction process, operation of the 
infrastructure and the maintenance strategy. This type of supportive institutional arrangement of 
verification and monitoring of the infrastructure and service delivery process, where the users / 
people are directly involved could considerably reduce fraudulent acts and mass corruption 
currently being perpetuated, and which the survey identifies as one of the major causes of 
infrastructure failure. 
In the traditional polycentric strategy, responsibilities for maintenance are shared in a 
polycentric fashion among users, the three tiers of government and the private sector. This 
polycentric maintenance strategy for infrastructure is derived from the main polycentric cultural 
model in Figure 7.9.3. Thus, everyone is charged with the responsibility of maintaining a project, 
since they have all been part of its financing, thereby addressing the problem of inadequate 
maintenance already identified as one of the major causes of infrastructure failures. For 
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sustainability, it is expected that one of the responsibilities of those awarded the project would 
be to play a key role in the training of local users in the provision of technical and managerial 
skills 
Figure 7.9.2 Cultural model for contemporary realities in the polycentric structure 
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Figure 7.9.1 Simplified traditional structure 
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7.10. Summary 
In the first section of this chapter the concept, definition and current international best practice for 
procurement was outlined, followed by the apparent objectives of infrastructure procurement. The various 
internationally accepted modes of procurement were then introduced and briefly explained. The 
prequalification process and international competitive bidding, along with their various rudiments, were 
extensively discussed in the fourth and fifth sections, leading to an examination of Nigerian procurement. 
In this section, the inherent problems were identified, suggested recommendations were outlined and the 
current steps taken by the Nigerian government to rectify the Nigerian procurement system were also 
briefly explained. 
Nonetheless, the disregard for culture, beliefs and value system and the sheer disregard for the users 
of infrastructure and services right from its conceptualisation to actual delivery was identified as a 
major flaw in all international best practice for procurement. In this chapter, it was argued that as long 
as differences exist in people's cultures, value systems and beliefs, there is no such thing as 
"international best practice for procurement", for the simple reason that some acceptable norms or 
values in the West might be unacceptable in the other parts of the world. Consequently, a 
procurement strategy that takes into consideration the uniqueness and complexities of the Nigerian 
system was developed in this chapter; this is called The Polycentric Cultural Model for Infrastructure 
and Service Delivery". 
This model is principally structure around the traditional African society were consensus mechanism 
underpin every decision taken. This model is a conglomeration of major stakeholders within the 
contemporary African society. The application of this model is intended to address most of the major 
problems responsible for infrastructure and service delivery failures in Nigeria. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
The literature review begins by defining and discussing the concepts of infrastructure and service 
delivery, drawing special attention to the presence or absence of infrastructure and the implication 
for sustainable economic growth, as highlighted by several authors. A critical theoretical evaluation 
of the interface between infrastructure, economic growth and development was carried out. 
Although there was a positive interaction between infrastructure and economic growth, what 
remains unclear is the extent to which infrastructure impacts on economic growth and development. 
This uncertainty arises from the revelation that the implied return rate for infrastructure varies from 
one region to another, and from country to country. The implied return rate for infrastructure is as 
high as 63% in some instances and as low as 14% in others. 
Overall, the greatest improvements in infrastructure have been in East Asia, with sub-Saharan 
Africa showing the least in the hierarchy. Though, It is outside the scope of this investigation to 
identify the causal relationship between infrastructure, economic growth and development, but the 
findings of this study give some indication of what this might be. For example, it reveals that an 
increase in the amount of infrastructure and income does not guarantee a concomitant improvement 
in the stability of infrastructure services. What does guarantee stability is the institutional 
environment within which it operates; this often varies across sectors in individual countries. 
The study also critically evaluates the effects resulting from an infrastructure deficit in the 
developing world, and adduces glaring examples of how over 2.5 billion people in the developing 
world remain without access to basic infrastructure, with consequent implications for health, 
economic growth and development. Infrastructure investment patterns and the present state and 
perceived causes of infrastructure deficiency in sub-Saharan Africa are examined. It is revealed that 
sub-Saharan Africa consumes far more infrastructure services than its capacity to produce them, or 
to invest in them. The importance of institutions in infrastructure and service delivery in sub-Saharan 
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Africa and the various models for delivering infrastructure and services to the people are also 
critically studied. Lastly, an overview of some of the most important existing physical infrastructures 
in Nigeria is presented, including a regionally integrated approach to infrastructure delivery. 
The first three sections of chapter 3 introduce the political and economic profile of Nigeria. The 
northern domination of the military and the Nigerian political landscape, along with the monocultural 
nature of Nigeria's economy, were all revealed. The political economy of the influence of political 
positions on infrastructure and service delivery in Nigeria is examined; this influence has shown a 
disproportionate growth since Nigeria became Independent from Great Britain, and has resulted in 
an economic advantage to the northern part of the country. An empirical analysis reveals that this 
northern dominance of the political landscape is responsible for the disproportionate spread of 
infrastructure in Nigeria. The background of the present neglect of infrastructure in the political 
economy, as well as of revenue sharing, were next examined, followed by an investigation into the 
political economy of the effects of globalisation on infrastructure in Nigeria. 
The formula for revenue sharing for infrastructure and economic development has always worked to 
the advantage of the majority (i. e. the north and the western parts of Nigeria) at the expense of the 
minority in the Niger delta, where over 75% of the country's income is generated. The uneven 
distribution of international trade and the elasticity of price of African exports, together with the 
direction of exports of African goods, were considered In order to ascertain the political economy of 
globalisation on infrastructure in Nigeria. 
To demonstrate empirically the interface between infrastructure and economic growth and 
development, some production functions and secondary data are examined in chapter 4, and some 
conclusions are reached. This investigation establishes that industrialised countries' final 
consumption expenditures are greater than their gross capital formation to a degree significantly 
greater than that of sub-Saharan Africa, which shows that the latter region invests far less than it 
consumes relative to the west. The present study arrives at an inference relationship for measuring 
and comparing economic stability and shows that industrialised countries are economically more 
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stable than sub-Saharan Africa, with a 4.6% margin of stability. Another significant conclusion is that 
the region is presently in the hands of the private sector seven times over, contrary to popular belief, 
which holds that the region's infrastructure is controlled by the public sector. It follows that, because 
the private sector is demonstrably more efficient than the public in this region, more privatisation is 
needed. 
In addition, it emerged that the economic predicament of sub-Saharan Africa is not really about the 
balance between the public and private sectors, but rather about the size of the region's GDP. The 
inclusion of labour services as an independent variable in the production function reveals that the 
interface between public infrastructure and economic growth and development in sub-Saharan 
Africa is quite negligible. The final interface model in equation (18) of Chapter 4 further reaffirms the 
dominant role of private investment or private infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa. Thus a very 
strong interface exists between private infrastructure on the one hand and economic growth and 
development on the other. 
Sampling and surveying techniques are examined in Chapter 5, with a view to establishing the most 
appropriate methods for fieldwork in this research. A sample size of 600, was decided on; this was 
evenly distributed across the six geopolitical regions or zones in Nigeria, each region having an 
estimated sample size of 100. The six geopolitical zones are the south-south (Edo state), south- 
west (Lagos state), south-east (Imo state), north-west (Kano state), north-central (Kaduna state) 
and north-east (Adamawa state). Respondents were drawn from the public and private sectors and 
from non-governmental organisations. Probability sampling was chosen, and the two-stage stratified 
random sampling technique was adopted, after brief discussion and rejection of mixed sampling 
design and the various non-probability sampling techniques on the grounds of unsuitability. The 
questionnaire was used as the system of data collection, and some unique experiences are also 
reported from the field work. In each of the geopolitical regions visited, the research data collection 
team observed that the understanding of the people, their culture, values, religion and even 
language assisted the data collection exercise considerably. In addition, practical experience and 
other anecdotal evidence obtained in the field revealed how failed infrastructure is affecting the 
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thinking and behavior of the poor. A total of 443 (73.83%) respondents returned their questionnaires 
and 40 (9.03%) of these were randomly selected for validation. This left a total of 403 (67.17%) 
questionnaires for analysis. 
Chapter 6 examined the construction, distribution and results of the survey according an exhaustive 
array of parameters. Surveys were distributed by geopolitical region, and the results from these 
were cross-tabulated and compared both with national results and results from other geopolitical 
regions. Responses were categorised in several ways to check the effect on them of the 
respondents' backgrounds. It was observed that the rank or class of respondents, their range of 
monthly income and their age range distribution did not affect their responses. Respondents were 
asked to rate infrastructure services in Nigerian by region according to various criteria. These 
responses were then analysed by using correlations and subsequent mathematical models from 
regression analysis between several variables such as the stability of infrastructure services and 
infrastructure supply, quality, maintenance and the conduct of the staff of these services in Nigeria. 
Notwithstanding the findings from these empirical models, frequency analysis earlier revealed that 
respondents were grossly dissatisfied in all these areas. Results from the frequency analysis were 
compared and contrasted across regions and with the national picture. The analysis of the collected 
data in this survey gave rise to a new mathematical model, called Severity Index in Matrix Order 
(SIMO), developed by the researcher using existing mathematical and statistical tools; this model 
aids the analysis and identification of core variable factors. SIMO is not specific to this research, but 
is rather a generic model that can be used in future investigations of this kind. This chapter 
concludes with clear identification of the major perceived causes of infrastructure and service 
delivery failures in descending order of severity in Nigeria, provides a clear line of demarcation 
between those perceived causes which are of major importance and those which are relatively less 
so, and gives a coefficient of spread of each perceived cause across all the geopolitical regions. 
These perceived major causes are corruption, misallocation of Investments, inadequate 
maintenance, lack of transparency and accountability, insufficient funding for Infrastructure, lack of 
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supportive institutions, inconsistent political, economic and social policies, and lack of technical and 
managerial skills. 
Chapter 7 critically analyses the international frameworks of procurement provided by The World 
Bank, UNCITRAL and The African Development Bank, before proceeding to a detailed examination 
of the Nigerian situation, including identification of failures and recommendations for their 
rectification. The primary finding is that cultural differences undermine any attempt to construct a 
"one size fits all" procurement model. Practice must be adapted to local conditions, and to this end a 
model specifically designed for Nigeria is developed, called "The Polycentric Cultural Model for 
Infrastructure and Service Delivery". The application of this model is intended to address most of the 
major problems responsible for infrastructure and service delivery failures in Nigeria and other parts 
of sub-Saharan Africa. This model underpins the traditional African system which emphasises 
consensus building in decision making at all levels. The true nature of the African traditional 
institution in both decentralised and centralised systems were examined. Also considered is 
consensus building in traditional African society. This can be seen at all levels, from the family 
through the clan to the village. In a more centralised traditional system, consensus building goes far 
beyond the village level. Lastly, the influences of the traditional institution in contemporary African 
societies are presented with some related examples of their influence on infrastructure and service 
delivery. 
Finally, as a recommendation for future investigation, there is the need to carry out a similar kind of 
research in two other sub-Saharan African countries in order to examine further those perceived 
causes of infrastructure and service failures already identified in this study. Preferably, these should 
be countries from both the southern and eastern part of sub-Saharan Africa. Examples might be 
South Africa from the southern part and Kenya from the eastern part. Other areas for future 
research include the effects of infrastructure failures in these countries and the extent to which 
variables such as supply, quality, maintenance of infrastructure and staffs of infrastructure service 
providers affect the stability of infrastructure services. Procurement frameworks in these countries 
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should also be critically examined. After such analyses have been performed, the findings from 
Nigeria and other countries chosen for study should be harmonised. 
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APPENDIX A 
Figure 1 Infrastructure expansion in recent decades 
Power 
(production per capita) 
Telecom 
(main lines per capita) 
Sanitation 
(share of population with access) 
Paved roads 
(kilometers per capita) 
Water 
(Share of population with access) 
0 Middle-income countries ® Low-income countries 
Note: Based on telecom, sanitation, and water data for 1975-90, and road and power data for 1960-90. 
Source: Appendix tables A. 1 and A. 2. 
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X 3.356327316 099565550t 3.766204 021181 13W316945 5.31m371 1360116945 531037686 
bU 3.2181219l16 035551761 9.29223 12E-12 2503155115 3.9335933 2.59315505 3.933593163 
Table 2. Summary output: Linear regression with variable W as explanatory 
variable 
Regressur 2a! ist+cs 
Multiple R 0.951285 
Up* 024943 
Adjusted R Square 0.902983 
Standard Em 4135508 
Obsenaöons 50 
MO\A 
oY SS An F Stprrka ce F 
Regression 1 78949647 78949647 4652522 3. ßö&25 
Residual 48 8292989 172770 9 
Total 49 87242836 
CbeiAcv+ts Stardaid&ff tS1at PuaA, e tomer95% toper % Loner95.0% LLper95.0% 
Irteicept 229.1134 08D185 3308427 0.001498 023551 3052757 02.3551 355275653 
W 4.253019 0.198358 2137888 3.56E28 3252992 4.053047 3.852992 053047039 
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Table 3. Summary output: Linear regression with variable X as explanatory variable 
ligRS R Sý6st6cs 
M Ifiple R 0.88889471 
R 43ie 0.7901338 
Awed R Square 0.78578158 
Stand3 d En or 617011002 
OAser iims 50 
ANO\t 
df $$ zF %rifm F 
Regressfan 1 6893335533 08933355 1807112 8.83202E18 
Reidug 4 18309280.8 381443.4 
Tot] 49 87242838.14 
CDepicienls Strdard Fror tStt P-Afe Loner9S% tloper99% tnner95.9% ögver95O% 
Irtelcept 175.402885 
X 11.1399785 
105.0768948 1BM298 0.1O15N "35.86013700 386ß711 3526813700 3881672108 
0228075689 13.44911 0.83EI8 9.473813328 1280814 9.473813328 I2.8D613958 
Table 4. Summary output: Linear regression for the entire explanatory variables 
Regress&n Stabstrs 
Mug ble R 0.992964377 
R Square 0.985970254 
Adjusted R 
Square 0.984809T7h 
StandardError 140.48877% 
Observations 40 
ANOVA 
df SS MS F Sndmance F 
Regresson 3 49963296.06 16654428.7 843.8135263 2.1303E-33 
Resin 35 710535.4607 19737.0981 
Total 39 50673621.52 
CoefrieEEs Standas! Error t Stat Rva ne Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95 0% Upper 95 0% 
Intercept 150.6384435 26.92044181 5.59568967 2.41248E-06 96.04132885 205.2356 96.04132885 205235558 
X 0.829452224 0.45483582 1.82362995 OD76519208 . 0.09299636 1.751901 4.09299636 1.751900ö1 W 2.814716223 0.310352014 9.06913893 7.90324E"11 2.185273714 3.444159 2.185273714 3.44415873 
L 1.04402621 0.133966877 7.79316674 3.07872E-09 0.772329148 1315723 0.772329148 1.31572327 
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Dear Sir/ Madam, 
Re: Questionnaire for Infrastructure and Service delivery 
This survey is being conducted to ascertain amongst others, the causes of 
infrastructure deterioration in sub-Saharan Africa, using Nigeria as a case study. 
The aim is to design an appropriate and effective blueprint for infrastructure and 
service delivery in the sub-Saharan Africa. 
Your response to this questionnaire will not only ascertain relevant issues which 
pertains to my PhD but also a unique contribution to a research that serves as a 
direct response to the high failure rates of infrastructure and service provisions in 
sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Nigeria; where the dearth of infrastructure 
provisions continues to impose severe constraints to economic growth and 
development. 
For clarity, infrastructure could be define as an encapsulation for social overhead 
capital like water supply, electricity, telecommunications, housing, sanitation, 
accessible roads, railways, airports, drainage schemes, irrigation, schools, 
hospitals and markets. 
This questionnaire has been estimated to take at least ten minutes to complete 
and be rest assured that the information gathered would be strictly confidential and 
only to be used purely for academic purposes. 
If you are able to let us have your response by returning the completed 
questionnaire in the next few days, please accept our thanks. 
Yours sincerely 
... 
oh..... anOm.......... oreg.. ie... 
..... .... ..... ..... 
Al 
Developing World Built Environment Research Unit 
The Leicester School of Architecture 
The Gateway, Leicester LE1 9BH 
United Kingdom. 
Tel: +441162577516, +447765312741 (Mobile) 
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Questionnaire Design 
Respondent number: 
Where there are alternative answers, please tick the one relevant to you. 
A. Personal questions: 
1. Are you willing to respond to this questionnaire survey? 
1234 
Yes Partially No I don't know 
2. In which geo-political region of the country do you work? 
123456 
South-west North-west South-east North-east South-south North-central 
3. Which sector / organisation of the country do you belong? 
1234 
Public Private Nongovernmental organisation Not applicable 
4. What class of rank do you belong in this organisation? 
1234 
Low class Middle class High class Not applicable 
5. Range of monthly income? 
1234 
1 Under-50000 Naira £400 50000-100000 Naira £500 100000 Naira and above Not applicable 
6. Age range? 
1234 
Under 30 ears 30-60 years 60-65 years 65 years and above 
B. The State of Infrastructure provision In Nigeria: 
7. Is infrastructure service delivery in your area stable? 
1234 
Very stable Stable Unstable Very unstable 
8. If you have ticked option 3 or 4 In question 7 above, please indicate the reason or reasons 
from the following: 
a. The lack of adequate and supportive institution 
b. Misallocation of investments 
c. Lack of an effective competition 
d. Inadequate maintenance 
e. Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
f. Lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
g. Inadequate cost recovery 
h. Corruption 
I. Lack of transparency and accountability 
J. Poor wages and remunerations 
k. High construction and equipment procurement cost 
1. Weather and difficult environmental terrain. 
M. Inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
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n. Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
0. Hostile communal conflict 
p. Too much on existing infrastructure 
q. None of the above 
r. All of the above 
s. 
9. How would you rate the supply of infrastructure in Nigeria? 
Very adequate Adequate Inadequate Very inadequate 
1234 
10. If you have ticked option 3 or 4 in question 9 above please indicate reason or reasons from 
the following: 
a. The lack of adequate and supportive institution 
b. Misallocation of investments 
c. Lack of an effective competition 
d. Inadequate maintenance 
e. Inadequate cost recovery 
f. Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
g. Lack of managerial and financial autonomy 
h. Corruption 
I. Lack of transparency and accountability 
J. Poor wages and remunerations 
k. High construction and equipment procurement cost 
1. Weather and difficult environmental terrain. 
M. Inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
n. Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
o. Hostile communal conflict 
p. Too much on existing infrastructure 
q. None of the above 
r. All of the above 
11. How would you rate the quality of infrastructure and service delivery in Nigeria? 
high Fair low Very low 
1234 
12. If option 3 or 4 above, please tick the reason or reasons from the following: 
a. The lack of adequate and supportive institution 
b. Misallocation of investments 
c. Lack of effective competition 
d. Inadequate maintenance 
e. Inadequate cost recovery 
f. Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
g. - Lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
h. Corruption 
i. Lack of transparency and accountability 
J. Poor wages and remunerations 
k. High construction and equipment procurement cost 
1. Weather and difficult environmental terrain. 
M. Inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
n. Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
o. Hostile communal conflict 
p. Too much pressure on existing infrastructure 
q. None of the above 
r. All of the above 
13. How wo uld you rate infrastructure maintenance in Nigeria? 
high Fair low Very low 
1234 
14. How would you rate the response to infrastructure maintenance by relevant agencies in 
Nigeria? 
high Fair low Very low 
1234 
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15. If maintenance and the response rate to maintenance is rated low or very low, please tick 
reason or reasons from the following: 
a. The lack of supportive institution 
b. Misallocation of investments 
c. Lack of an effective competition 
d. Inadequate cost recovery 
e. Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
f. Lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
g. Corruption 
h. Lack of transparency and accountability 
I. Poor wages and remunerations 
J. High construction and equipment procurement cost 
k. Weather and difficult environmental terrain. 
1. Inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
m. Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
n. Hostile communal conflict 
o. Too much on existing infrastructure 
p. None of the above 
q. All of the above 
16. Generally, what is your im ression of the staff of your local infrastructure service providers? 
Honest Fair honest Dishonest I don't know 
1234 
17. If you ticked potion 3 in question 16 above, please indicate the reason or reasons from the 
following? 
a. Inconsistent billing pattern. 
b. Misallocation of investments 
c. Inadequate maintenance 
d. Inadequate cost recovery 
e. Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
f. Corruption 
g. Lack of transparency and accountability 
h. Poor wages and remunerations 
I. Hostile communal conflict 
J. Too much pressure on existing infrastructure 
k. None of the above 
1. All of the above 
18. Are you satisfied with your average infrastructure monthly bills? 
Very satisfied Satisfied Unsatisfied Very unsatisfied 
1234 
19. If you ticked option 3 and 4 in question 18 above, please tick why from the following: 
a. Inadequate maintenance 
b. Inconsistent billing system 
c. Inadequate cost recovery strategy 
d. Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
e. Corruption 
f. Lack of transparency and accountability 
g. Inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
h. Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
1. Too much pressure on existing infrastructure 
j.. None of the above 
k. All of the above 
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C. Causes of infrastructure failures In Nigeria 
20, Which of the following best describes the causes of infrastructure and service failures in Nigeria? 
Please rank in order of importance. 
Factors Rank 
a) The lack of supportive institution 
b) Misallocation of investments 
c) Lack of an effective competition 
d) Inadequate maintenance 
e) Inconsistent billing strategy 
f) Inadequate cost recovery strategy 
g) Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
h) Lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
I) Corruption 
j) Lack of transparency and accountability 
k) Poor wages and remunerations 
1) High construction and equipment procurement cost 
m) Weather and difficult environmental terrain. 
n) Inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
0) Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
p) Hostile communal conflict 
q) Too much pressure on existing infrastructure 
r) All of the above 
21. Are there other factors to any of the questions above not mentioned that you might want us 
to be aware of, please highlight them accordingly: 
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Table 4 Table of Random numbers 
l23456789 10 
1 48461 14952 72619 73689 52059 37086 60050 86192 67Q¢ 64739 
2 76534 38® 49692 31366 52093 15422 20498 33901 103L2 43397 
3 70437 25861 38504 14752 23757 29660 67844 78815 23M 86814 
4 59584 03370 42806 11393 71722 93804 09095 07856 555$Q 50063 
5 04285 58554 16085 51555 27501 73883 33427 33343 45Q 50© 
6 77340 10412 69189 85171 29802 44785 86368 02583 96g$ß 76553 
7 59183 62687 91778 80354 23512 97219 65921 02035 594$2 91403 
8 91800 04281 39979 03927 82564 28777 59049 97532 5410 79472 
9 12066 24817 81099 48940 69554 55925 j 48379 12866 41® 21580 
10 69907 91751 53512 23748 65906 91385 L 84983 27915 48-42L 910 
11 80467 04873 54053 25955 48518 13815 37707 68687 15RQ 08890 
12 78057 67835 28302 45048 56761 97725 58438 91529 24691 18544 
13 05648 39387 78191 88415 60269 94880 58812 42931 71$ 61534 
14 22304 39® 01350 99451 61862 78688 30339 60222 740 25740 
15 61346 50269 67005 40442 33100 16742 61640 21046 312Q2 72641 
16 56793 37696 27965 30459 91011 51426 31006 77468 6102 57(& 
17 56411 48609 36698 42453 85061 43769 39948 87031 30767 13953 
18 62098 12825 81744 28882 27369 88185 65846 92545 093 22653 
19 68775 06261 44265 16203 23340 84750 16317 88686 86842 00879 
20 -52679 19599 13687 74872 89181 01939 18447 10787 76® 80C) 
21 84096 87152 20719 25215 04349 54434 72344 93008 83 J 31670 
22 83964 55937 21417 49944 38356 98404 14850 17994 171LL 98981 
23 31191 75131 72386 11689 95727 05414 88727 45583 225 ¢$ 77700 
24 30545 68523 29850 67833 05622 89975 79042 27142 99 32349 
25 52573 91001 52315 26430 54175 30122 31796 98842 37M 2 2663 
26 16586 81842 01076 99414 31574 94719 34656 80018 86988 79(E) 
27 81841 88481 61191 25013 30272 23388 22463 65774 IN D 58376 
28 43563 66829 72838 08074 57080 15446 11034 98143 742U 26885 
29 19945 84193 57581 77252 85604 45412 43556 27518 90M 00563 
30 79374 23796 16919 99691 80276 32818 62953 78831 54M 30705 
31 48503 26615 43980 09810 38289 66679 73799 48418 12 40® 
32 32049 65541 37937 41105 70106 89706 40829 40789 59 00783 
33 18547 71562 95493 34112 76895 46766 96395 31718 48302 45893 
34 03180 96742 61486 43305 84183 99605 67803 13491 0 4. 29557 
35 94822 24738 67749 83748 59799 25210 31093 62925 72 6 69991 
36 4330 60599 85828 19152 68499 27977 35611 96240 62M 89529 
37 43770 81537 59527 95674 76692 86420 69930 10020 72$$1 12532 
38 56908 77192 50623 41215 14311 42834 80651 93750 599E2 311 
39 32787 07189 80539 75927 75475 73965 11796 72140 48244 74®5 
40 52441 78392 11733 57703 29133 71164 55355 31006 2552¢ 55790 
41 22377 54723 18227 28449 04570 18882 00023 67101 06895 08915 
42 18376 73460 88841 39602 34049 20589 05701 08249 74(o 250 
43 53201 28610 87957 21497 64729 64983 71551 99016 872U 63875 
44 34919 78801 59710 27396 02593 05665 11964 44134 002 76358 
45 33617 92159 21971 16901 57383 34262 41744 60891 5724 06962 
46 70010 40964 98780 72418 52571 18415 64362 90637 38O3 04909 
47 19282 68447 35665 31530 59838 49181 21914 65742 89M 39 3 
48 91429 73328 13266 54898 68795 40948 80808 63887 89222 47938 
49 97637 78393 33021 05867 86520 45363 43066 00988 64® 09803 
50 95150 07625 05255 83254 93943 52325 93230 62668 79U2 66964 
Source: Statiuiml Table by Rohlf and Solml. Copyright 01969 by W. H. Freeman and Company. Used with permission. 
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The procedure for selecting a sample using a table of random numbers according as explained 
in Kumar (1999) is as follows: 
1. Identify the total number of elements in the study population. The total number of 
elements may run up to four or more digits (if the total sampling population is 9 or less, 
it is considered one digit; if it is 99 or less, it is considered two digits). 
2. Number each element starting from one. 
3. If the table of random numbers is on more than one page, choose the starting page by 
a random procedure. Then select a column or a row that will be your starting point with 
a random procedure and proceed from there in a predetermined direction. 
4. Corresponding to the number of digits to which the total population runs, select the 
same number, randomly of columns or rows of digits from the table. 
5. Decide on your sample size. 
6. Select the required number of elements for your sample from the table. If the same 
number is selected twice, discard it and go to the next. This could happen because the 
table for random numbers is generated by sampling with replacement. 
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Table 5: Variable factors under consideration 
Variables Variable factor (F(%)] 
The lack of supportive Institutions F(1) 
Misallocation of Investments F(2) 
Lack of effective competition F(3) 
Inadequate maintenance F(4) 
Inconsistent billing strategy F(5) 
Inadequate cost recovery strategy F(6) 
Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill F(7) 
Lack of financial and managerial autonomy F(8) 
Corruption F(9) 
Lack of transparency and accountability F(10) 
Poor wages and remunerations F(11) 
High construction and equipment procurement cost F(12) 
Weather and difficult environmental terrain F(13) 
Inconsistent political, social and economic policies F(14) 
Insufficient funding for Infrastructure F(15) 
Hostile communal conflicts F(16) 
Too much pressure on existing infrastructure F(17) 
All of the above F(18) 
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Results using severity index in matrix order (SIMO) Model. 
Table 20 Severity matrix and actual ranking positions of factors for Nigeria 
f(1) 132.62 p(1) f(9) 256.88 
f(2) 236.06 p(2) f(2) 236.06 
f(3) 83.07 p(3) f(4) 194.38 
f(4) 194.38 p(4) f(10) 162.83 
f(5) 85.34 p(5) f(15) 142.62 
f(6) 78.25 p(6) f(1) 132.62 
f(7) 108.02 p(7) f(14) 120.60 
f(8) 92.92 p(8) f(7) 108.02 
f(9) 256.88 p(9) f(8) 92.92 
f(10) a 162.83 p(10) a f(5) ý 85.34 
f(11) 81.81 p(11) f(3) 83.07 
f(12) 67.66 p(12) f(11) 81.81 
f(13) 64.49 p(13) f(6) 78.25 
f(14) 120.60 p(14) f(12) 67.66 
f(15) 142.62 p(15) f(17) 67.51 
f(16) 42.97 p(16) f(13) 64.49 
f(17) 67.51 p(17) f(18) 63.71 
f(18) 63.71 p(18) f(16) 42.97 
p(1) 
p(2) 
p(3) 
p(4) 
p(5) 
p(6) 
p(7) 
p(8) 
p(9) 
P(ro) 
p(1 1) 
P(12) 
P(13) 
P(14) 
p(15) 
P(16) 
P(17) 
P(18) 
t. 
f(9)= corruption 
f(2)= misallocation of Investments 
f(4)=inadequate maintenance 
f(1 O)=lack of transparency and accountability 
f(1 S)= Insufficient funding for Infrastructure 
f(1)= Lack of supportive Institutions 
f(14)=inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
f(7)=lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
ýýýý=>=ý>=*=*, ==>=: >Demacation po/ntýýý=*. =*=*=*=*=* 
f(8)=lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
f(S)= Inconsistent billing strategy 
f(3)=lack of effective competition 
f(11)=poor wages and remunerations 
f(6)= Inadequate cost recovery 
f(12)=high construction and equipment procurement cost 
f(17)=too much pressure on existing Infrastructure 
f(13)sweather and difficult environmental terrain 
f(18)= all of the above 
f(16)=hostile communal conflicts 
s 
Thus: D1 = 5; and D3 = 14; h1 = 142.62 and h2 = 67.66 
:. Threshold value =105.14 
N. B. In applying equation (10) Variable factors In the matrix having magnitudes greater than 
or equal to the Threshold value are to be considered critical In policy formulation. 
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Table 21 severity matrix and actual ranking positions of factors for North-central 
Nigeria 
f(1) 10.77 p(1) f(9) 26.21 
f(2) 20.03 p(2) f(18) 22.94 
f(3) 5.22 p(3) f(4) 22.27 
f(4) 22.27 p(4) f(2) 20.03 
f(5) 11.59 p(5) f(15) 18.92 
f(6) 5.33 p(6) f(10) 18.82 
f(7) 9.17 p(7) f(16) 12.01 
f(8) 4.88 p(8) f(5) 11.59 
f(9) 26.21 p(9) f(14) 11.44 
1(10) 18.82 p(10) f(1) _ 10.77 
f(11) 7.00 p(11) f(13) 10.29 
f(12) 3.59 p(12) f(7) 9.17 
f(13) 10.29 p(13) f(11) 7.00 
f(14) 11.44 p(14) f(6) 5.33 
f(15) 18.92 p(15) f(3) 5.22 
f(16) 12.01 p(16) f(8) 4.88 
f(17) 3.05 p(17) f(12) 3.59 
1(18) 22.94 p(18) (17)J L 3.05 
p(1) 
P(2) 
p(3) 
p(4) 
P(5) 
p(6) 
P(M) 
p(8) 
p(9) 
P(10) 
P(11) 
p(12) 
P(13) 
P(14) 
P(15) 
P(16) 
P(17) 
f(9)= corruption 
f(18)s All of the above 
f(4)=Inadequate maintenance 
f(2)s Misallocation of investments 
f(15)s Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
f(1 0)s Lack of transparency and accountability 
=*=*=>Demacation polnt=: ý=*=*=*: *=>=:: ->: * 
f(16)5 Hostile communal conflicts 
f(5)= Inconsistent billing strategy 
f(1 4)n Inconsistent social, political and economic policies 
f(1)s Lack of supportive Institutions 
f(1 3)s Weather and difficult environmental terrain 
f(7)= Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
f(1 1)s Poor wages and remunerations 
f(6)= Inadequate cost recovery strategy 
f(3)a Lack of effective competition 
f(8)= Lack of financial and managerial authonomy 
f(1 2)a High contruction and equipment procurement cost 
f(1 7)s too much pressure on existing Infrastructure 
x 
Thus: D1 = 5; and D3 = 14; h1 = 18.92 and h2 = 5.33 
Threshold value =12.125 
N. B. In applying equation (10) Variable factors In the matrix having magnitudes greater than 
or equal to the Threshold value are to be considered critical In policy formulation. 
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Table 22 Severity matrix and actual ranking positions of factors for North-eastern 
Nigeria 
f(1) 15.42 p(1) f(9) 38.23 
f(2) 22.54 p(2) f(10) 25.14 
f(3) 13.97 p(3) f(4) 24.16 
f(4) 24.16 p(4) f(2) 22.54 
f(5) 13.93 p(5) f(15) 18.98 
f(6) 12.76 p(6) f(7) 17.15 
f(7) 17.15 p(7) f(11) 17.10 
f(8) 10.74 p(8) f(1) 15.42 
f(9) 38.23 p(9) f(3) 13.97 
1(10) _ 25.14 p(10) W f(5) 13.93 
f(11) 17.10 p(11) f(6) 12.76 
f(12) 10.42 p(12) f(14) 12.57 
f(13) 7.80 p(13) f (8) 10.74 
f(14) 12.57 p(14) f(12) 10.42 
f(15) 18.98 p(15) f(17) 8.04 
f(16) 4.30 p(16) f(13) 7.80 
f(17) 8.04 p(17) f(16) 4.30 
8). j L 4.00 p(18) 8)J L 4.00 
p(1) 
p(2) 
P(3) 
P(4) 
P(5) 
P(6) 
P(M) 
P(8) 
P(9) ' 
P(10) 
p(11) 
P(12) 
p(13) 
p(14) 
P(15) 
P(16) 
P(17) 
f(9)= corruption 
f(10)= Lack of transparency and accountability 
f(4)=Inadequate maintenance 
f(2)= Misallocation of Investments 
f(15)= Insufficient funding for Infrastructure 
f(7)= Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
f(1 1)s Poor wages and remunerations 
f(1)= Lack of supportive institutions 
ýý=ý, =ý=: ý=: >=: ý=ý=*=*Demacation polnt=>=*=>=: =-:,: *=*=*=ý 
f(3)= Lack of effective competition 
f(5)= Inconsistent billing strategy 
f(6)= Inadequate cost recovery 
f(14)= Inconsistent social, political and economic policies 
f(8)= Lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
f(12)= High construction and equipment procurement cost 
f(1 7)s Insufficient funding for Infrastructure 
f(13)= Weather and difficult environmental terrain 
f(16)= Hostile communal conflicts 
f(18)= All of the above 
Thus: b1 = 5; and D3 = 14; h1 = 18.98 and h2 = 10.42 
:. Threshold value =94.7 
N. B. In applying equation (10) Variable factors In the matrix having magnitudes greater than 
or equal to the Threshold value are to be considered critical In policy formulation. 
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Table 23 Severity matrix and actual ranking positions of factors for North-western 
f (1) 34.81 p(1) f (2) 50.81 
f(2) 50.81 p(2) f(4) 40.99 
f(3) 19.44 p(3) f(9) 38.75 
f(4) 40.99 p(4) f(1) 34.84 
f(5) 10.44 p(5) f(8) 27.12 
f(6) 14.15 p(6) f(13) 22.07 
f(7) 16.77 p(7) f(3) 19.44 
f(8) 27.12 p(8) f(10) 17.81 
f(9) 38.75 p(9) f(7) 16.77 
f(10) 17.81 p(10) f(6) 14.15 
f(11) 8.89 p(11) f(15) 13.83 
f(12) 8.99 p(12) f(18) 11.61 
f(13) 22.07 p(13) f(5) 10.44 
f(14) 9.77 p(14) f(14) 9.77 
f(15) 13.83 p(15) f(17) 9.04 
f(16) 4.74 p(16) f(12) 8.99 
f(17) 9.05 p(17) f(11) 8.89 
f(18) 11.61 p(18) 6)J L 4.74 
p(1) 
p(2) 
p(3) 
p(4) 
p(5) 
P(6) 
P(7) 
p(8) 
p(9) 
P(1O) 
P(l1) 
P(12) 
p(13) 
P(14) 
P(l5) 
P(ss) 
P(») 
s 
f(2)= Misallocationofinvestments 
f(4)= Lack of adequate maintenance 
f(9)e Corruption 
f(1)= Lack of supportive Institution 
f(8)= Lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
f(13)= Weather and difficult environmental terrain 
f(3)s Lack of effective competition 
f(10)= Lack of transparency and accountability 
f(7)s Lack of suitable technical and mangerlal skill 
f(6)a Inadequate cost recovery 
f(15)= Insufficient funding for Infrastructure 
f(18)= All of the above 
f(5)s Inconsistent billing strategy 
f(14)* Inconsistent social, political and economic policies 
f(17)= Too much pressure on existing lnfrastrucutre 
f(1 6)s High construction and equipment procurement cost 
f(16)= Poor wages and remunerations 
f(18)  Hostile communal conflicts 
Thus: 0, l = 5; and D3 = 14; h1 = 27.12 and h2 = 9.77 
:. Threshold value =18.45 
N. B. In applying equation (10) Variable factors in the matrix having magnitudes greater than 
or equal to the Threshold value are to be considered critical In policy formulation. 
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Table 24 Results severity matrix and actual ranking positions of factors for South- 
eastern Nigeria 
p(1) 
P(2) 
p(3) 
P(4) 
p(5) 
p(6) 
P(7) 
p(8) 
p(9) 
P(10) 
P(11) 
P(12) 
P(13) 
P(14) 
P(15) 
P(16) 
p(17) 
f(1) 8.03 p(1) f(9) 41.87' 
f(2) 30.86 p(2) f(2) 30.86 
f(3) 5.66 p(3) f(4) 29.87 
f(4) 29.87 p(4) f(14) 24.41 
f(5) 15.70 p(5) f(15) 24.07 
f(6) 5.51 p(6) f(10) 21.18 
f(7) 12.62 p(7) f(18) 20.94 
f(8) 12.61 p(8) f(5) 15.70 
f(9) 41.87 p(9) f(7) 12.62 
f(10) _ = 21.18 p(10) = f(8) _ 12.61 
f(11) 4.43 p(11) f(13) 12.27 
f(12) 5.71 p(12) f(1) 8.03 
f(13) 12.27 p(13) f(12) 5.71 
f(14) 24.41 p(14) f(3) 5.66 
f(15) 24.07 p(15) f(6) 5.51 
f(16) 4.85 p(16) f(16) 4.85 
f(17) 2.00 p(17) f (II) 4.43 
f (18) 20.94 p(18) f 7)J L 2.00 
i 
f(9)= corruption 
f(2)= Misallocation of Investments 
f(4)=Inadequate maintenance 
f(1 4)z Inconsistent social, political and economic policies 
f(15)= Insufficient funding for infrastructure 
f(1 O)= Lack of transparency and accountability 
f(1 8)a All of the above 
f(5)  Inconsistent billing strategy 
=ý-=>=:, =>=: >==>=: >=*=>=*Demacation point=*=>=: O=>=*=*=>=: ý=* 
f(7)= Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
f(8)= Lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
f(13)= Weather and difficult environmental terrain 
f(1)= Lack of supportive Institutions 
f(1 2)a High construction and egipment procurement cost 
f(3)a Lack of effective competition 
f(6)= Inadequate cost recovery 
f(16)5 Hostile communal conflicts 
f(1 1)s Poor wages and remunerations 
f(1 7)z Too much pressure on existing Infrastructure 
Thus: D1 = 5; and D3 = 14; h1 = 24.07 and h2 = 5.66 
:. Threshold value =14.87 
N. B. In applying equation (10) Variable factors In the matrix having magnitudes greater than 
or equal to the Threshold value are to be considered critical in policy formulation. 
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Table 25 Severity matrix and actual ranking positions of factors for South-south 
f(1) 44.22 p(1) f(2) 117.44 
f (2) 117.44 p(2) f (9) 69.04 
f(3) 24.62 p(3) f(4) 45.69 
f(4) 45.69 p(4) f(1) 44.22 
f(5) 21.28 p(5) f(10) 42.70 
f(6) 23.46 p(6) f(15) 36.05 
f(7) 32.20 p(7) f(11) 32.80 
f(8) 20.80 p(8) f(7) 32.20 
f(9) 69.04 p(9) f(14) 31.87 
f(10) _ 42.70 p(10) f(3) 24.67 
f(11) 32.80 p(11) f(6) 23.46 
f(12) 18.27 p(12) f(5) 21.28 
f(13) 13.39 p(13) f(8) 20.80 
f (14) 31.87 p(14) f(17) 18.60 
f(15) 36.05 p(15) f(12) 18.27 
f(16) 13.00 p(16) f(13) 13.39 
f(17) 18.60 p(17) f(16) 13.00 
f(18) 11.39 p(18) f(18) 11.39 
p(1) 
P(2) 
p(3) 
P(4) 
p(5) 
J. P(6) 
p(7) 
P(8) 
p(9) 
p(1O) 
p(11) 
P(12) 
5 p(13) 
p(14) 
P(15) 
P(16) 
p(17) 
p(18) 
f(2)= Misallocationofinvestments 
f(9)= Corruption 
f(4)alnadequate maintenance 
f(1)= Lack of supportive Institutions 
f(10)' Lack of transparency and accountability 
f(1 S)s Insufficient funding for Infrastructure 
f(11)= Poor wages and remunerations 
f(7)= Lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
f(14)= Inconsistent social, political and economic policies 
=*=*=:: -=*=*=*=*=:, ý=t. Demacation point 
f(3). Lack of effective competilton 
f(6)= Inadequate cost recovery 
f(S)m Inconsistent billing strategy 
f(S)= Lack of financial and mangerlal autonomy 
f(1 7)z Too much pressure on existing Infrastructure 
f(1 2)z High construction and equipment procurement cost 
f(1 3)a Weather and difficult environmental terrain 
f(16)= Hostile cummunal conflicts 
f(18). All of the above 
Thus: 01 = 5; and 03 = 14; h, 1 = 42.70 and h2 = 18.60 
Threshold value =30.68 
N. B. In applying equation (10) Variable factors In the matrix having magnitudes greater than 
or equal to the Threshold value are to be considered critical In policy formulation. 
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Table 26 Severity matrix and actual ranking positions of factors for South-western 
Nigeria 
f(1) 21.47 p(1) f(9) 
f(2) 20.70 p(2) f(4) 
f(3) 13.61 p(3) f(10) 
f(4) 35.97 p(4) f(15) 
f(5) 11.73 p(5) f(17) 
f(6) 14.71 p(6) f(7) 
f(7) 22.98 p(7) f(14) 
f(8) 13.26 p(8) f(1) 
f(9) 46.47 p(9) f(2) 
f(10) = 32.62 p(10) = f(12) 
f(11) 13.86 p(11) f(6) 
f(12) 18.06 p(12) f (ii) 
f(13) 4.03 p(13) f(3) 
f(14) 22.46 p(14) f(8) 
f(15) 28.81 p(15) f(5) 
f(16) 4.02 p(16) f(13) 
f(17) 23.40 p(17) f(16) 
8)j L 2.06 p(18) f(18) 
p(1) 
P(2) 
p(3) 
p(4) 
p(5) 
P(6) 
P(7) 
p(8) 
p(9) 
P(LO) 
P(11) 
P(12) 
p(13) 
P(14) 
P(15) 
P(16) 
P(17) 
  
= 
35.97 
32.62 
28.81 
23.40 
22.98 
22.46 
21.47 
20.70 
18.06 
14.71 
13.86 
13.61 
13.26 
11.73 
4.03 
4.02 
2.06 
f(9)= corruption 
f(4)=Inadequate maintenance 
f(10)=lack of transparency and accountability 
f(15)=insufficient funding for Infrastructure 
f(17)=too much pressure on existing Infrastructure 
f(7)=lack of suitable technical and managerial skill 
A(14) =Inconsistent political, social and economic policies 
f(1)=lack of supportive Institutions 
M)=misallocation of Investments 
ýýýýýý=: ý. =:, =>=: ýDemacation point=*=*ý=; ý=; >=>=: ->=*=* 
f(12)=high construction and equipment procurement cost 
f(6)=Inadequate cost recovery 
f(11)=poor wages and remunerations 
f(3)= lack of effective competition 
f(8)=lack of financial and managerial autonomy 
f(5)=Inconsistent billing strategy 
f(13)= weather and difficult environmental terrain 
f(16)=hostile communal conflicts 
f(18)=All of the above 
Thus: D1 = 5; and D3 = 14; h1 = 23.40 and h2 = 13.26 
r.. Threshold value =18.33 
N. B. In applying equation (10) Variable factors In the matrix having magnitudes greater than 
or equal to the Threshold value are to be considered critical in policy formulation. 
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